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Thesis Abstract
This thesis examines the role of religion— both liberal and
evangelical Protestantism— in the development of a feminist
political theory in America during the nineteenth century
and how that feminist theory in turn helped to transform
American liberalism.
Chapter 1 looks for the genesis of women's rights language,
not in the republican rhetoric of the Founding Fathers, but
in the teachings of liberal Protestantism and its links with
laissez-faire economic theory. The antebellum understanding
of rights is shown to have encompassed social and civil
rights alike, and to have arisen from a vision of the mutual
benefits that derived from the individual's duties within
the family and community.
Chapters 2 and 3 examine the development of liberal feminism
in the post-civil War period, focusing especially on the
thought of Elizabeth Cady Stanton. Stanton was a classic
liberal whose particular concern was with women's bodily
autonomy and with self-government as the basis for
citizenship. As a result of her efforts, it is argued,
debates about liberalizing divorce laws, marital abuse,
voluntary motherhood, and prostitution helped to widen the
definition of liberalism to include a new zone of privacy,
and to forge a consensus by the late-nineteenth century that
the liberal individual was autonomous in personal as well as
civil life, with rights extending to privacy of the body and
freedom from physical coercion even within the home.
Chapters 4 and 5 focus on the Woman's Christian Temperance
Union, evangelical feminists who made common cause with
progressive reformers in addressing the problems of
industrialization. The WCTU's vision of the maternal state,
it is contended, especially as developed in the thought of
its president Frances Willard, extrapolated the Christian
obligation to care for others to the state, conceived of as
a maternal and compassionate institution. The maternal
state thus foreshadowed the welfare state, though with a
vision of communal rights radically at odds with
liberalism's. The WCTU's religious philosophy both enabled
it to conceive of a welfare state and moved it to work
toward the establishment of a theocratic state that
contained the potential for the infringement of individual
liberties as well as the protection of economic interests.
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Introduction
To understand what significance "law" and "rights" had
for nineteenth-century female activists, we must interpret
their concepts of power and governance according to the
Protestant ethos which informed their world vision.

For as

women and reformers they fell into two categories of people
who were socially defined— and very often defined
themselves— in religious ways.

Historians have described

the feminization of religion and the spiritualization of
women's culture in the nineteenth century at some length.
Citing phenomena like the popular identification of women as
the pious sex; women's predominance in all areas of church
life except the ministry; and a greater emphasis on mercy
and love in place of the harsh doctrines of orthodox
theology, they have outlined an elaborate antebellum social
construction which characterizes the feminine element as
naturally spiritual, pure, and loving, a construction with
persuasive power even outside the middle classes where it
originated.
Scholars' judgments of the process of feminization have
ranged widely.

Ann Douglas, for example, finds nineteenth-

century spiritual forms cloying, sentimental, emasculating,
destructive of the tough fiber of republican virtue and

1
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Puritan theology; while Barbara Welter's article cites
purity and piety as critical components of an oppressive,
man-forged domestic ideal.1 Others have seen these
religious affiliations in a more positive light: religious
and moral questions constituted women's special preserve,
and allowed them to extend their authority outward to
encompass many charitable and benevolent activities, and
finally suffrage itself as a tool of moral guardianship,
greatly enhancing women's power in public life.2 For in
antebellum America, the concept of woman's spirituality had
tremendous clout in the public domain, and was widely
accepted by women themselves.

Although arguments about

woman's moral nature were often made in essentialist terms,
they were received in a culture where the construction of
womanly piety held sway, rather than representing a marginal
position.

In a society which still adhered strongly to the

forms of Christian faith, arguments from woman's moral

*Ann Douglas, The Feminization of American Culture (New
York, 1977); Barbara Welter, "The Feminization of Religion
in Nineteenth-Century America," in Clio's Consciousness
Raised: New Perspectives on the History of Women. Mary S .
Hartman and Lois W. Banner, eds. (New York, 1974).
2For an overview of the literature on the feminization
of religion, see Elizabeth B. Clark, "Women and Religion in
America, 1780-1870," in John F. Wilson, ed., Church and
State in America, vol. 1 (Westport, Conn., 1986), pp. 370374, 398-400.
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responsibility took on a deeply political nature.

Feminists

on one end of the spectrum and orthodox critics of woman
suffrage on the other disagreed violently over the
interpretation of woman's role, but in the antebellum years
moral discourse was still an accepted form of political
dialogue, although its influence was waning.
Although they eschewed orthodoxy, the advocates of
woman's rights were not secular beings who had risen above
some popular misbelief in the existence of God.

The

movement for women's emancipation, for women fully to
control and develop their own individual talents and beings,
was firmly tied to the widespread revolt within
Protestantism against Calvinist orthodoxy.

Freedom of the

will was a critical tenet for women convinced that they must
look to their own resources, work out their own salvation.
Like other contemporary reforms, woman's rights took much of
its philosophy and strength directly from the most
progressive religious teachings of the day.

Virtually all

of the early leaders— those who began the movement at Seneca
Falls— were raised with ties to some Christian group or
denomination, and many made a common journey over the course
of their lifetimes, not toward atheism or agnosticism, but
toward the vigorous reform wing of liberal Christianity.
The break with clerical authority seemed naturally to
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accompany innovative political action both emotionally and
intellectually, and many women experimented with
increasingly liberal creeds as they sought a better fit
between their sacred beliefs and their changing social
ideals.
For these women, Quakerism, Transcendentalism,
Unitarianism and Universalism, as well as the free church
movement, were influential in the development of ideals and
political creeds which underlay a lifetime's work.
Quakerism's inner light provided the theology, and Quaker
meeting the experience, of female equality: Blanche Glassman
Hersh found that of 51 feminist-abolitionists she studied,
15 were cradle Quakers, a disproportionately high number;
and the Society of Friends became the adopted religion of a
number of feminists, like Sarah and Angelina Grimke.3
Lucretia Mott, a figure of great authority in the Quaker
community, had a profound influence on the first generation
of rights advocates.
Cady Stanton owed

So fierce a priest-baiter as Elizabeth

a deep debt to Quakerism and the more

rationalist influence of Unitarians and Universalists for
the values of moral equality of the sexes, the worth of the
individual, and the imperative for his or her full

3Blanche Glassman Hersh, The Slavery of Sex: FeministAbolitionists in America (Urbana, 111., 1978).
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development as a human being, which underlay all of
Stanton's political work.4
Much of the power of radical Christianity within the
woman's movement can be traced to the movement's roots in
abolitionism.

In The Slavery of Sex. Hersh outlines the

many links between the two movements; their female
components were virtually interchangeable, for both activist
men and women tended to be involved in multiple sympathetic
reforms.

Arising largely out of the Garrisonian anti

slavery faction, known for its deep and radical if somewhat .
eccentric piety, abolitionist feminism embodied a sense of
divine mission, of a millennial movement called to cleanse
the social soul of impurities through conversion.

Hersh

depicts religion as female abolitionists' sun and shield:
though unorthodox, "their personal perfectionism and sense
of moral duty and calling sustained them through many
trials" {p. 33).

The practical experience of organizing,

writing, and the novelty of public speaking; the raising of
consciousness of their own circumstances through the fervent
rhetoric of bondage and freedom; and the great ideologies of
universal human rights, moral equality, and natural law were

4Maureen Fitzgerald, "Religion in the Life and Thought
of Elizabeth Cady Stanton," M.A. thesis, University of
Wisconsin, 1985.
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the gifts abolitionism imparted to feminism.
Another strain of religious influence, revivalism,
which represented a cultural mainstream far more than
liberal Protestantism did, also grounded women's efforts to
improve their status.

The Second Great Awakening,

spearheaded by Charles Finney, produced a cycle of revivals
which were particularly strong in the 1820s and 1830s, but
which continued to wax and wane throughout the century.
Though not of like mind with his liberal colleagues,
Finney's thrust was equally against Calvinist precepts of
predestination and human inability, ideas which withered
throughout the revival belt at the sound of his voice.

The

revivalist creed of "means," or human ability to prepare for
and perhaps initiate a salvific conversion experience, was
thoroughly in harmony with the social creed of the day as
well.

Reformers were galvanized by the doctrine of

perfectionism, or the potential perfectibility of human
beings, initially for the sake of salvation, but
increasingly for the sake of a purified society.
Alice Rossi in The Feminist Papers makes the
distinction between "Enlightenment feminists" and "Moral
Crusader feminists," and places virtually all mid-century
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woman's rights leaders in the latter category.5 As
exemplified by Stanton and Lucy Stone, she describes them as
native born, middle class, small town joiners and exhorters,
deeply influenced by the revival culture in which they grew
up.

For these women, a "bit of reform would not do": with

conversion as the model, the piecemeal change of political
life was unthinkable, because once truth was manifest,
change would follow as a natural consequence.

Perfectionism

underlay "the upward tending spirit of the age, busy in a
hundred forms of effort for the world's redemption from the
sins and sufferings which oppress it ..."*
The "hundred forms of effort" included charitable and
benevolent societies, temperance, abolitionism, woman's
rights, dress reform, spiritualism, health diets and water
cures, running the spectrum from the staid to the
outrageous.

The great early leaders of the woman's movement

were all raised on temperance, abolitionism, and other
charities and reforms.

Thomas Wentworth Higginson showed

the interconnectedness of reform when he reported a friend's
comment, "Not know the Briggs girls? I should think you

5Alice Rossi, The Feminist Papers (New York, 1974),
introduction to part 2.
‘"Call for the First National Convention for Woman's
Rights, Worcester, M a s s . . O c t o b e r , 1850" (n.p.. 1850), pp.
23-24.
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would certainly know them.

Work in the Globe Mills;

interested in all the reforms; bathe in cold water every
morning; one of 'em is a Grahamite."7 The bustling female
do-gooder often became a comic stereotype like Dickens' Mrs.
Pardiggle ("I am a School lady, I am a Visiting Lady, I am a
Reading Lady, I am on the local Linen Box committee, and
many general committees, and my canvassing along is very
extensive”), but this activity did not represent an isolated
women's politics.

Reformers saw themselves as attacking,

not piecemeal or isolated evils, but the varied symptoms of
a larger corruption.

Feminists were never without the

active support and participation of a number of leading male
reformers of the day— Henry Ward Beecher, William Lloyd
Garrison, Wendell Philips, Henry Blackwell, Parker
Pillsbury, and Thomas Wentworth Higginson, to name only a
few.

Woman's politics had its own special features, but it

also developed alongside of and dialectically with male
political theory in a way that this thesis will not do
justice to.

After the war, the reform community would come

to bitterness over the place of woman's rights in the reform
galaxy.

But despite some tensions, notably within

abolitionism, in the antebellum period many expressed a

7Thomas Wentworth Higginson, Cheerful Yesterdays (1899;
reprint, New York, 1968), p. 119.
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belief in common action moved by the "upward tending spirit
of the age."
Again, this spirit among reformers was the offspring of
liberal Christianity and the perfectionism of the revival.
Despite many reformers' divorce from the orthodox churches,
they sought holiness in their lives in a disciplined way
that went well beyond the norm: Higginson notes that his
friends were concerned at his entering Harvard Divinity
School, afraid he would become like another colleague who
"used to be a real come-outer, interested in all the
reforms; but now he smokes and swears and goes to church,
and is just like any other young man."*

The woman's

movement too contained these contradictions, so that it was
not unusual for the minutes of a convention to record days
of -vigorous diatribes against the established church ending
with the Doxology, sung to the tune of Old Hundred.

Women

activists were engaged in a search for a structure of church
and state which would embody their social and spiritual
values.

They were reenvisioning God as well as the state,

and often spoke of him as Allah, the First Cause, the
Eternal Searcher of Hearts— names signifying not just poetic
whimsey, but an attempt to find a divinity they could

'Higginson, Cheerful Yesterdays, p. 109.
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understand and respect.
Antoinette Brown Blackwell's is perhaps the most
telling story about the reconceptualization of religion
which accompanied and strengthened the quest for woman's
rights.

An early feminist, a seminarian from Oberlin, one

of the first ordained woman ministers in the country, she
was a woman of strong life-long faith.

But even her gentle

creed precipitated a crisis of faith during the first year
of her ministry, and she resigned in doubt and spiritual
anguish.

After a time, her faith was restored, but in a new

form, one which is emblematic of the liberal reformers'
stand: "My present religion is a free one; all its truths
are revelations from Nature's God to the soul; and one must
be outside all sectarian pressures to speak it freely."
Blackwell's emphasis on nature, the absence of the
restraint of formalized creed or institutional ties, is
common to feminist thought while at the same time expressing
the spiritual faith and longing which imbued the woman's
movement in the years before the war.

Women reformers did

not accept the god of orthodoxy, but their belief in
divinity and in transcendent natural laws was critical to
their political development.

God was a childhood familiar,

and though protean in nature he remained a fixed point for
many feminists, as he did for Henry C. Wright, the apostate
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abolitionist who explained his return to faith saying that
in his loneliness he had been unable to erase the idea of
God from his mind.
But if spirituality was a constant, organized religion
itself was changing rapidly.

In the transformation of

women's movements from benevolent and reform societies to
suffrage organizations in antebellum America, we see the
shift of political life away from local, social settings
toward organized politics at state and national levels.

The

personal, religious networks of the smaller community were
well adapted to the exercise of women's influence: their
status within the church and the social hierarchy were good
bases of power.

In towns where most transactions were face

to face, women successfully pursued reform programs and
influenced policy in their capacities as wives and
churchwomen.
But by the mid-nineteenth century these networks were
becoming seriously weakened by increased population, the
growth of cities, impersonal work relations, the growing
stratification of society— many of the effects of industrial
capitalism.

The Protestant Church's grip on public life had

also loosened, further eroding women's base of power.
widened franchise gave most men some opportunity to
participate in the newly important culture of electoral
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The

politics.

That option was foreclosed to women unless they

themselves created new channels of power, and it is in this
context that we must understand why the factions that
developed after the Civil War within the woman's movement,
although they worked for radically different social ends,
were both scrambling to get a foothold in public politics:
private politics no longer worked.*
This work will focus on two groups, one at either end
of the ideological spectrum of organized feminism: the
National Woman Suffrage Association (NWSA), a group
spearheaded by the brilliant feminist theorist Elizabeth
Cady Stanton; and the Woman's Christian Temperance Union
(WCTU), whose charismatic president Frances Willard
revolutionized its agenda.

The differences between the two

groups are striking, and are usually cast in contemporary
feminism's terms as the "equality-difference" conflict.

But

to force last century's struggles into this century's molds
distorts them, and tells us nothing about the historical
conditions under which such a split originated.

The

*See Paula Baker, "The Domestication of Politics: Women
and American Political Society, 1780-1920," American
Historical Review, vol. 89 no. 3 (1984), pp. 620-647; Judith
Wellman, "Women and Radical Reform in Upstate New York: A
Profile of Grassroots Female Abolitionists," in Clio Was a
Woman: Studies in the History of American Women. Mabel E.
Deutrich and Virginia C. Purdy, eds. (Ithaca, N.Y., 1980).
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assessment that one side believed in "equality" and the
other in "difference," in addition to being simplistic, is
the tip of the iceberg.

The NWSA was an elite corps of

educated women of liberal religious temperament and
affiliation, centered in the East, whose strategy was a
national one and whose strong suit was not grass roots
organization.

Most of its members had cut their political

teeth on abolitionism, and understood well the
constitutional remedies of Reconstruction.

The WCTU, by

contrast, was midwestern in origin with strength in the
west, populist in flavor, and brilliantly organized to
exploit the labors and loyalties of every woman in small
town America.

Its members were burghers' wives, not the

elite; not raised on abolitionism; and came largely from the
revivalist strain of Protestantism, belonging overwhelmingly
to evangelical denominations, Methodism in particular.
What is as striking as their divergence is that,
starting from such distant points, these two wings of the
woman's movement had a common agenda that went well beyond
their superficial agreement on suffrage: they shared the
close bond of a common enemy, Calvinist patriarchy, which
women reformers felt had pervaded public and private life
alike.

The death of theology and the minister's loss of

authority can certainly be separated from the decline of
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patriarchy and the father's waning discretion within the
home; but women on all points of the spectrum identified the
two as one phenomenon, one knotty problem in governance.
This is the study of two groups who constitute one
generation of women who came of age in Charles Finney's
America; they were engaged in the common rejection of
Calvinist patriarchy, but deeply split over the nature of
authority in a post-Calvinist world.
The answer to the familiar riddle "When is a patriarch
not a patriarch?" is, "When he's not home."

By strict

definition a patriarch is one who rules over children, and
incidentally over anyone else in the way; the father who
left the farm and went off to work every morning, whether to
a factory or to his office, gave up that power.

This left

households in the hands of mothers, who for the first time
became the Lockes, the Filmers, the Rousseaus of their
world.

Tales of family governance— now maternal governance

— from women reformers of the mid-nineteenth century carried
with them the seeds of new political theories.

And like

Locke, women reformers from both parties based their
political theories on their views of human nature.

Women's

power originated in the private sphere— initially in power
over children— and they became matriarchal in the sense that
their view of appropriate family relations became the model
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for social governance as well.
This was true for both members of the WCTU and of the
NWSA; but they were poles apart over what the appropriate
model of the family, and therefore of society, should be.
Many evangelicals showed themselves in their letters and
autobiographies to be strongly mother-identified; they
pushed for a heavily mother-dominated household which
translated into a maternal state that was both compassionate
and coercive.

Few liberals identified

with their mothers

in the same way in print, or subscribed to the idealization
of the mother; and again from autobiographical sources it is
possible to say that Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B.
Anthony, Lucy Stone, and other more liberal suffragists
either did not get: along well with either parent, or had
more respect for their fathers.

The liberal household, like

the liberal state, was short on care and coercion both.
To call someone a "liberal” today is to mean one of two
things: that they carry a card and care about civil rights,
or that they are advocates of the welfare state— two
positions that actually sit rather uneasily together.
Antebellum feminist theory sought to combine the two,
envisioning the use of rights for the full growth of the
individual but in the context of that person's duties and
obligations.

After the Civil War these two positions
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emerged as separate strands of political thought; rights to
further individual growth were set in opposition to rights
which assisted the individual and the community in the
context of a set of mutual obligations.

Both strains

contributed strongly to what we call liberalism today.
Nineteenth-century liberalism has sometimes been
described as a static compound of free-market and laissezfaire principles grounded in a pessimistic view of human
nature as self-interested.

But so barren a philosophy could

hardly have taken such a firm hold on the minds of
Americans.

Christian perfectionism and the optimistic

belief in self-government, free of human regulation but
under a larger system of laws, were tenets of the woman's
rights movement that dovetailed with prevailing economic
theory and helped to create a liberal ethic that nineteenthcentury Americans could understand and accept.

Woman's

rights advocates helped to transform liberalism over the
course of the century: Stanton and her followers worked to
construct a liberal defense of privacy and individual
autonomy based largely on freedom of conscience; while
Christian feminists deployed the Christian obligation to
personal charity to help lay the groundwork for an incipient
welfare state.

Both themes have become important components

of twentieth-century liberal theory.
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The volume of paper generated by these two well-staffed
organizations is tremendous, and the problem of what is
representative looms large.

I have chosen for the purposes

of this thesis to concentrate heavily on two figures,
Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Frances Willard; this method both
enhances the comparison between the two groups because the
source material is so rich and plentiful; and makes the
comparison suspect at some level.

Instead of opting to call

this thesis "Stanton and Willard: Two Feminist Theorists," I
have continued to see it as at least in part a

group

comparison; I have consulted the official papers of both
groups, and read widely in the letters and papers of the
women who worked with Stanton and Willard.

Both women's

views are often representative of the views of the rest of
the leadership (although not necessarily the rank and file,
especially in the case of the WCTU); are sometimes a taste
of the future, as both were more radical than the
mainstream, and were highly articulate and influential and
never let go; and occasionally both were well out of the
mainstream of their own followers, in which case I have
tried to indicate the split.
I like to see studying Stanton and Willard as studying
two sopranos in a municipal opera: they are out in front,
singing louder than anyone else, often but not always in
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tune with the chorus, and always heard.

In addition, the

comparison itself is fascinating; despite the difference in
their ages, both grew up resisting religious orthodoxy; went
on to become leaders of major woman's organizations; and
ended their lives as Fabian socialists.

What lay in between

is another story.
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Chapter I - Religion and Rights Consciousness
in the Antebellum Woman's Rights Movement
The meeting of feminists at Seneca Falls in July of
1848 marked the nominal beginning of the movement which in
the nineteenth century was labeled "woman's rights."

For us

that term has become commonly interchangeable with
"suffrage," and we often assume that "woman's rights"
describes a seventy-odd year campaign to gain civil and
political power and protection from a government which—
although it had perpetrated outrages against women and
blacks— had an unquestioned legitimacy as the guarantor and
enforcer of rights.
Historical interpretations of the woman's movement have
reaffirmed this picture, stressing the republican origins of
women's claims and their easy fit within the tradition of
American constitutionalism.

The movement's biographers have

placed feminists' arguments well within the secular
political tradition of the nineteenth century.

They have

treated "natural rights" as a form of "super-right"— more
emphatic, an appeal to historical tradition, but not
qualitatively different from constitutional claims— and
natural law language as formulaic fist shaking.1 Ellen

Eileen Kraditor takes this tack in The Ideas of the
Woman Suffrage Movement. 1890-1920 (New York, 1965).
19
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DuBois, the foremost historian of the movement's early
period, has stressed suffrage as the activists' most radical
and most mature demand, and the highest evolution of women's
political consciousness.

For DuBois, the quest for the

ballot reflected a rights consciousness rooted in the
*

secular, enlightened, liberal tradition of the American
Revolution.

She labels suffrage as the primary goal from

the beginning for the right-thinking portion of the movement
as represented by Elizabeth Cady Stanton and the National
Woman Suffrage Association (NWSA), and sees the more
conservative Woman's Christian Temperance Union's
endorsement of the vote in the 1880s as a measure of the
NWSA's success in setting a liberal agenda for the woman's
movement as a whole.2
Historians have overstated both the secular identity of
antebellum feminism and the centrality of suffrage to that
movement, emphasizing the roles of Elizabeth Cady Stanton
and Susan B. Anthony to the exclusion of scores of other
activists more representative of the movement's mainstream.

2See Ellen C. DuBois, Feminism and Suffrage: The
Emergence of an Independent Woman's Movement in America.
1848-1869 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1978); and "The Radicalism of Woman
Suffrage: Notes Toward the Reconstruction of
Nineteenth-Century Feminism," Feminist Studies, vol. 3 no. 3
(1975), pp. 63-71.
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The rather abstract language of rights used by the Founding
Fathers was common currency in America, and women drew on it
for help in fashioning their arguments and in making public
appeals.

But feminists did not don the Founders' philosophy

of rights as a perfectly fitting suit of mail.

Many were

initiated into organized feminism through the philosophies
of liberal Protestantism so prevalent in antebellum reform
thought.

The content of their rights thinking was informed

by a deeply religious sensibility which stressed the
interconnections between rights and responsibilities,
between civil and domestic relations, and between the
workings of the state and of the home.

Suffrage did not

automatically take pride of place in the panoply of rights
womea sought in the period before the Civil War, but stood
as one goal among many, and not the most important.
Further, rights consciousness was originally rooted in
domestic concerns for many women, who saw them as a means of
achieving protection for themselves and their families while
pursuing the ends of social justice.

Such an understanding

of rights was in full accord with the liberal Protestant
imperative for the full development of the individual and
his or her full participation in society.

The demand for

rights did not emerge theoretically full-blown from any
woman's head, but was born the usual way, amid a welter of
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personal and familial concerns.
Finally, although "equality" was the watchword of the
movement, in the antebellum period it referred largely to a
negative proposition; the removal of the false and
artificial restraints of woman's sphere, restraints which
prevented her full entry into public life.

"Equal" was not

"like," and although feminists ideally hoped that the
destruction of spheres could bring about the growth of
common sympathies between men and women, their attitudes
toward male culture were rooted in the genuine, material
differences in men's and women's lives which existed in
education, opportunity, political entitlement, and social
expectation in nineteenth-century America.

Although women

demanded equality, they also predicated their entry into the
political world on a moral sensibility which most saw as
uniquely feminine, and which served as the basis for their
political agenda and their theory of rights.

The Christian Understanding of Politics and Power
To understand what significance "law" and "rights" had
for mid-nineteenth-century female activists, we must
interpret their concepts of power and governance according
to the Protestant ethos which informed their world vision.
Within this Christian framework, the possession of power was
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construed in a peculiar and particular way.

Both

evangelical revivalists and Garrisonian abolitionists— two
groups which influenced budding feminist thought profoundly
— were suspicious of power and of its potential for
corruption in human hands, where it could so easily work
against God's designs.

The power of the husband, the

father, the slaveowner, the legislator, the judge— all were
potentially abusive, or abusive by the fact of their
existence, as intrusions between God and the individual.3
For many Christians, morality remained sharply antithetical
to concepts of power or human governance, an attitude which
in many respects early woman's rights advocates shared.4
Certainly in the 1850s the Christian ethos still shaped
women's apprehension of power relationships, and of what
kind of action they could most effectively undertake in the
world.

A case in point is Uncle Tom's Cabin: seeing the novel

3See Lewis Perry, Radical Abolitionism: Anarchy and the
Government of God in Anti-Slaverv Thought (Ithaca, N.Y.,
1973), esp. chap. 2.
4One of the grievances in the original Declaration of
Sentiments drawn up at Seneca Falls includes the claim, "He
has usurped the prerogative of Jehovah himself, claiming it
as his right to assign for her a sphere of action, when that
belongs to her conscience and to her God." See "Report of
the Woman's Rights Convention Held at Seneca Falls, New
York, July 19th and 20th, 1848" (1848; reprint, 1969)
(hereafter cited as "Seneca Falls"), p. 7.
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as nineteenth-century Americans did can show us the distance
between their political understandings and our own.

In

recent decades "Uncle Tom" has become a term of contempt.
The slave's loving but dignified submissiveness in the face
of brutality is seen as the behavior of a lackey, a cousin
of Steppin Fetchit.

This ahistorical reading ignores the

devout nineteenth-century evangelical culture which received
the book, where the power of docility and selfless love to
work conversion constituted a power far greater than any
political tool.

The tremendous public response to the novel

was not an acclamation of weakness but of strength from a
public for whom the conversion experience still represented
the greatest force for political or historical change.
Uncle Tom did not die moaning "Woe is me" but exclaiming
"I've got the victory!"

The success of the novel showed

that the "feminine" values of submissiveness, Christian
humility, prayer and love in the face of brutality
represented for many a type of power beyond the ballot or
the whip.5
The death of Uncle Tom— and "what majesty there is in a
Christian death"— struck an answering chord in the vision of
women as pious, submissive, workers of change through love

sJane Tompkins, "Sentimental Power: Uncle Tom's Cabin
and the Politics of Literary History," Glyph, vol. 8 (1981).
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and moral suasion.

The Lilv showed how women had to

struggle to come to terms with, incorporate, or overcome the
Christian model of submission.

For both temperance

activists and certain abolitionists, moral suasion was the
only godly and effective way to seek change, and women as
well were exhorted to work change through loving and
peaceful means.

The archetypal story of the weak

vanquishing the strong is introduced in the pages of the
Lilv, but in this case potential female Davids are advised
that in confronting Goliath, "we must arm ourselves with but
the simple sling of truth, and pebbles from the pool of
love."*

There is an element of self-sacrifice here: as Jane

Tompkins describes it, Little Eva's death signifies that
"the pure and powerless die to save the powerful and
corrupt, and thereby show themselves more powerful than
those they save."7
Well before the publication of Uncle Tom's Cabin, the
story of the dying child begging the sodden father to sign
the temperance pledge and stop his abusive ways was staple

*Lilv, vol. 1 no. 7, p. 52 (July, 1849).
7Tompkins, p. 128.
p. 94 (Dec. 1851).

See also the Lilv. vol. 3 no. 12,
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fare.*

Even when it was supplemented by more sophisticated

political analysis, the moral suasion model maintained a
great attraction for women; not just because it emphasized a
socially acceptable submissiveness, although there were
certainly cultural pressures on women to accept that role,
but also because it spoke to women's perceptions of
themselves as loving, and to their abhorrence of the culture
of male violence.

"The Moral Power of Woman" lauds the

levelling potential of forgiveness to defeat the cycle of
violence, suggesting that by a spiritual ranking women's
acts were as weighty as men's.

Another story relates with

high praise how Dorthea Dix once disarmed a highwayman with
compassion where her driver would have begun a bloodbath,
clearly setting out two models of

alternative dispute

resolution.9
Glory notwithstanding, Uncle Tom does die in the end, a
fact h.iKv‘ did not escape woman's rights advocates who were
beginning to ask,

"when smitten on one cheek, we are

commanded to turn the other also. Does anyone suppose that
this carries with it the authority to strike?" The Lilv

for

*For example in the Lilv, vol. 1 no. 10 (Oct. 1849),
"The Drunkard's Child;" and vol. 1 no. 7 (July, 1849).
9Lilv, vol. 1 no. 7, p. 53 (July, 1849); vol. 3 no. 6,
p. 43 (June, 1851).
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April of 1851 carried a story on the scourging of rumsellers
illustrated by a fable showing many women's ambivalence
about the use of direct power.

An old lady one day found a

frog in her tea kettle, who refused her polite request to
hop out.

"Well," she responded, "I shall not use force or

compel you to leave your quarters, but __ " she said,

putting the kettle on the fire, "I shall make you DREADFUL
UNCOMFORTABLE.10
Given the early woman's movement's understanding of
power— apprehension over its direct exercise, fear and
distrust of the institutions of government, seeing morality
and official power as antithetical, belief in change worked
from within rather than from without— it is difficult to
interpret the demand for woman's rights strictly within the
framework of secular liberal political theory.

Most

feminists were more pragmatic than the Garrisonians; they
lacked the wild, intense piety which prepared that group to
renounce all human organizations on the spot, including
their own, in favor of some form of mutual self-government
which their faith had not yet revealed.

Still, a strain of

anti-institutionalism was strong within feminism in the
antebellum years.

Women repeatedly resolved to "rely no

10Lily, vol. 3 no. 9 (Sept. 1851); vol. 3 no. 4, p. 29
(April, 1851).
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longer on organizations of any kind— upon neither national
or state, secret or public societies of any description ...
but to depend upon ... (our) own energetic, determined, and
individual effort for ... the final triumph of our glorious
principles"— hardly the stuff of legal positivism.11
The majority of feminists believed that legal and
political change— changes in statutes, court rulings, the
common law, interpretations of women's political rights—
were symptomatic, and could only reflect deeper change on
the level of public opinion worked by individuals coming to
a real understanding of natural laws.

Even Stanton,

certainly one of the best versed of the feminists in legal
matters and a fiery advocate of political measures, opined
that "(P)ublic sentiment is higher than laws— laws in
advance of the people are mere chaff."12 Most reformers

^Lilv. vol. 3 no. 3, p. 21 (March 1851).
^Lilv, vol. 1 no. 11, p. 86 (Nov. 1849); see also vol.
2 no. 1, p. 4 (Jan. 1850). At one national convention, Abby
Kelly Foster and Ernestine Rose came into direct conflict
over the question of whether laws shape people, or only
follow public opinion, as reported in "Proceedings of the
Woman's Rights Convention Held at Cleveland, Ohio...October
5th, 6th, and 7th, 1853" (1854) (hereafter cited as
"Cleveland"), pp. 81-82. Foster urged strongly that law was
a creature of public sentiment. Rose's counter-statement,
and her stance within the movement, are fascinating. A
Polish Jew who grew to intellectual maturity in the
free-thinking circles of enlightened Europe, Rose was
probably the only atheist among the early feminist leaders.
Much closer to the secular, European tradition which
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believed that reeducation of the moral sentiments was the
way to bring public opinion around, and that old laws could
not withstand new leanings: "The ballot box is not worth a
straw, until woman is ready to use it ... The moment that
woman is ready to go to the ballot box, there is not a
constitution that will stand in the country."13 Far from
looking to government for remedies and favors, there was a
strong emphasis on self-help and a belief that, by readying
themselves and their neighbors, activists could bring about
the desired transformation without seeking direct political
change or soliciting governmental intervention.14 Women
strove, not for new laws to reshape public life, but to
promote moral sentiments and their adoption by the whole
community.

Majoritarian democracy was not the standard of

judgment here.

The appeal was rather to communal consensus,

to the "honest judgment of every member of the community,"

produced feminists like Mary Wollstonecraft and Frances
Wright, Rose alone consistently denied any connection
between rights and duties or any particular feminine
qualifications for the franchise. She had the earliest and
most emphatic vision of law as a strong, positive force in
shaping human thinking and behavior. On the differences
between European and American feminism see Alice Rossi, The
Feminist Papers (New York, 1974), part 2.
“ "Cleveland," p. 168.
“Speech of Abby Kelly Foster in Woman's Rights
Commensurate with Her Capacities and Obligations: A Series
of Tracts (1853).
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and to that community's right to formulate and prosecute its
own laws according to its own communal mores, and so defend
itself from harm.15 Women judged progress, not by citizens'
begrudging acceptance of a law eked out through determined
assaults on the legislature, but by a reorientation of each
individual conscience toward God, and a consequent righting
of public opinion.
This vision is at odds with the positivist view of law
and government which plays an important part in our
conceptualization of rights.

Rights consciousness today

implies at least a mediating state power to protect against
encroachment, and usually looks to human government or a
constitution as the source and guarantor of rights.

Between

1848 and 1860, however, positive or positivist attitudes
were not a major feature of women's legal repertoire, which
held only a nascent recognition of the law's transformative
potential.

For the many who believed that divine and

natural laws ruled the world in intimate detail, human
legislation loomed small.

Stanton spoke for many when she

said admiringly of the New York abolitionist Gerrit Smith
that he went to the Bible for his policies, and to Christ

“Lily, vol. 3 no. 3, p. 21 (March 1851); vol. 1 no. 1,
p. 4 (Jan. 1849); vol. 2 no. 1, p. 5 (Jan. 1850); vol. 1 no.
8, p. 62 (Aug. 1849).
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for his social, moral, and political creed, "over the heads
of Popes, Cardinals and Bishops, Judges, Jurists ... writers
on law and jurisprudence __

(and) over all laws, common and

uncommon, codified and uncodified"— a fairly comprehensive
listing.16 The determined belief in law as a constitutive
or transformative force grew as women became politicized and
moved outward from the revival-style convention to
engagement with state and national legislatures.

But in the

early years, the shared wisdom was that law was a creature
of public sentiment, and any legal revision which did not
derive from an underlying shift in the common mindset had a
futile career ahead of it.
For most, a budding hope that law would provide them
redress or protection was seriously compromised by the
belief that the vision of law as external authority instead
of as self-government constituted the problem, and that
genuine reform would entail the erosion of government which
sought to coerce human behavior.

Feminists identified human

law with the "might makes right" fallacy, as Hannah Tracy
Cutler suggested in a letter to the Una in 1853.
Laws, among men, have been for the most part
either the enactments of despots who have
swayed by the physical force they commanded,
or else the concessions which despots have

16Lilv. vol. 4 no. 5, pp. 39-40 (May 1852) .
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reluctantly yielded to the counterbalancing
physical force of their unwilling subjects.
Hence it has been the exponent of what force
would yield to force, rather than the free
expression of the moral sentiments of a
people ... the old physical force law ...
still keeps women from an equal participation
in its primary relations, even after the
evangel of equal human rights has been
proclaimed.11
Women viewed the evolution of society as entailing the
ascendance of moral and mental over physical might, and the
consequent withering away of the state as an instrument of
control.

Divorced from law and legal processes as they

were, and with their understanding of the corrupt nature of
humanly held power, antebellum feminists were not simply
seeking inclusion in the revolutionary settlement, or in the
system as it stood.

When it came to law and governance,

their attitude is best expressed by the text they so
frequently quoted— "Behold, I make all things new."

Woman's Legal Culture and the Equality Problem
Feminists consistently pitted themselves against what
they perceived as a distinctly male culture of law and
politics in developing their critique of male institutions.

l7Una, vol. 1 no. 1, p. 14 (Feb. 1853) . For
biographical information about particular feminists
mentioned here see James, Edward T.; James, Janet Wilson;
and Boyer, Paul S ., eds., Notable American Women. 1607-1950:
A Biographical Dictionary (3 vols., Cambridge, Mass., 1971)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

33

Nevertheless, the

idea of a distinctive woman's politics or

legal culture has not received much play in the scholarship.
For some women's historians, the glory of the woman suffrage
movement lies in the assertion of equality, and in the
"philosophical tenet that women were essentially human and
only incidentally female" which helped women activists break
down a sexual differentiation that was tantamount to
inferiority and confinement.1* For many contemporary
feminists the acknowledgement or assertion of difference,
then or now, is deeply illiberal.

They can conceive of

women having full rights only in a system which treats men
and women as strictly fungible civil and legal
personalities.

Ellen DuBois has raised the quest for

suffrage and the claim of equality as the standard for the
nineteenth-century woman's movement as a whole, and
classifies anything else as a type of "domestic feminism,"
an inferior variety which mounted no challenge to the male
hierarchy.
radical.

Surely the claim to the vote was eye-openingly
But this assessment of the themes of equality and

difference as they came into play in the movement requires
dismissing a large part of what women said about their own
campaign and about themselves.

Many who agreed that they

“DuBois, Feminism and Suffrage, p. 36.
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were "essentially human" did not consider themselves to be
"only incidentally female," and entertained strong beliefs
in equality, likeness and dissimilarity, and a womanly
mission, simultaneously .1?
The claim of equality between men and women, a staple
of woman's rights rhetoric, contradicted deeply entrenched
social thought on gender roles.

Rarely has a society

postulated such elemental differences between men and women
as mid-nineteenth- century American society did.

Feminists'

assertion that women had the same souls, same moral duties,
same intellects and hopes as men opened the way to a more
fully integrated public sphere than was ever possible
before: we are still dining out on the capital of that
ideal.

The assertion of equality was a protest lodged

against discrimination in both law and custom, against
whatever rules or attitudes restrained women's natural
energies or kept them in a dwarfed or crippled state.

Women

believed that, "possessing common natures, common rights,
and a common destiny, society can never be harmoniously
organized until the individuality and equality of each one

1#Blanche Glassman Heish says of Stanton, Susan B.
Anthony, and Lucy Stone, "All three combined a belief in
woman's special moral and domestic responsibilities with a
vision of her obligations in the broader world." The Slavery
of Sex: Feminist-Abolitionlsts in America (Urbana, 111.,
1978), p. 80.
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is practically recognized."20
Equality was an ideal with political consequences, and
feminists used it in an attempt to break down formal
structures of restraint.

In the early years they envisioned

legal equality entailing the abolition of all laws which
weighed disproportionately on women.

After that, women's

unobstructed energy would surely bring them into full
parity.

But while the ideal of equality held great meaning

for women, it did not eradicate their understanding of their
social and familial roles and their larger interests as
being distinct from men's.

In twentieth century society,

where civil equality is held up as the highest stage of the
citizen's development, justice is blind to individual
characteristics, and the fungibility of the bearers is the
measure of rights.

This kind of equality— ignorant of

gender, race, role, duty, station— was initially
incomprehensible to most feminists.

Instead, they argued in

the name of equality for rights that would allow each to
fulfill her role and attain her highest individual destiny
decreed by God, whatever it might be.

An important degree

of difference was built into this idea of equality, which

2aLilv. vol. 2 no. 10, p. 73 (Oct. 1850); see also vol.
3 no. 5, p. 36 (May 1851); and "Proceedings of the Woman's
Rights Convention Held at Syracuse, Sept. 8th, 9th, and
10th, 1852 (1852) (hereafter cited as "Syracuse"), p. 31.
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did not "mean either identity or likeness ... of the two
sexes, but equivalence of dignity, necessity, and use;
admitting all differences and modifications which shall not
affect a just claim to equal liberty in development and
action. "21
The apprehension of their own special interests and
duties which imbued women's politics in the 1850s did create
some friction in the elaboration of women's political
empowerment.

The popular cultural idealization of woman's

superhuman goodness, her angelic nature, raised the hackles
of those who suspected men of packing women off to heaven
prematurely to limit their influence on earth.

Feminists

rejected the idea that they were "fine porcelain" to be laid
on the shelf, and insisted on their right to "mingle with
the rude stone jugs, mugs, and platters of humanized
crockery."22 One writer even ventured the opinion that, far
from moral superiority, woman's goodness resulted from a
lack of opportunity, and that when they had money and power
they would become competent swindlers and bribe-takers like

21Paulina Wright Davis, "On the Education of Females,"
tract no. 3 in Woman's Rights Commensurate with Her
Capacities.
22Lilv. vol. 3 no. 6, p. 46 (June 1851) .
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everyone else.”
But although they were prickly and resistant to what
they considered demeaning characterizations on the part of
men, women reformers had their own ideas of their goodness
and what role it would play in a reformed society.
have been extraordinary if they hadn't.

It would

Revivalism, liberal

Protestantism, romanticism, reform— all tended toward an
identification of femininity with morality, spirituality,
and self awareness as a potent political force capable of
containing the male tyranny of corruption and greed.

Women

may have claimed that they were equal to men, but not that
they were like; and likeness could not be established by
assertion, but only by a different kind of living together,
a recognition of "mutual dependence, and separate fountains
of reciprocal life."24
The utopian dream was the eventual blending of natures,
so that "there will be but one code of morals, and of taste.
Women will acquire the energy and self reliance of man, and
man will emulate the purity and religious sincerity of

”Una, vol. 1 no. 5, p. 72 (June 1853); see also Una,
vol. 1 no. 1, p. 11 (Feb. 1853); vol. 1 no. 4, p. 72-73 (May
1853); Lily, vol. 3 no. 6, p. 46 (June 1851).
“ "Syracuse," p. 60.
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woman.”25 In their vision of a "better Eden," men and women
would grow more alike over time, taking on each other's
qualities, thereby eradicating the oppressive imbalance
which deformed contemporary government, and making communal
self-government a reality.2* The result would mean
narrowing the gap between men and women, allowing their like
moral natures to eradicate the harmful differences of
temperament and culture.

Women often quoted a stanza of

Tennyson to that effect:

"The woman's cause is man's: they

rise or sink/Together, dwarfed or god-like, bond or free./
... The woman is not underdeveloped man/But diverse./Yet in
the long years, liker they must grow;/The man be more or
woman, she of man ,.."27
Pleasant as this idyll was, in envisioning a political
future women saw themselves endowing men with their own
traits far more often than they saw themselves taking on the
traits of men.

In the years before the Civil War, woman's

rights activists were inspired by a sense of equality; but

“ "Cleveland," p. 52; see also Elizabeth Oakes Smith,
Woman and Her Needs (1851; reprint, New York, 1974), passim.
2*Hersh, Slavery of Sex, p. 139, suggests that the
conception of interdependence is a tenet of Universalism.
“ "Report of the Woman's Rights Meeting at Mercantile
Hall, Boston, May 27, 1859" (1859) (hereafter cited as
"Boston"), p. 9.
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they were also motivated by a discontent with the existing
order which fell out along gender lines, and emphasized the
differences, both natural and cultural, between the sexes.
When arguments for woman's rights came largely from
abolitionism, equality was a natural focus.

But as women,

unlike slaves, developed their own well articulated
positions, they began to enumerate their grievances with
male management.2* The belief in woman's moral mission to
clean up politics and society was not interjected into the
woman's movement by the entrance of the Woman's Christian
Temperance Union into the suffrage movement in the late
1870s and the 1880s, as Ellen DuBois has suggested.29
Rather, it was a position to which many women openly or
tacitly adhered from the movement's beginnings.

Difference

was both the agent of change in this scheme, and the problem
to be overcome.

Woman's rights workers expected the

integration of masculine and feminine to bring particularly
beneficial results in the public realm, often picturing

“Barbara L. Epstein in The Politics of Domesticity:
Women. Evangelism, and Temperance in Nineteenth-Centurv
America (Middletown, Conn., 1981), sees women's religious
culture as a vehicle for antagonism between the sexes,
picturing religion more as a tool to express generalized
gender antagonism than as a system of belief which
interpreted and fostered political change.
29"The Radicalism of Woman Suffrage," pp. 68-69.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

40

themselves in the role of redeemer, as when a correspondent
to the national convention in Cleveland suggested that "the
eye of the law is diseased, and women must ... make that eye
pure and single sighted."30 Even the egalitarian Stanton
recommended the "feminine element in humanity" to "save man
from the bondage of his animal nature— the slavery of his
own low appetites."3l Women had little doubt that they
would perform the duties of office better than men, firmly
opposing poverty, intemperance, and their social roots, and
promoting "all just and beneficent purposes."32
Nor does the movement's moral consciousness necessarily
suggest that it was politically immature, insular, or
domestic in its focus.

If anything, it suggests broader

concerns, a fuller life within the reform community, than
was true of suffragism after the war, when narrower legal
and political concerns took precedence.

Many of the pacific

dictates of liberal Christianity— "feminine submissiveness"“were known in another guise as politically oppositional
stands taken by reformers convinced that problems like

“ "Cleveland," p. 8.
31In "The Pleasures of Age: An Address Delivered by
Elizabeth Cady Stanton on Her Seventieth Birthday" (1885);
see also Lilv. vol. 4 no. 5, p. 40 (May 1850); vol. 2 no. 4,
p. 29 (April 1850).
“ "Cleveland," p. 30, p. 91; "Syracuse," p. 63.
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slavery and territorial aggression would diminish under
their rule.33 Calls to non-violence and reason in place of
force were grounded in a Christian tradition, but served in
the antebellum years as a potent charge against the
government which perpetrated such crimes.

By adding the

feminine to the masculine element, women were rejecting the
political sphere men were carving out for themselves, one
seemingly cut loose from the constraints of traditional
moral principles of governance.

The absence of either

element would bring "results fatal both to justice and
morality.

The civil and political departments are fair

illustrations of these results."34 Above all, women
manifested a wish to substitute the principles of
noncoercion, nonviolence, and consensual government for the
Hobbesian arrangements of the day.
Politics and statesmanship, still resting so
much upon the force of armament, must come
under the jurisdiction of simple justice,
give up the employment of physical force, and
rise to a sphere of mind and feeling fit for
woman's administration ... the policy of
government, now so intricate, so dark a
contexture of fraud and force that the worst'

33Una, vol. 1 no. 3, pp. 37, 41 (April 1853);
"Cleveland," p. 92.
34"Syracuse," p. 22. See also "Proceedings of the
Seventh National Woman's Rights Convention Held in New York
City...Nov. 25th and 26th, 1856" (1856) (hereafter cited as
"New York"), p. 23.
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men are its best ministers, will be redeemed
and reformed, so that the acknowledged
excellence of feminine morality and woman's
directness and clearness of intellect, will
be the highest qualification for national
government.35
Women activists vigorously disputed their critics'
charges that they were being unsexed through their political
activities, and affirmed their own femininity and security
in their roles as wives and mothers.

No one rebutted those

charges more effectively than Frances Gage when she
complained,
They (men) cannot get up a picture of a
woman's rights meeting ... but they must put
cigars and pipes in our mouths, make us sit
cross-legged, or hoist our feet above their
legitimate positions— making us behave as
nearly as possible as disgustingly and
unbecomingly as themselves ... They have ...
so long associated their vulgar thoughts and
feelings with constitutional rights and
privileges, that they seem to think them
inseparable .. .3‘
Gage in her pithy way put her finger on a thread which runs
consistently through women's concerns in this period—
resentment and dislike of male political culture, from which
women were so excluded.

Stanton, in a letter to the

Syracuse Convention, castigates men who, "having separated
themselves from women, in the business of life, and thus

”Una, vol. 1 no. 3, p. 41 (April 1853).
“Lily, vol. 4 no. 2, p. 14 (Feb. 1852).
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made their natures coarse by contact with their own sex
exclusively, now demand separate pleasures too; and in lieu
of the cheerful family circle ... they congregate in clubs
to discuss politics, to gamble, drink, etc . .,"3’’ Stanton
often spoke of a lyceum lecture she longed to write on "The
Antagonism of the Sexes."3' Male opponents of the woman's
franchise often argued that polling places were too rough
for women; feminists deplored this self-confessed pollution
of civic functions, finding man in his role as political
animal repugnant, whether as lawyer, judge, voter, or
clubman.3'
This attitude translated into often made claims that
male legislators could not represent women adequately, not
because they would not, but because the difference in their
natures and interests meant that men were not capable of
such representation.

Ernestine Rose argued cleverly that,

if man's nature was different, he could not understand
woman's needs sufficiently to make laws for her; and if the
same, there was no reason to exclude women from full

J1wSyracuse," p. 32; see also "Cleveland," p. 38.
3>Lilv, vol. 3 no. 11, p. 82 (Nov. 1851); see also
letters of Sept. 1, 1817, and Dec. 15, 1886, Stanton Papers,
Douglass College Library, Rutgers University.
“ "Syracuse," p. 73.
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political participation.40 Cool argumentation aside, even
Stanton clearly felt the outrage and slight when she asked,
"Shall the most sacred relations of life be called up and
rudely scanned by men who, by their own admission, are so
coarse that women cannot meet them even at the polls without
contamination? ... How can man enter into the feelings of
(a) mother?

Shall laws which come from the logical

brains of man take cognizance of the violence done to the
moral and affectional natures which predominate, as it is
said, in woman?"41
Antoinette Brown Blackwell tended toward essentialist
rather than cultural explanations of men's and women's
differences, but her conclusion was the same: "The law is
wholly masculine: it is created by our type or class of man
nature.

The framers of all legal compacts are thus

restricted to the ... thoughts, feelings, biases of men ...
we can be represented only by our peers."4* The insult of
being bound by masculine law was compounded by "the
shamefulness of trying intelligent, educated, well-bred

“ "Cleveland," p. 36; see also Lilv, vol. 2 no. 5, p.
38 (May 1850).
“Elizabeth Cady Stanton, "Address to the Legislature
of New York, Adopted by the State Woman's Rights Convention,
Held at Albany...Feb.14 and 15, 1854" (Albany, 1854), p. 7.
“ "Syracuse," pp. 20-21.
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native born American women by juries of men made up of the
riffraff from the monarchies of the old world."4* Women
were sure that if they served on juries they would be very
lenient with woman defendants, perhaps under the tutelage of
woman lawyers who would either suggest more liberal
interpretations of the law, or a whole new code of laws to
replace those that currently disgraced the statute books.44
It was this dangerous isolation of the masculine from
the feminine which feminists hoped to remedy, feeling that
"so long as woman is required to take care of the morals of
the community and men to take charge of the politics, having
... separate interests in these two great matters, we shall
have a strange and incongruous state of things."4*
Traditional networks of women's influence— local, personal,
religious networks which operated through churches,
voluntary organizations, and familial
strong in pre-industrial America.

contacts— had b^en

Through these networks

women had wielded social influence disproportionate to their

4*Stanton, letter to Susan B. Anthony and Matilda
Joslyn Gage, 1873, in the Stanton Papers, Douglass College
Library, Rutgers University. See also Lilv. vol. 2 no. 5, p.
38 (May 1850).
44Una, vol. 1 no. 4, p. 63 (May 1853); "Syracuse," p.
77.
45Una, vol. 1 no. 1, p. 14 (Feb. 1853).
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formal standing.

But the growing cult of electoral

politics— male politics— and the shifting of power away from
the local to more centralized levels, undermined women's
leverage in the community.46 The early feminist agenda is
remarkable, not because it tried to vault women from the
private into the public arena leaving the wall intact, as
scholars have suggested, but because it sought to eradicate
spheres entirely, and with them the growing and dangerous
split between public governance and private morality.
a distinction made little sense to women reformers.

Such
Rather,

through the interdependence of the sexes they hoped to
integrate public with private, legal with moral, in a common
standard of universal governance.

Women's denigration of

male political life for its insularity and its brutishness
betrays both resentment and understanding of the dangers
which the isolation of politics posed for women, a politics
conducted outside their scope of influence.

460n this general topic, see Judith Wellman, "Women and
Radical Reform in Upstate New York: A Profile of Grassroots
Female Abolitionists,” in Clio Was a Woman: Studies in the
History of American Women, ed. Mabel E. Deutrich and
Virginia C. Purdy (Ithaca, N.Y., 1980); Nancy Hewitt,
Women's Activism and Social Change: Rochester. New York.
1822-1872 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1984); and Paula Baker, "The
Domestication of Politics: Women and American Political
Society, 1780-1920," American Historical Review, vol. 89 no.
3 (1984), pp. 620-647.
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Law. Nature. and Rights
Feminism also evolved an articulate critique of the
exclusive legal world, criticism informed by moral and
religious concerns.

Distaste for the profession of

lawyering was rife in larger reform circles, as well; the
Boston reformer Thomas Wentworth Higginson reported in
Cheerful Yesterdays that, under the influence of "the
Newness," there was a Wwave of that desire for a freer and
more ideal life which made (William Wetmore) Story turn
aside from his father's profession to sculpture, and made
(James Russell) Lowell forsake law after his first client."
Higginson himself abdicated a legal course, emboldened by
friends who characterized law as a "system of formalized
injustice" and a branch of "knowledge that cannot be carried
into any other stage of existence."41

"The Newness" did not

bring women the immediate privilege of renouncing a career
in law in favor of one in sculpture.

In fact, it was often

urged at conventions and in periodicals that women take up
the profession, both to protect their own interests and to
reform the field.

At the same time, the legal system came

in for a constant barrage of criticism from feminists who
occasionally took gratuitous swipes at other professions,

47Thomas Wentworth Higginson, Cheerful Yesterdays
(1899; reprint, 1968), pp. 78, 87.
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but reserved their most biting criticisms for clerics and
lawyers.
The Lilv. in particular, hosted a string of female
correspondents with a distinctly gender-based legal
critique, an editorial policy which drew fire from some.**
Indeed, at times it seems in reading the Lilv that each of
its 6,000 subscribers had contributed her mite against the
"chicken hearted ministers of justice."49 As in most law
reform movements, corruption was often alleged against
lawmakers, but it was corruption of a particular kind.
Bribery was occasionally charged in the Lilv. and the
economic interests of legislators involved in the sale or
manufacture of liquor was seen as creating conflict of
interest problems.”

More often, though, women depicted

lawyers and judges as morally and spiritually corrupt,
"winebibbers" with "bullet heads and red faces," "vulgar,
rum-drinking ... tobacco chewing men, thick lipped
voluptuaries, gourmands and licentiates who disgrace our
national councils with their grossness and profanity ...
who, instead of sound reason and strong argument, resort to

4*D.C. Bloomer, Life and Writings of Amelia Bloomer
(1895; reprint, New York, 1975), p. 155.
49Lily, vol. 1 no. 7, p. 55 (July 1849).
50Lily, vol. 3 no. 4, p. 29 (April 1851).
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fisticuffs and ... duelling."”

As they did with the

church, women reformers castigated law as a human corruption
of a divine institution.

Law, however, represented a

particularly egregious instance of male corruption.

The

drinking, swearing legislator who would rather resort to
brute force than „ogic and reason was pictured as a
throwback to a less advanced stage of civilization, and as
the opposite of the "Christian Gentleman" who was many
reformers' and evangelicals' manly ideal.”

Wily, dissolute

lawyers figured prominently in short pieces of fiction which
also filled the pages of women's papers.

Readers could

hardly fail to see the moral in stories like that about the
wife of a "half-educated Attorney at Law, a thoroughbred
contemnor of the laws of God," who brings his family to an
unhappy and impoverished end.”
Women revealed the level of frustration and outrage
they felt with male legislators in many ways, proclaiming
"let man cease to persuade woman by his sophistry and logic,
or compel her by his cruel and unnatural statutes to act in

”Lilyf vol. 4 no 5, p. 39 (May 1852); see also vol. 2
no. 2, p. 13 (Feb. 1850).
“See Charles E. Rosenberg, "Sexuality, Class, and Role
in Nineteenth-Century America," in American Quarterly, vol
25 no. 2, pp. 131-153 (1973).
”Lilv, vol. 2 no. 6, p. 44 (June 1850).
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violation of her will and conscience ... "M

Law had placed

women in an intolerable position and created a catch-22 of
tragic proportions by refusing the legal right of divorce,
while refusing at the same time legal protection of maternal
rights, property, and earnings for wives of drunkards and
insolvents; "woman cannot obey nature's first law of
self-preservation without violating man's (laws)," a fact
which inspired "indignation and hatred of our laws and
law-makers."5S Elizabeth Cady Stanton was fond of saying
that law gave women such protection as "the wolf the lamb,
or the eagle the dove."56
At least on paper, the Lilv encouraged women in acts of
self-help like the burning or trashing of their husbands'
haunts, and congratulated one unusual woman on horsewhipping
the barkeeper, citing it as a justifiable act of
self-defense.57 Abolitionists' manifestoes on human rights
and natural law had laid a strong groundwork for a critique
of human laws like those enabling slavery and rumselling as

5<L_ily,

vol. 4 no.

55Lily, vol. 1 no.
pp. 13,15 (Feb. 1850).
“Lilv,

vol. 2 no.

i7Lilv, vol. 4 no.
pp. 61-62 (July 1849).

7,p. 58 (June 1852) .
6,p. 46 (June 1849);vol.2 no. 2,
10, p. 73 (Oct. 1850).
9,p. 77 (Sept. 1852);vol. 1 no. 8,
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counter to the laws of God and Nature.5' The Lilv's
correspondents boldly and repeatedly urged women to ignore
the law's shabby cloak of legitimacy, and act according to
higher right: "Resistance to tyranny is obedience to God ...
if the vampyres of the law will continue to suck the life
blood of their fellow men and spread destruction and death
all around them, then let women step boldly forward and take
matters into their own hands.1,59 The question of damage to
taverns was dismissed with the argument that a tavern
"ceases to be property when it is employed to destroy the
people. "SB
Again, in the antebellum years women were brought to
this pitch not as much by high-minded notions of equality as
by a vivid apprehension of their wrongs.
of alcohol took on great significance.

Here the problem
In licensing the

liquor trade legislators were acting, not just to withhold
rights, but to commit clear wrongs, with grave consequences

“For example, William Hosmer, The Higher Law in Its
Relations to Civil Government (1852; reprint, New York,
1969); and Elisha P. Hurlbut, Essavs on Human Rights and
Their Political Guarantees (New York, 1845). Feminists
reproduced such arguments about the inefficacy of human laws
against divine ones; see Lilv. vol. 2 no. 4, p. 30 (April
1850).
“Lily, vol. 4 no. 9, pp. 77-78 (Sept. 1852).
“Lily, vol. 4 no. 7, p. 59 (July 1852).
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for women.

Woman's righters were uniformly temperance

advocates as well, and felt that it was in permitting the
sale of alcohol that government truly showed itself to be
morally deformed.

They castigated the rumseller, and begged

him to "stop your unholy work.

Tell us not that you have a

license, and certificate of good moral character (from the
legislature) to justify your deeds ... What will your
license avail you against the curse of your God? Is man
greater than his maker?

Shall he set the laws of the

Almighty at defiance? Your license cannot shield you from
guilt."61
Far guiltier than the rumseller, though, was the law,
which "threw its arms around him who was causing the ruin
... (with) legalized poison."”

The pages of the Lilv in

these years entertained a lively debate over the comparative
guilt of the legislator and the rumseller, who is described
as the lawmaker's "agent"— a word used here with satanic
rather than corporate overtones.

For the misguided agent,

some women initially entertained fond hope of reform— "Much
rather would we take you by the hand, and greet you as

61Lilv. vol. 1 no. 1, p. 5 (Jan. 1849).
*Lilv. vol. 1 no. 7, p. 61 (July 1849).
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friends and brothers, in the great cause of humanity."“
But legislators received no quarter.

In the best Protestant

tradition the humble were guilty, but the "people ... of
wealth and standing in society" were guiltier still.44
Women agitated for the repeal of licensing laws, not because
they believed that any law could make the sale of liquor
legal— it could not— but because removing that shield would
publicly brand liquor traders for what they were, "immoral
law breakers and law defyers."45 Many of these writers felt
that they should "challenge our legislators to an account of
their stewardship," and they looked forward, not with
sorrow, to the day when legislators must appear "at a
greater tribunal ... where they must answer for many crimes
committed, for much blood shed, and for many lives
destroyed."44
Women reformers in this period judged what they
perceived as male law by a higher standard, and found it
wanting.

They could see little difference between "the

guilt of killing a man by arsenic or alcohol,

or between

“Lily,
vol. 1 no. 1, p. 5 (Jan. 1849); vol. 2 no. 1,
p. 4 (Jan. 1850).
“Lily,

vol. 1 no. 2, p. 14 (Feb. 1849).

“Lily,

vol. 2 no. 6, p. 45 (June 1850).

“"Syracuse," p. 17; Lilv. vol. 1 no. 9, p. 70 (Sept.
1849) .
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stealing his property by first stealing his reason, or
breaking into his house at midnight, and carrying it off
when the owner is in peaceful slumber."

As one woman

declared, "God did not say, 'Thou shalt not kill with a
pistol.'"67

In the one case, the law would punish the

slayer; in the other it protected him, at the expense of the
wives and children of drunkards.

A great deal of time and

energy went into redefining crimes, and comparing various
statutory crimes to those of the rumseller.

Was the

highwayman who pulled the trigger guiltier than the one who
held the horses?

Were either more guilty than the man who

sold drink to an alcoholic?**
A deeply Christian conception of moral consequences
underlay this assessment of man's law.

Women saw that with

liquor, legislators were concerned, not with preventing or
punishing wrong, but with limiting liability.

They felt

strongly that legal doctrines of causation and the treatment
of the liquor trade as an issue of economic regulation only
obscured the nature of the transaction.

Moral consequences

could not be rightly limited by legal doctrine.

"We touch

<7Lilv. vol. 2 no. 6, p. 45 (June 1850); vol. 1 no. 11,
p. 85 (Nov. 1849).
**Lilv, vol. 2 no. 2, p. 15 (Feb. 1850); vol. 1 no. 5,
pp. 37-38 (May 1849); vol. 2 no. 6, p. 45 (June 1850).
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not a wire but vibrates in eternity ... we see not in this
life the end of human actions.

The influence

reverberates."*9 This was as true for evil as for good, and
for the Lilv's writers it was impossible not to see the
misfortunes of many homeless, abused, hungry women and
children

pouring straight from the rumseller's bottle in a

chain of accountability which no legal sanction could
interrupt.

For "sin perpetuates itself forever.

Like the

ocean ripple, its influence is beyond all calculation ..."
No amount of legal hair-splitting could excuse men from
their Christian duty, nor protect them on the day when "God
will call upon them to answer, 'WHERE IS THY

BROTHER?'"70

This sense of woman's wrongs at the hands of the
intemperate was extremely fertile ground for rights
consciousness, as women felt an increasing duty to protect
themselves, each other, and their children from man's
depredations on their persons and property.

Those who

invoke "rights" usually endow them with transcendental
qualities, but "rights" itself is not an ahistorical concept
with constant meaning over time.

Rather, it denotes a set

of values or demands used in a particular political context

"Lily, vol. 1 no. 2, p. 15 (Feb. 1849).
7BLily, vol. 2 no. 7, p. 51 (July 1850); vol. 1 no. 11,
p. 86 (Nov. 1849).
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which gives them meaning.

Antebellum feminists seized the

language of rights and transformed it with their own ideas
and concerns.

This does not mean that women rejected the

republican ideals of the founding generation.

Revolutionary

rhetoric, the enlightenment vision of inalienable human
rights, was a critical tool in helping women to envision a
new status, and express their demands to a male public.

But

the language women spoke among themselves appealed to a
larger sensibility.
A telling instance of this discrepancy occurred at a
woman's rights meeting in Ohio which was held in 1850 for
the purpose of influencing the work of that state's upcoming
constitutional convention.

The official "Memorial" written

to be presented to the men's convention began, "(W)e believe
the whole theory of the common law in relation to woman is
unjust and degrading, tending to reduce her to a level with
the slave, depriving her of political existence, and forming
a positive exception to the great doctrine of equality as
set forth in the Declaration of Independence."

Citing the

need for freedom and equality, for protection of maternal
interests and property rights by the government, it is a
businesslike appeal to republican sentiments, in which each
mention of rights is specifically qualified as "political
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and legal"— protection of property, custodial privileges,
and the vote.

The "Memorial" contains no broad enumeration

of personal or economic entitlements, and is devoid of any
hint of rights as divinely derived, or any religious
language.
By contrast, the corresponding "Address to the Women of
Ohio" passed by the woman's rights meeting on the same issue
opens with the sweeping assertion that "How the people be
made wiser, better, and happier is one of the grand
inquiries of the present age."71 The "Address" exalts the
role of God above that of the legislature in the creation
and definition of rights.

Dismissing the "cold sympathy and

tardy efforts" of the "dough-faced serviles" in the
legislature, the address is a paean to the "Rights of
Humanity *.. What is their design?

How do we know them?

They are of God ... their design is happiness."

In the

"Memorial" woman's entitlement is predicated on "the great
doctrine of Equality as set forth in the Declaration of
Independence," without elaboration.

In the "Address" by

contrast a broad range of rights are cast as directly
contingent on the discharge of responsibilities, enabling

71Both of these documents are to be found in the
History of Woman Suffrage* ed. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan
B. Anthony, and Matilda Joslyn Gage, vol. 1 (1881), pp.
105-110.
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individuals to "attain the end for which God the Father gave
them existence."

Ohio feminists urged women to seek not

just political rights but education and occupation as well
— "The full exercise of the heavenly graces ..."

The fact

that the business of women's rights was carried out in two
distinct languages signifies that women themselves
identified their values and politics as in some way separate
from men's.
This adjustment of language to audience crops up
repeatedly, and illustrates women's complex relationship to
the American rights tradition.

Early documents addressed to

legislators predictably pleaded in a secular language of
rights based on equality and the revolutionary settlement,
commonly citing principles like "no taxation without
representation."

Female lobbyists occasionally invoked

their duties as mothers in favor of their cause, but by and
large their arguments were couched in the familiar phrases
of the revolutionary settlement.

Women's writing to women

proved a far richer admixture, not limited to claims for
political and legal rights, but seeking a range of economic,
domestic and personal entitlements and opportunities.
Religious language and imagery permeates their discourse,
while arguments from liberal theology undergird their vision
of total reform.
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Feminists stood both within and without the republican
tradition.

While genuine in their appeal to the

revolutionary heritage, there was also a strong strategic
element in their choice of words.

As opponents of

despotism, arbitrary power, orthodoxy and hierarchy in
church and state, they honored the Founders and valued
dearly the philosophy which had so effectively countered
those evils.

But the revolutionary settlement was

incomplete and had unjustly excluded both women and slaves.
Further, mid-century reformers constituted a political
opposition, and remained highly skeptical that the current
crop of statesmen and legislators possessed the requisite
virtue to pursue the goal of liberty in their own
policies.72 Using the unadorned language of legal and
political rights, feminists were appealing to a critical
common tradition, in the language— meaningful both to
themselves and within larger political circles— they thought
would best make their case.

At the same time, their appeal

72Stanton illustrates this attitude in a letter to
Anthony of July 4, 1858 (Stanton Papers, Douglass College
Library, Rutgers University). In it she defends some men as
admirable against a friend's attack on the sex. "But alas!
when we read the views of average men, their laws, their
Bibles,...when we listen to their everyday talk, to their
decisions in the Courtroom, and to their sermons in the
pulpit...then we feel that they richly deserve all that she
says." See also Lily, vol. 2 no. 2, p. 13 (Feb. 1850).
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was not to the actual creations of the Pounding Fathers, but
to a normative ideal of natural rights to which feminists
gave unique definition.

Most women themselves seemed more

at home with the spiritualized discourse which is the argot
of private letters and diaries as well as women's newspapers
and public proceedings.73
For the ideology of woman's rights, unlike
revolutionary rhetoric, was shaped in the fervor of
millennial perfectionism.

On closer scrutiny both the form

and content of rights theories employed by feminists
differed markedly from the traditional strain of republican
rhetoric.

Rights for women were definitely not conceived in

the cool, secular dispassion of American constitutionalism.
The end of the eighteenth century represented a low point in
religious fervor and activity of all kinds: church
attendance dropped precipitously; except in the West there
was little by way of organized religious movement; and in
the love feast of toleration which attended the church-state
settlement, religious concerns receded formally and

73Some leaders of the antebellum feminist movement,
political sophisticates like Stanton and Anthony, subscribed
to a spiritualized view of the scope of rights and the
nature of social change, but needed no direct religious
sanction for political action. Writings in the Lilv suggest
that perhaps they and others also used religious arguments
strategically as those most likely to move their audience of
female political uninitiates.
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informally as a predominant force in the establishment of a
public order.

This tepid public piety did not fuel a

fervent, God-centered view of natural law or natural rights.
By the early federal period, natural rights was a concept
which statesmen sought to contain, because of its volatile
and potentially explosive reach.

The exuberant rights

language of early political documents was toned down, and
the enumeration of precise and specific entitlements
replaced the sweeping claims of the earlier period.1*
Feminists did not tread in this cautious path.15 In
common with laborers, abolitionists, and other dissident
groups, women sought to reopen the great constitutional
questions of inclusion and entitlement, wielding a theory of
natural rights which went well beyond the meager portion
allotted in the state constitutions.

The onset of the first

woman's movement came after the Second Great Awakening had
stirred the country to new heights of millennial passion and
transformed the public's understanding of socii.1 change.

74Daniel T. Rodgers, Contested Truths: Keywords in
American Politics Since Independence (New York, 1987) chap.
2; and Benjamin Wright, American Interpretations of Natural
Law (Cambridge, Mass., 1931), pp. 179 ff.
75 On the general question of feminists' use of natural
rights theory, see Hurlbut, chap. 8; Kraditor, chaps. 3 and
4; Wright, pp. 176-179; and T.V. Smith, The American
Philosophy of Equality (Chicago. 1927), chap. 3.
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Nineteenth-century reformers did not share their forebears'
utilitarian vision of power as something to be balanced and
shared.76 The emphasis on free will, the belief in the
possibility of perfection and the newly benevolent designs
of a ./ell-disposed God— all worked to dispel the fear of
unchecked liberty which dominated political debate in the
constitution-making era.

Women showed unbounded faith in

the workings of an inner law: "emancipate from external
bondage and the internal law written upon every heart makes
itself audible.1,77 Such protean concepts as natural law and
natural rights were plastic in the hands of feminists, who
followed traditional rhetorical forms with conviction while
giving them new meaning.
One innovation lay in feminists' perception of the
relation of rights to natural laws.

A concept of ancient

lineage repeatedly refashioned by thinkers both within and
without the church, natural laws in the revolutionary era
diminished in importance while natural rights theory grew
explosively.18 In America, natural rights became a largely
secularized concept.

Its proponents did not derive such

7<Rodgers, chap. 2.
"Elizabeth Oakes Smith, p. 34.
7,Wright, pp. 173 ff.
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rights from a divine source# but looked increasingly to
human government and constitutional guarantees for their
provenance, rendering a system of natural laws quaint and
redundant.
Natural law regained its rule in the philosophy of the
early woman's rights movement, where all rights were
immediately derived from a divinely sanctioned order
governed by the system of natural laws which was a pillar of
reformers' faith.

To claim human government as the source

of rights was to confuse the cart and the horse— "It is God
that gives our rights.

Government is the offspring of

righcs, not the parent. F e m i n i s t s ,

abolitionists, and

other disaffected antebellum reformers frequently dismissed
the Constitution as but another human law to be judged by
God's standards.10 Women saw rights as springing directly
from the divinely ordained natural order, proclaiming that
"the true rights of humanity are founded in the laws of
nature, and consequently are natural rights."41 Rights

’’"Proceedings of the Woman's Rights Convention Held at
Akron, Ohio, May 28 and 29, 1851" (1851; reprint, 1973)
(hereafter cited as "Akron"), p. 41; see also Hurlbut, p.
27.
“ See Hosmer, pp. 46-47 and chap. 14; Hurlbut, p. 33.
41Lily, vol. 4 no. 2, p. 11 (Feb. 1852) .
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claims for antebellum feminists were not in the nature of
strict bids for inclusion in a grant of powers and
protections from human government.

Rather, they expressed

the terms on which individuals could best live out God's
designs for human happiness.

In the years before the Civil

War the vote itself was repeatedly described by the valise
theory of suffrage— as a way of obtaining the rights to
domestic protection, property, education, remunerative work,
personal autonomy, and all the other entitlements which
women so desired.12 The specific rights women sought
heralded not an alteration but a transformation of society.
"Nature" in early feminist thought became a powerful
normative force, a measuring stick rather than a descriptive
tool.”

What was "natural"— and this was almost always

defined by what contributed to the full realization of human
potential— became
At

theideal state

toward which to strive.

the same time, nature— spruced up into a civil order by

the Founding Fathers— regained an earthiness in feminist
thought rooted in the physical functions of life itself.
For feminists and abolitionists both faced the problem of
elaborating compelling grounds on which full rights should

,2Una, vol. 1 no. 4, p. 59 (May 1853).
MSee Wright,

pp. 3, 176-179;

T.V. Smith, pp. 106 ff.
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be extended to women and slaves— a difficult task since the
constitutional guarantees of inalienability, freedom, and
equality had produced such partial entitlement.

Women's

passionate arguments from moral equality partly filled the
bill.
But both women and slaves, suffering from a lack of
education, were commonly stigmatized as mentally deficient
and without the proper intellect or character to cultivate
civic habits.

In response to their opponents, reformers

also fashioned arguments from the lowest common denominator
of physical life— needs common to all.

Abolitionist tracts

elevated "the right to see, or to eat, or to walk" to stand
beside life and liberty as "conditions of being.

We have

them from God when we have existence, and so long as
existence remains those rights must remain, unless taken
away by Him who gave them."14 The pursuit of "happiness,"
always a somewhat vague component of revolutionary
philosophy, took on a new specificity in claims to food,
clothing, jobs, education— claims measured by needs and
wants.

"The Creator ... has endowed man with certain innate

desires, emotions, and faculties, the gratification and
exercise of which are the means of his happiness.

Here is

“Hosmer, pp. 46-47.
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the consummation of man's rights— the right to gratify his
natural desires; to supply his natural wants; to exercise
his natural functions, as the means of attaining
happiness."“
Such abolitionist writing— particularly Elisha
Hurlbut's treatise on human rights— proved very influential
for feminists, who agreed that natural rights "emanated from
the nature and wants and emotions of m a n k i n d . W o m e n and
slaves did not know Latin, but they could know hunger, and
from the capacity for hunger sprang the entitlement to food-"that is to say, physical existence acknowledges a higher
law, whether we intellectually and morally acknowledge it or
not."'7 It was this assertion of the essential, physical
fact of humanity as granting status that was behind
Sojourner Truth's

cry, "Ain't I a woman?" And the right to

provide for these

wants was guaranteed by the God who

created them, for

it was a critical aspect of the new,

“Hurlbut, p.

16.

“Lily, vol. 2 no. 10, p. 73 (Oct. 1850); see also vol.
4 no. 2, p. 11 (Feb. 1852); and History of Woman Suffrage,
pp. 112-113. For references to Hurlbut, see History of Woman
Suffrage, p. 38; Una, vol. 1 no. 4, p. 59 (May 1853); Lilv.
vol. 4 no. 7, p. 59 (July 1852); and "Cleveland", p. 57. The
Lily also printed extracts from Hosmer's work, vol. 3 no. 5,
p. 35 (May 1851); and from Hurlbut's work, vol. 4 no. 9, p.
80 (Sept. 1852).
“Hosmer, p. 20.
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benevolent deity that he would impart no hunger, no
yearning, without granting a means of its satisfaction.'*
This concept of rights as following physical function
ordained by natural laws is at odds with the idea of
inalienable rights as settled during the struggle for
independence.

But it provided far greater scope for claims

to economic and social justice than the revolutionary model,
which effectively limited feminists to claims to political
rights.
Feminists' conception of rights can perhaps best be
contrasted with revolutionary republican tradition by
comparing the terms •’underlying” and "overarching.”

For the

Founding Fathers, natural rights were pulled down from the
sky, a set of external restraints to limit the actions of
human government.

In the early reform movement, by

contrast, much of the focus of natural rights shifted to the
internal.

In a return to an older tradition, natural rights

were seen as emanating from natural laws discovered, not in
anterior principles like "no taxation without
representation" and "one man one vote," but in the ordinary
patterns of everyday life.

Women did not look to outside

sources or rules to control human behavior, but sought to

"Elizabeth Oakes Smith, pp. 116-118; Hurlbut, pp. 13,
16.
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bring human behavior into harmony with an inner working
which comprehended material and spiritual forces alike.
The belief that God gave no need and no capacity which
he did not mean to be fulfilled was expanded on by woman's
rights advocates, and became what was probably the most
common argument of that group before the war.

Frequently

the rationale for the dismantling of "woman's sphere" and
taking up rights and duties in the wide world was put in
functionalist terms, rather than in the language of
inalienable human rights.

Lucy Stone in one convention

offered her own definition of "natural": "when God made the
human soul and gave it certain capacities, he meant that
those capacities should be exercised.

The wing of the bird

indicates its right to fly; and the fin of the fish the
right to swim.

So in human beings, the existence of a power

presupposes the right to its use, subject to the law of
benevolence.

It was this functionalism that lay behind

the recounting of the stories of renowned and competent
women popular in speeches and tracts.

What had been done

indicated an ability, and where there was an ability lay a
God-given right to use it.

This argument, of course, had

,9"New York", p. 42. This was a sentiment so strongly
felt that it had already been adopted into the resolutions
at the Syracuse National Woman's Rights Convention in 1852;
see "Syracuse", p. 76, and pp. 46, 48, 83.
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certain dangerous implications/ apparent to a few who feared
a standard of duty or performance as a prerequisite to
grants of civil or political rights.

But early feminists

exuded confidence in their untested powers and relied
heavily on this definition of natural rights to break down
the artificial limitations of sphere.

Frances Gage

described how she lost her woman's sphere, piece by piece: a
chunk fell off when she learned to plough and was ploughed
under; another disappeared during a medical emergency/
several more while doing her chores around the farm.*0 More
than in an ideological commitment to political rights, women
first perceived of rights as originating in the capacities
and talents handed out by God, which it was their duty as
well as their pleasure to use fully.
Initially, power and rights were conceived in this
context of self-development: "for what is power in the sense
in which it is so often applied to women, but the liberty to
employ one's facilities in one's own way unobstructed
The emphasis on individual calling, not determined
by sex but by innate talent, of course meant practically
that women should enter into whatever activity or profession

“Lily, vol. 3 no. 3, p. 20 (March 1851).
MUna, vol. 1 no. 1, p. 7 (Feb. 1853); Elizabeth Oakes
Smith, p. 116.
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she felt fitted to.

As the Syracuse Convention resolved in

1852, "that in the great body politic, or in the great
social body, each one, irrespective of sex, talent, or
capability for a higher or lower function, fulfill the great
ends of his or her being."“

In the unfolding of their

natural talents women saw no limit to their intellectual,
moral, or social progress, developments which would make the
woman's sphere obsolete.

Indeed, the pulling down of these

artificial boundaries was among the most articulate of
women's demands.
Rights arguments were strongly addressed to the
development of individual capacities in the context of the
fulfillment of duties in the 1850s.

No clear distinction

was made in this period between rights stemming from
concerns for family and social justice, and those which
contributed to civic competence and personal development.
Most often the two were pictured as mutually reinforcing,
with woman's increased freedom enhancing her capacity to
serve herself and others, including her family.93 Stanton
in a speech to the American Anti-Slavery Society in 1860
gave voice to a cherished reform belief that "rights never

“"Syracuse", p. 75.
“"Syracuse", pp. 62-63; "Boston", p. 8; "Cleveland",
p. 8.
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clash or interfere, and where no individual in a community
is denied his rights, the mass are more perfectly protected
in theirs."”

Most feminists subscribed to the thesis that

"A man has rights in order that he may do right."”

The

frequent pairing of "rights" and "duties" was not
accidental.

Women were sincere when they repeatedly argued

that it was because of their equal moral accountability to
God, and the resulting duties to themselves, their families,
and society, that they deserved and needed rights.”
Since women's duties were so much concerned with
family, it should not be surprising that there was a
significant domestic component in the developing ideal of
woman's rights, and that natural rights were often pictured
as concrete ways for women to protect or further the
interests of their families.

The Lilv and the Una were

published, not just for the several hundred pioneers of the

”Elizabeth Cadv Stanton. Susan B. Anthony;
Correspondence. Writings. Speeches (New York, 1981), Ellen
C. DuBois, ed., p. 78. See also Hurlbut, pp. 25-27, for the
same argument based on the need to defend individual
liberties from a tyrannical government.
“Mark Hopkins, cited in Rodgers, Contested Truths.
See also resolutions passed at the first convention, "Seneca
Falls", pp. 4-5.
“Lily, vol. 2 no. 10, p. 73 (Oct. 1850); Clarina I.
Howard Nichols, "On the Responsibilities of Woman," tract
no. 6 in Woman's Rights Commensurate with Her Capacities.
See also "Syracuse", pp. 23, 34, 63.
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movement, but also for many thousands who were still
puzzling out their positions.

Its letters and articles

chronicle the conversion of many women to politics on the
ground that it was woman's right and duty to assert her
claims for protection.”

it was a common maxim among

reformers that the main object of the law was to protect the
weak from the tyranny of the strong, and in the Lily, one
can trace the clear evolution of a doctrine of woman's
rights through the arguments over temperance— "learning
woman's rights by woman's wrongs."”

The archetypal tale is

of "poverty, desertion, and tyranny on the part of ...
worthless and drunken husbands ... taking away from their
wives and children every possible means of support ..." The
number and intensity of these stories increase with the
Lily's commitment to political solutions; one enlightened
girl takes her flighty cousin for a walk through an
impoverished neighborhood, pointing out women who are
victims of intemperate husbands, low wages, and a lack of
legal protection, and demands at last, "Has this woman had
her rights?"”

"Lily, vol. 1 no. 10, p. 77 (Oct. 1849) .
""New York", pp. 4, 76.
"Lily, vol. 3 no. 5, p. 34 (May 1851); see also vol. 3
no. 11, p. 86 {Nov. 1851); and "Boston", p. 24.
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Nor was this elaboration of woman's rights confined to
some conservative wing of the movement; in the antebellum
years there was considerable harmony of position.

Although

Stanton and Anthony moved from organized temperance to
woman's rights in the mid-1850s, they and other woman's
righters remained advocates of the temperance cause, finding
it a "hard matter to speak of the cruel wrongs inflicted on
women by the liquor traffic, without at the same time saying
that her rights have been trampled upon ... (and) difficult
to depict the woes of the drunkard's wife ... without saying
that her rights have been recklessly invaded, and wrongfully
withheld.”100 Many women initially resistant to the
assertion of rights became enthusiastic converts: their new
ideals were rooted, not in higher political theory, but in
concrete concern

for the "sacred

tiesof family relations."

Mothers turned to rights for the sake of their children,
seeking assurance that they would be able to feed and clothe
them, and keep them nearby.101 Many women sought "equal
rights for (women) in the family, in order that its highest
uses and harmonies may be insured."102

100Llly, vol. 4 no. 3, p. 22 (March 1852).
101Lilv# vol. 4 no. 5, p. 35 (May 1852); vol. 4 no. 6,
p. 51 (June 1852); Una, vol. 1 no. 1, pp. 14-15 (Feb. 1853).
1M"Boston", p. 8.
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Nevertheless, th ^ theoretical harmony between rights
for the self and duties to others was not to survive the
Civil War.
discernible.

Even before then the two strains had begun to be
The broadest category of rights included "the

general question of woman's Rights and Relations (which)
comprehends such as: HER EDUCATION, literary, scientific,
and artistic— HER AVOCATIONS, Industrial. Commercial, and
Professional— HER INTERESTS, Pecuniary. Civil, and Political
in a word, her RIGHTS as an Individual, and her FUNCTIONS as
a Citizen."103 Many middle class feminists stressed
forcefully the incidents which contributed to personal
freedom and development— the right of sexual autonomy within
marriage, of education, work outside the home,
independence— and were content to see economic parity rather
vaguely as the inevitable consequence of women's personal
and civil gains.104

Stanton herself emphasized autonomy

above suffrage, saying "When we talk of woman's rights, is
not the right to her person, to her happiness, to her life,
the first on the list? If you go to a southern plantation
and speak to a slave of his right to property, to the

»3nSyracuse", p. iv.
104"Cleveland," pp. 10, 17, 41, 55-56; Una, vol. 1 no.
1, p. 10 (Feb. 1853); Lilv. vol. 3 no. 5, p. 35 (May 1851);
Hersh, p. 189.
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elective franchise, to a thorough education, his response
will be a vacant stare ... The great idea of his right to
himself, to his personal dignity, must first take possession
of his soul."1”
As the movement developed, those activists who weighted
issues of autonomy and personal development more heavily
tended increasingly to align themselves behind the vote,
re-envisioning it, not just as a lever to achieve social
ends, but as a measure of autonomy and individual freedom in
itself.

A few others, who saw women's impoverishment as the

paramount issue, urged economic measures over the quest for
legal or civil entitlement.1”

Still, antebellum activists

understood their rights and duties as a seamless web.

Only

in Stanton's work do we see fully foreshadowed the conflict
between individual women's rights and the interests of
family and community which was to split the suffrage
movement so bitterly in the last years of the century.107

10SLetter to Susan B. Anthony, July 20, 1857, Stanton
Papers, Douglass College Library, Rutgers University.
10<Historv of Woman Suffrage, p. 233; "Syracuse,"
Nichols.

p. 9;

107Even in this early period Stanton is beginning to
develop her notion of rights as based in the psychological
needs of the autonomous personality, an individualism far
more pronounced than the liberal Protestant ideal of
self-development. Although Stanton scholars have generally
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To the extent that it is possible to isolate two
different strands of rights thought here, the question
arises of whether one is superior to the other, or more
truly feminist in outlook.

Most scholars of women's

movements have explicitly valued political rights over any
claim for right to livelihood or protection of the home.
They see the "home values" of later temperance union
suffragists as a second-class feminism, an expression of
"woman-oriented moral conservatism."10* Ellen DuBois,
Barbara Epstein, and others have denigrated the suffrage
campaign of the. Woman's Christian Temperance Union as
instrumental because it sought the vote with clear public
policy goals in view which addressed women's welfare as tied
to the well being of f.he family under the wage labor
system.109

viewed her late address "Solitude of Self" as representing
an evolution of her thought, at least one unusual passage
fully prefigures that address, though written forty years
earlier; in it she says that woman is her own "self
supporter, self defender and self protector, compelled to
stand or fall, to live or die, alone." Lilv. vol. 4 no. 5,
p. 40 (May 1852). "Solitude of Self" is reprinted in
Stanton and Anthony: Correspondence. Speeches. Writings, at
p. 246.
“‘Epstein, p. 6.
10,Even the sympathetic chronicler of the WCTU, Ruth
Bordin, although she vaunts the Union's effectiveness in
engaging women in political activity, finds its agenda
defective in emphasizing the uses and purposes of the
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For DuBois the strength of the demand for suffrage is
that it bypassed the private sphere altogether to focus on
equality within the public sphere.110 As a political
feminist, she sees a relation between woman's oppression and
her ideological association with the private sphere.

By

this standard, any claim other than the strict one for
formal equality appears a manifestation of false
consciousness, even though well intentioned.

In fact, many

of the temperance workers goals were highly repressive.
This should not obscure the fact that the association of
political power with social ends allows greater possibility
for social change than viewing the vote as an abstract
good.111 Political rights, rightly considered, are not ends
in themselves, but ways of allocating power and resources
within the community.

In a democratic society, at least

theoretically, they are closely connected to maximizing
benefits for all.
Even leaving aside contemporary debates, it is unclear

woman's vote above absolute rights. See Woman and
Temperance: The Quest for Power and Liberty. 1873-1900
(Philadelphia, 1981).
110Dubois, "The Radicalism of Woman Suffrage," p. 63.
m I imagine this abstract good as the majestic,
solitary figure of Elizabeth Cady Stanton sailing through
the universe with a star in one hand and a ballot in the
other.
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that this standard can be usefully applied to
nineteenth-century feminism.

For one thing, what could

"formal equality" mean to women in the absence of any
federal or state regulatory mechanism to ensure it?112

In

the 1850s, the possibility of constitutional amendments like
the fourteenth, fifteenth, or nineteenth, was remote.

In

many ways the woman's movement's political aspirations
developed reciprocally with the growth of the government's
capacity to administer equal protection standards.

As we

have seen, most antebellum feminists were initially highly
skeptical of the power of government to work change by law;
Hannah Tracy Cutler once declared that she never saw the
words "law reform" or "revised statutes" without thinking
happily of a bonfire.113
More important is the question of whether "domestic
rights." really represented an inferior brand, and what
consequences the repackaging of women's early broad vision
into the demand for political rights had for the movement as
a whole.

One critic has charged that "The concept of

112In this I follow Michael Grossberg's line in
Governing the Hearth: Law and the Family in NineteenthCentury America (Chapel Hill, 1985), that "rights" women
were gaining in family law doctrine were actually privileges
granted at the discretion of the court.
113Una, vol. 1 no. 3, p. 41 (April 1853) .
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'rights' in general (is) a concept that is inherently static
and atstracted from social conditions.

Rights are by

definition claims staked within a given order of things.
They are demands for access for oneself, or for 'no
admittance' for others; but they do not challenge the social
structure, the social relations of production and
reproduction."1”

While this may accurately diagnose a

contemporary malaise, antebellum woman's rights claims
spilled over legal categories: not limited to what
governments could provide, they were the markers of a state
of harmony with natural laws which mandated the satisfaction
of all human wants.

Their revolutionary character lay in

representing, not claims to an established order, but new
ways of reenvisioning social relations and the relations of
power.
Nor did feminists see rights as any kind of absolute or
unlimited entitlement.

The linking of rights to

responsibilities, and their firm placement within a system
of natural laws, meant that rights were not seen as
discrete, but as functioning within a larger context as a
set of reciprocal obligations.

Far from granting a power to

^Rosalind P. Petchesky, Abortion and Woman's Choice:
The State, Sexuality, and Reproductive Freedom (Boston,
1984), p. 7.
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be exercised against others, restraint was built in: "the
great laws of our own beings demand justice to ourselves and
justice to our neighbors.

We cannot infringe either law

without disorder and pain, and ... the Infinite Creator
looks benignly upon his creature who thus obeys the laws of
his own nature, and reverences those appertaining to every
other."115 Yet such restraints were not galling.

Perfect

freedom still lay not in total autonomy but in acting out
God's will, so that "the most free are the most bound."116
Rights were a precious new license for women to employ their
talents for themselves and others, and women saw them, not
only as individual entitlements, but as the context for a
happier and more fulfilled life for all human beings.
Rights were not static entitlements, but the conditions of a
dynamic new freedom: "rights ... will galvanize women into
civil liberty:

(and) you will find her capable of being in

it, and sustaining it."111

Conclusion

115Elizabeth Oakes Smith, p. 118.
“‘"Syracuse," p. 81.
“’"Proceedings of the Woman's Rights Convention Held
at...Rochester, New York, Aug. 2, 1848" (1870; reprint,
1969), p. 7.
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When the antebellum woman's movement took up the
concept and language of rights, it was not a case of
incorporating the meanings and usages of the Founding
Fathers whole into women's vocabulary.

Rights rhetoric

evoked a political tradition meaningful to women as well as
men, a set of promises for women as gender blind as the
assurances of the new God of liberal theology.

But the

genesis of rights, their meaning for women, lay initially in
Christian-based concepts of social justice, the fulfillment
of needs, and each person's development according to their
divinely ordained talents.

In the early years the problem

of power was itself a critical hurdle for women's activism.
Understanding its corrupting nature, seeing the evidence all
around them in the political arrangements of men, how could
women justify their own accession to power?

A good deal of

argument within the broader movement was directed toward the
idea, not of seizing or sharing power, but of its
dissolution, on the theory that when men ceased their
corrupt administration, the problem of power would resolve
itself into a natural harmonious balance between the sexes.
Much of the rest of the discussion was taken up by mutual
assurances that, should women gain their political due,
their natures would protect them from the misuse of power
through corruption and greed.
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Despite their hesitance about the assumption of power,
the antebellum feminist campaign was a time of political
maturation, overcoming scruples and fears about acting in
the political world.

Women reformers began to prepare

themselves, not just to speak in the role of
outcast-prophet, but to take up the tools of government for
their own ends.

In the spring of 1852 the Lilv published

separate short blurbs side by side on two cases at law
successfully argued by women.

In one, the woman is armed

with nothing but her knowledge of right and faith in good
justice; her appeal reaches past the minds and straight into
the hearts of her listeners, who acknowledge that she has
shown up their law as irrelevant and grant her the decision.
In the second, the female advocate is beautifully prepared
with a wealth of incisive arguments which dumbfound her
opponents and lead to her uncontested victory on highly
technical points of legal doctrine.111
These two cases represent a progression: the woman's
movement in the 1850s is a microcosm of political change, a
moment of transition in individuals' basic attitudes toward
government.

Despite their initial disaffection with

government, workers in combined woman's and temperance

u,Lily. vol. 3 no. 6, p. 42 (June 1851).
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movements came to recognize that politics and law were
increasingly becoming creatures of the central state, and
were passing out of local control.

The potential of

national government to protect woman's due was only dimly
realized, but the admission that nwe are in an age when the
wrongs of society are adjusted at the courts and at the
ballot oox" dictated a new approach.119 Women saw that
politics was increasingly a man's game, one played away from
home.

They resented their own exclusion, and distrusted the

ability of male legislators sitting at a distance to
represent their interests, and to meet the diverse needs of
the banker, the housewife, and the drunkard.

The

impartiality and anonymity of legislation in this period was
seen not as a possible protection, but as a failure of
government to care for the whole individual.

Relying on the

ancient maxim, "salus populi suprema lex, "1J0 women revealed
their fears that in the brave new world of politics there

119History of Woman Suffrage, p. 14. The History of
Woman Suffrage, although an invaluable and bottomless
source, is not a fully objective account of the early years
of the movement. Unlike the convention proceedings
themselves, it was edited and issued thirty years after the
movement's beginnings by three of the earliest and most
vehement proponents of women's political activity; it
consistently emphasizes political themes at the expense of
spiritual and religious arguments.
U0Lily. vol. 2 no. 6, p. 47 (June 1850).
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was no place for the standard of moral accountability which
pertained between relatives, friends, and neighbors, and
that the law was not creating any new ethic whereby the
bonds of community, loosely worn but still taut in times of
need, could be maintained.

The imperative for women's entry

into politics became clearer and clearer to feminist
reformers in the decade before the War.
Theirs was a romantic vision; its romanticism was
partly redeemed and partly betrayed by the political
maturation of its proponents, a process that started even
before the war.

In fact, the Lily illustrates that it was

through the temperance activities of the 1850s that many
women were brought around to the use of political means,
including the ballot.

The Maine liquor law of 1851 gave

reformers a heady taste of the .sweeping change which
legislation could accomplish so much more effectively than
the painful, uncertain process of personal conversion to
abstinence which had been the temperance workers' model.
The Maine law was the "philosopher's stone in the pocket,"
capable of effecting spiritual and behavioral regeneration
instantly, and the Lily followed the progress of similar
laws with intense interest.121 Under Amelia Bloomer's

m Lily, vol. 5, nos. 1 or 2 (Jan. or Feb. 1850) (page
and date undecipherable), speech of Antoinette Brown.
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management, editorials, articles, and letters in almost
every issue starting in 1850 exhorted women to take up
political tools to accomplish their social ends.12*
Not all those sympathetic to woman's rights were
converted to political means on the spot.

The leaders of

the woman's movement, the politically sophisticated, the
speakers, became convinced early on that, rotten or not,
women had to enter man's political world to effect change.
For a much larger group of women, sympathetic but unsure how
far to go, the transformation into political beings was
piecemeal and slow.

Again, the Lilv is valuable in that it

exposes us not just to the thought of the leaders, but of
the rank and file as well.

For a time, Stanton and Anthony

served as leaders of the state woman's temperance
organization in New York, of which the Lily served as the
unofficial organ.

They and like-minded co-workers exercised

a tremendous influence on the shape of women's reform
through the newspaper, as well as through the blizzard of
publications and the exhaustive cross-country lecture
circuits many undertook.

Under their tutelage many women

came to believe they couid best assure their own chances for

u2See for example Lilv. vol. 2 no. 10, p. 73-74 (Oct.
1850); vol. 3 no. 10, p. 79 (Sept. 1851); vol. 4 no. 5, p.
33, 35-36, 39-42 (May 1852); vel. 4 no. 6, p. 53 (June
1852).
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self-development and thereby help to bring society back into
a natural order through the means of the vote.

Over the

years of the Lily's publication (1849-1856) readers of all
persuasions wrote in to attest to their conversion to
political methods, at least to the combination of legal and
moral suasion.

A growing number found that moral suasion

alone "will not do," was "worse than useless," and made
little impression on the legislators who, corrupt or not,
were calling the shots.123 Citing the inability of mothers
to protect sons from the liquor "monster," one former
anti-feminist found that "there came a complete change over
my feelings on the subject."

"A realizing sense of our

weakness ... (and) that we were warring with harmless
weapons" brought many reform women to a more assertive
political challenge to the supremacy of the male liquor
cartel.124
The new philosophy of women's political power did not
require women to jettison moral ideals, but it did require a
transformation of the imagery of morality and power.

Most

importantly, it required the acknowledgement that the
institutions of government were not inherently opposed to

“3Lily, vol. 4 no. 5, p. 39 (May 1852); vol. 1 no. 8,
p. 61 (July 1849).
U4Lily, vol. 3 no. 10, p. 77 (Oct. 1851).
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morality, but with the right composition could act to
improve social conditions.

Many women urged the adoption of

political tactics for the purpose of fulfilling obligations
to others.

One woman, deploring her lack of

the vote, exhorted, "Arise, sisters, to your duty! Gird on
the garment of love to your fellow creatures, and form the
high resolve te crush the enemy which is stabbing them to
the heart," a formulation which retains the rationale of
social duty but endorses a different kind of action.125
After the Civil War the rights movement became a
suffrage movement in earnest, with the ballot's earlier
focus as a carrier of other rights downplayed.

Because of

the movement's fuller engagement with the political process,
and the growing involvement of government in mediating and
enunciating the rights of its citizens, women increasingly
conceived of rights in legal terms.

The emphasis on legal

rights, narrowly conceived, diminished discussions of
economic and social entitlement.

Feminists like Antoinette

Brown Blackwell found the movement's agenda narrowed after
the war, too neglectful of issues like education and work.124
Although the untested antebellum vision was probably naive,

125Lilv, vol. 1 no. 9, p. 69 (Sept. 1849) .
“‘Elizabeth Cazden, Antoinette Brown Blackwell: A
Biography (Old Westbury, N.Y., 1983), p. 138.
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and certainly immature, in its conviction that the wellbeing
of the community lay simply in the perfection of individual
rights, the shift in focus toward legal remedies represented
both a gain and a loss.

Women gained a basic political

agenda which could be pursued to ultimate success; and
limited their claims for transformative social change
inherent in their early vision.
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Chapter IX - Matrimonial Bonds: Slavery, Contract,
and the Law of Divorce in Nineteenth-Century America
In the covenant of marriage, (woman) is
compelled to promise obedience to her
husband, he becoming, to all intents and
purposes, her master— the law giving him
power to deprive her of her liberty, and to
administer chastisement. He has so framed
the law of divorce ... as to be wholly
regardless of the happiness of women— the
law, in all cases, going upon a false
supposition of the supremacy of man, and
giving all power into his hands.1
As early as 1848, in the first public meeting on
woman's rights, feminists raised the touchy issues of
women's marital subjugation and divorce.

They complained

that the laws of marriage and divorce were framed for the
benefit of men, and to entrap women within the oppressive
institution of marriage.

Another controversial claim made

at Seneca Falls— that to the ballot— went on to become the
great organizing principle for women's campaigns for legal
and political reform.

But despite the bold beginning,

divorce remained a complex and divisive issue for feminists
throughout the century.

Although legislatures in most

states in the mid-nineteenth century were systematically

:Report of the Woman's Rights Convention Held at Seneca
Falls, New York. July 19 and 20. 1848 (1848; reprint, New
York, 1969), p. 6. This chapter is forthcoming in the Law
and History Review. Spring, 1989.
89
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liberalizing divorce laws, they could not lift the social
stigma which attached to it.2 Fearful of being branded as
anti-marriage or anti-family, or believing in the permanency
of marriage, many feminists spoke of divorce reluctantly,
and never used their formidable organizing skills to launch
a full-scale assault on laws restricting the dissolution of
marriage.
Elizabeth Cady Stanton stood as the great exception to
this rule.

An early and ardent champion of liberal divorce,

her arguments were highly influential in the development of
nineteenth-century feminist theory.3 A few feminists
followed Stanton whole-heartedly, some agreed with her in
part, still others were shocked at her advocacy of measures

2William O'Neill, Divorce in the Progressive Era (New
Haven, 1967).
3Stanton's writings on divorce are not collected in any
one place. The major sources, which contain most of her
ideas on the subject, are in Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan
B. Anthony, and Matilda Joslyn Gage, eds., History of Woman
Suffrage. (New York, 1881), vol. 1, pp. 716-722, 738-742,
860-861; "Address of Elizabeth Cady Stanton on the Divorce
Bill Before the Judiciary Committee of the New York Senate
... Feb. 8, 1861" (Albany, 1861); "Mrs. Elizabeth Cady
Stanton's Address at the Decade Meeting on Marriage and
Divorce," in Paulina Wright Davis, A History of the National
Woman's Rights Movement for Twenty Years (New York, 1871);
and "Marriage and Divorce," unpublished manuscript, Stanton
Papers, Douglass College Library, Rutgers University. Ellen
DuBois includes relevant selections from Stanton's work as
well in Elizabeth Cadv Stanton. Susan B. Anthony;
Correspondence. Writings. Speeches (New York, 1981).
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they felt would
the family.

jnd toward the disruption of marriage and

Yet even for those feminists who resisted her

conclusions, the analysis of marriage she offered— "from
covenant to contract" could have been her rallying cry— was
transformative.

Despite its mixed reception, Stanton's

theory of divorce and family relations helped to shape
nineteenth-century American attitudes toward marriage.
Stanton's theory of divorce became as well a critical
platform for her maturing theory of rights, which was far
more in tune with both mainstream feminist and liberal
thought of her day than were her ideas about divorce.
Stanton's work, emphasizing the ultimate "right" to free
oneself from obligations that had become unwanted bonds,
paved the way for a liberal feminist theory that rested on
the autonomy of the individual.

She helped to promote both

the growth of a family law based on a contractual theory of
relations, and a view of politics that deemed the rights of
individuals paramount.

In Stanton's work, persona], autonomy

began to constitute the individual's citizenship in a way
that has become a dominant motif in American life.
Stanton's vision of individual rights drew heavily on
ideas of slavery and freedom, and the debate over their
definitions that raged in post-Civil War America.

Stanton's

adoption of the radical extremes of freedom and slavery to
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describe the condition of women has left a mixed legacy.
The most brilliant and dynamic feminist theorist of her day,
she helped forge a language of individual liberty that acted
as a catalyst for social change.*

Nevertheless, the

adoption of the slavery paradigm to describe marriage
narrowed Stanton's perceptions of women's condition, and
dictated an appeal to a specific sort of legal remedy that
both shaped and limited feminist goals during the nineteenth
century.

Divorce in the Antebellum Era
In January of 1853, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, acting on
behalf of the New York State Women's Temperance Society,
offered a ten dollar prize for the best essay entitled "The
Duty of the Drunkard's Wife," in the women's temperance
newspaper Lily.

The readers of the Lily, themselves a

piogressive group, rose to the challenge.5 Well coached,
all took the position that Stanton and Susan B. Anthony had

4Ellen DuBois has explicated the transformative nature
of Stanton's rights theory, primarily in Feminism and
Suffrage; The Emergence of an Independent Woman's Movement
in America. 1848-1869 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1978); and Stanton and
Anthony: Correspondence. Speeches. Writings.
sThe contest was advertised repeatedly in the Lilv
starting in January of 1853. The first entry appeared in
the Lilv ca. Sept. 1853 (date illegible); others in the
issues for Jan.-March 1854 (vol. 6 nos. 1-3).
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been urging in the Lily's columns in the preceding months:
that wives of chronic inebriates had a duty to seek a
separation, to sever the conjugal relationship, so as not to
be the agent of breeding a drunkard's children.

The

contestants, however, chose in the end to resolve their
characters' problems through separation, death, or
desertion; none broached the subject of legal divorce.
Half-measures never satisfied Stanton, and for her these
analyses fell short: the Lilv contains no record of the
prize being awarded.
The liberalization of divorce laws was by no means
foreordained.

Even progressive minds feared the path to

easy divorce, disagreeing about its significance, its
desirability, and its consequences.

Antebellum reformers

recognized the need for legal separation or divorce most
consistently in the case of the chronically drunken husband.
Under these circumstances, a virtually unanimous consensus
prevailed that the law must somehow intervene.

The Lilv.

whose subject matter ranged between +■ .e poles of temperance
and women's rights, rendered in particularly lurid tones the
plight of the battered mother bound for life to a "moral
monster— [a] vulgar, gross, imbruted nature."6 Indeed,

sLily 4, no. 10 (Aug. 1852), p. 69.
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feminists who remained deeply committed to the Christian
ideal of life-long marriage agreed on the need for the
equivalent of a legal separation/ contingent upon reforms in
the law of marital property to safeguard women's rights.
Fueled by the broader reform agitation over family law
in the 1850s, the debate on divorce extended beyond feminist
circles.

In the early 1850s the editor of the New York

Tribune, Horace Greeley, engaged the anarchist and free
lover Stephen Pearl Andrews and the Boston Swedenborgian
Henry James, Sr., in an extended and highly publicized
debate over the ongoing liberalization of divorce laws.

In

1860 Greeley took up his cudgel again, this time against
Robert Dale Owen, son of communitarian Robert Owen.7 Not
just divorce but the function of family law was at stake in
these debates.

Greeley served as the linchpin, or perhaps

the lightning rod, articulating a strain of thought which
held that family law existed to coerce "moral" or socially

7The debates between Greeley, Andrews, and Henry James,
Sr., appeared in the Tribune in 1852 and 1853. They were
reissued with an introduction by Charles Shively in Love.
Marriage, and Divorce, and the Sovereignty of the
Individual (Weston, MA, 1975). James's arguments are rather
less lucid than Andrews's or Greeley's, and I have omitted
them. Greeley's 1860 exchange with Robert Dale Owen was
reprinted in the back of Greeley's autobiography
Recollections of a Busy Life (1868; reprint, New York, 1970)
as "Marriage and Divorce." The contest between Greeley and
Andrews sparked again in Woodhull and Claflin's Weekly, vol.
3 no. 25 (Nov. 4, 1871), p. 8.
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desirable behavior.

He valued the maintenance of the family

as a social unit well above any measure of personal or
erotic satisfaction, and delighted in pointing out that the
law warned people to exercise caution in contracting a
life-long bond.

If they misjudged the case, the pain and

penalty were theirs.

"To the libertine, the egoist, the

selfish, sensual seeker of personal and present enjoyment at
whatever cost to others, the indissolubility of marriage is
an obstacle, a restraint, a terror: and God forbid that it
should ever cease to be!"'

That the indecisive, the

deluded, the trusting, and the optimistic got caught in this
trap as well was of little concern to Horace Greeley.
An alternative view, put forth most forcefully by
Andrews and Owen, argued that family law should enable free
choice and facilitate human relations in a way that
approximated the laissez-faire model of economic regulation.
Stanton sympathized with Owen and Andrews, assailing
Greeley's view of law as Draconian and old-fashioned.9 For
all three, the emphasis on human will mandated a new view of

'Greeley, "Marriage and Divorce," p. 606.
'Stanton addressed Greeley specifically about the
matter; see History of Woman Suffrage, vol. 1, pp. 738-742.
She also says in the Revolution (vol. 3 no. 14 [April 8,
1869], p. 212, that her views on marriage and divorce
coincide with Robert Dale Owen's.
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law, one more enabling than coercive.

They retained law

within their social program, but as the servant and not the
master:

"Marriage itself, like the Sabbath, was made for

man; not man for marriage."10 A law that forced the
continuation of an unhappy relation obstructed its purpose
of securing happiness, and should be changed.

"There is no

absolute right or wrong about this matter of divorce; but
that it may properly vary in its details at different stages
of civilization."11
Early nineteenth-century radicals and communitarians
such as Robert Owen and Frances Wright had constructed the
groundwork for such claims well before the meeting at Seneca
Falls: however controversial and heretical their teachings
remained, they had received a wide public airing.12 But
although this radical tradition was at hand, most early
feminists eschewed it.

An emphasis on liberty, on the

10In Greeley, "Marriage and Divorce," p. 577.
“ in Greeley, "Marriage and Divorce," p. 584.
“Sidney Ditzion, Marriage. Morals, and Sex in America:
A_Historv of Ideas (New York, 1953), esp. chapter 3. See
also Barbara Taylor, Eve and the New Jerusalem: Socialism
and Feminism in the Nineteenth Century (New York, 1983).
Robert Owen, the founder of the community at New Harmony,
Indiana, lectured and published tracts in favor of cheap and
easy divorce in the 1830s and 1840s. Fanny Wright's
community, Nashoba, was notorious for its loose sexual
practices and the liberal terms of its marital arrangements.
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affective nature of the marriage bond, and on the need for
divorce to ensure the happiness of the individual were
strikingly absent from the early feminist discourse.
Perhaps with the exception of Stanton— a major exception—
they did not thrill to the "right" to dissolve the marriage
bond and seek their romantic fortunes elsewhere.

Rather,

those who first approved divorce saw it as self-defense, a
measure of last resort to counter physical violence levelled
at women by drunken and abusive husbands.
Before the Civil War, feminist arguments for divorce
were not made in terms of an abstract right to individual
liberty, but in more pragmatic terms, the most fundamental
being the instinct for self-preservation.

Story after story

in women's papers such as the Lilv and the Una, and in other
works both fictional and factual, stressed the combined
burdens of overwork and brutal treatment that could result
in insanity or death for wives and mothers.

Tales of

marital violence were so frequent and widely known that one
child— probably the son of reformers— grew up thinking of
murder as a common contingency of marriage.13
Antebellum feminists most often invoked duties rather
than rights as justification for divorce, particularly the

“Elizabeth Oakes Smith, The Sanctity of Marriage
(Syracuse, 1852), pp. 7-8.
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mother's duty to children.

Many women initially feared

crossing the border into the land of absolute
rights-bearers, and even Stanton— whose viewswere,

as

always, more radical— dwelt heavily on maternal obligation
rather than rights in exhorting women to recognize the need
for full and free divorce in cases of chronic inebriation.11
The physical safety of drunkards' children was at issue as
well as that of their mother; liberal feminists stressed her
duty to remove them to a safer environment.
The obligation to protect extended beyondliving
children to children unborn, and became the basis of
antebellum feminists' arguments for refusing husbands their
"rights'1 in the marriage bed.

Stanton relied heavily on

what Linda Gordon has described as a folk wisdom of
eugenics, preaching widely on the poor genetic harvest of

“Recent historical work has stressed the pragmatic
nature of much of the mid-century reform of marital women's
property laws and rules of custody, not as extensions of
absolute rights but as piecemeal efforts by legislatures to
protect women in carrying out what were in fact rapidly
growing roles in household management and domestic finance.
See, for example, Suzanne Lebsock, The Free Women of
Petersburg: Status and Culture in a Southern Town. 1784-1860
(New York, 1984); Richard Chused, "Married Women's Property
Law, 1800-1850," Georgetown Law Journal, vol. 71 (1983), pp.
1359-1425; and Michael Grossberg, Governing the Hearth: Law
and_the Family in Nineteenth-Centurv America (Chapel Hill,
1985).
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unwilling unions.”

Exploiting the nineteenth-century

passion for statistics, she calculated that of the nearly
1300 idiots in Massachusetts, between 1100 and 1200 had been
born of alcoholic parents, and urged women to sever
immediately conjugal relations with husbands who drank: "the
unspeakable misery of looking a laughing idiot in the face
and calling him 'my son' is known but to the mother's heart
— the drunkard's wife.1116 Stanton and Anthony's scientific
Calvinism stressed the heritability of sin, and preached
that " (No) woman should consent to be the wife of a drunkard
because she may be the medium of stamping new forms of
immortality on his gross, carnal nature."

At one New York

Women's State Temperance Convention it was resolved that "it
is a sin for any woman to consent to entail on innocent
beings the curse and degradation that are the certain
heritage of the Drunkard's offspring

Recognizing

that abandoning the marriage bed was a painful and audacious
step, Stanton counseled her readers that God in his
benevolence never intended such a travesty of human

“Linda Gordon, Woman's Body. Woman's Right: A Social
History of Birth Control in America (New York, 1976),
especially Chap. 6, "Social Purity and Eugenics."
“Lily 2, no. 4 (April 1850), p. 31.
17L11v 4, no. 7 (July 1852), p. 57-58.
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happiness as a virtuous woman tied for life to a "loathsome/
putrid carcass.nl*
The brutalized wife presented the most vivid and
compelling case for divorce, but a rather higher-minded
strain of thought ran through antebellum divorce arguments
as well.

One of the abolitionists' strongest arguments was

that slavery illegitimately interposed human authority
between the individual and God, thwarting that person's
growth and their development according to God's plan.

The

antebellum protest against the usurpation of God's authority
took on new form in decrying marriage as subsuming the
individuality of one person to the will of another.

For

liberal Protestants in full revolt against both the theology
and political implications of Calvinist orthodoxy, the
binding of the human will was both a crime and a sin, in
marriage as elsewhere.

Stanton and fellow feminist

Antoinette Brown Blackwell adopted and embroidered This
argument, using it to challenge the husband's authority.19
Stanton asked:
(H)ow can (woman) subscribe to a theology
which makes her the conscious victim of

^Lilv 4, no. 10 (Aug. 1852), p. 69.
19Stanton and Blackwell engaged in a protracted debate
on divorce at the national woman's rights meeting in 1860.
See History of Woman Suffrage, vol. 1, pp. 716-735.
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another's will, forever subject to the triple
bondage of man, priest, and the law ...? How
can she endure our present marriage relations
by which woman's life, health, and happiness
are held so cheap that she herself feels that
God has given her no charter of rights, no
individuality of her own?20
Obedience to God was a far easier principle for
mainstream feminists to accept than one of individual
happiness through severing the marital bond.

The liberal

Protestant notion of a newly-benevolent God with designs for
each individual's happiness provided Stanton with an
argument in favor of divorce that was more acceptable to
contemporaries in the 1850s.

Stanton thus introduced into

the divorce debate— embedded in a theory of divine will and
human duty— the ideas of individual happiness and the
importance of personal growth, concepts that she would later
develop into claims for personal autonomy.

Marriage and Slavery in the Post-War Period
In the post-Civil War period the rhetoric of divorce
changed dramatically, as the language of rights replaced
that of duty to God or children.

For feminists, caught up

in the great public debates of the post-war period, the

“Letter of Nov. 24, 1856, Stanton Papers, Douglass
College Library, Rutgers University.
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wrongs of brutalized wives served as a catalyst for early
consciousness of individual rights: " (it is) difficult to
depict the woes of the drunkard's wife ... without saying
that her rights have been recklessly invaded, and wrongfully
withheld.1,21 Earlier, divorce had been understood as an act
of self-defense; now it became an issue of personal liberty.
The idea of the right to one's body and to one's labor was a
critica1 tenet of post-war political theory; liberal
feminists adapted this "rights" definition to their own
ends.
Slavery was over, but slavery/freedom became the ruling
paradigm through which liberal feminists conceived and
developed their vision of rights within marriage.

The

analogy between marriage and slavery was natural and
powerful, the conclusion inescapable:
Did the wives of all drunkards know that they
have no master but God — that they are their
own, and not the property of man — that
woman is endowed with the same wants and
capacities, and entitled to the same rights
and privileges with him, they would not long
wear the yoke of slavery ...22
Feminists' reliance on slavery imagery to express the
plight of women grew naturally from the early ties with the

21L_ily 4, no. 3 (March 1852), p. 22.
22Lily 4, no. 2 (Feb. 1852), p. 13.
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abolitionist movement.

The fledgling pre-Civil War woman's

rights movement was ignited and fueled by women whose
involvement in the anti-slavery movement had convinced them
that arguments from natural rights and human dignity applied
equally to women.

Early feminists had labeled their own

conditions as slavery, referring largely to the civil wrongs
of coverture and disfranchisement.

The direct analogy

between slavery and marriage appeared less frequently:
despite criticisms of its legal trappings, the institution
of marriage itself was accorded great deference.
After the war, though, liberal feminists' use of
slavery imagery took on a new directness, serving to
describe the actual physical and emotional relations between
husband and wife.

Slavery imagery gained dominance and new

meaning, and bondage became the metaphor of choice for
pro-divorce feminists.

Marriage itself had not become

significantly more oppressive in those few years.

Rather,

the Emancipation Proclamation and the subsequent
constitutional amendments offered a compelling new model for
the articulation of grievances, grievances that in the
slave's case had already been addressed with a suggestive
array of constitutional rights and remedies.

During the

Civil War, anti-slavery ideology had developed into a
political force invoking newly powerful models of government
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intervention to redress slavery's wrongs.

In many respects

anti-slavery rhetoric was a more powerful political tool
after the war precisely because of its new legal status.
For antebellum reformers, slavery had held the status of a
sin, a widespread corrupt practice that had offended notions
of natural and divine law.

By the late 1860s enslavement

had essentially become a crime, which human law outlawed and
whose consequences human law sought to redress.

The woman's

rights movement's reliance on the mechanisms of human law
grew reciprocally with the government's administration of
equal protection standards through statutes and
constitutional amendments.

With feminist theory newly

oriented toward legislative and policy goals, the franchise
foremost among them, the slavery paradigm took on a new
value as a language of political opposition.23
In gross terms, middle-class women who compared
themselves to bondswomen may seem melodramatic and
self-aggrandizing.

But feminists felt themselves in both

acute physical and spiritual bondage.

The slavery/freedom

23The growth of women's political culture is discussed
by Paula Baker in "The Domestication of Politics: Women and
American Political Society, 1780-1920," American Historical
Review 89, no. 3 (June, 1984): 620-647. See also Lori D.
Ginzberg, "'Moral Suasion is Moral Balderdash': Women,
Politics, and Social Activism in the 1850s," Journal of
American,History 73, no. 3 (Dec. 1986): 601-622.
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dichotomy helped articulate common apprehensions of the
illegitimacy of male and masterly authority, as well as
women's genuine outrage at a marital servitude that many
felt keenly was as degrading as actual bondage.

In

describing bad marriages women spoke of being crushed,
dwarfed, broken, crippled— a language of assaults on the
body that resonated wildly in the immediate aftermath of the
slavery contest.

Stories abounded of wive.? who pictured

themselves as "legalized slaves" to "masters" who meted out
brutal treatment unchecked and unprovoked.

An article in

the Revolution entitled "The Slavery of Woman" offered a
standard catalog of seductions, rapes, and assaults to which
women had been subjected.

One writer suggested, in the

absence of anyone to raise a cry of "murder," that "we do it
for ourselves, by stepping into the footprints of
Garrison.
For those women who were fortunate enough to escape
actual violence, codes and customs appeared to create
manacles no less confining for being based on law, habit,
and public sentiment.

Even the ostensibly autonomous female

body was encumbered by a scaffolding of hoops, buttons, and
stays. One mother asked in defense of the Bloomer costume,

“Revolution 1, no. 14 (April 9, 1868), pp. 216-17.
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"ought we, my child, to be enslaved by anything that cramps
the freedom of the soul ...?"”

Stanton eloquently declared

that "Our evolution thus far is but a struggle to stretch
ourselves while bound hand and foot, to fly with clipped
wings, to breathe with an anesthetic held to mouth and nose
... the oneness of man and woman (is) a oneness that makes
woman a slave."24 Women wrote and read books with titles
such as Hedged In. Forced Vows, and Fettered for Life, or
Lord and Master.27
Women's writing also made frequent literary use of the
escape scene inspired by fugitives from the South.
Diatribes against the laws of parental custody were laden
with descriptions that drew on the Eliza story from Uncle
Tom's Cabin, the slave mother escaping with her child,
hounds baying at her heels.

Such mothers, escaping their

oppressive husbands, asked, "but he will follow me, will
traduce me, and take my baby away from me, and the law won't

“Revolution 1, no. 16 (April 23, 1868), p. 244-45.
“Stanton, letter to Isabella Beecher Hooker, April 12,
1871, Stanton Papers,Douglass College Library, Rutgers
University. Stanton claimed great success for her marriage
lectures on the circuit.
“Hedged In. E.S. Phelps Ward (Boston, 1870); the other
two are by Lillie Devereaux Blake, Forced Vows (New York,
1870), and Fettered for Life (New York, 1874).
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give me my freedom, will it?"2'
This sentimentalized presentation of marital
enslavement and its consequences among all classes of
society is portrayed vividly in Fettered For Life, or. Lord
and Master, written in 1874 by the prominent suffragist and
Stanton-sympathizer Lillie Devereaux Blake.

Despite its

traditional format, the novel's moral was unconventional.
The mortality rate for the novel's female characters is
improbably high, and the author unsubtly conveys her message
that "man-marriage," or the common model of male domination,
takes a toll on women.

Marital slavery plays itself out

differently for each class, however, in a way that shows the
growing recognition of class distinctions in feminist
political analysis.

Antebellum divorce and anti-marriage

rhetoric had pictured all women as potential victims of a
husband's drunken violence without acknowledging hurts or
rights special to any group.

But in Fettered for Life women

of different classes are at risk in different ways, and
follow out particular patterns in their marriages.
The novel's working-class female characters— Biddy,
Rboda, Mrs. Blodgett— are especially vulnerable to physical
abuse, and have all beeh victimized by overt male brutality:

2>Wo_odhull and Claflin's Weekly. Oct. 29, 1870, p. 10.
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seduced and abandoned like Rhoda, or like Biddy brought to
death's door by an abusive spouse.

Mrs. Blodgett, whose

marriage to an underworld figure we follow throughout the
narrative, remains a loving and subservient mate to a
small-time criminal who finally kicks her to death in a
drunken frenzy toward the end of the novel.
By contrast, the genteel and middle-class Mrs. Moulder,
overworked mother of three, suffers a more subtle oppression
at the hands of a grumpy and domineering newspaper editor,
who shreds her dreams of a more cultivated life with his
mundane tyrannies rather than his fists.

Violence here is

displaced onto her pet canary, which Mr. Moulder kills with
a thoughtless (but significant) blow while trying to return
it to its cage.

Mrs. Moulder, undone by the excitement,

suffers a miscarriage and sinks into physical decline.
Harsh as these scenarios are, Blake saves the most
vivid slave imagery for the case of Flora, wealthy daughter
of a prominent businessman and best friend of the heroine.
Clearly the gay, innocent, and talented Flora represents for
Blake the most compelling and sympathetic case, one of
"pure” enslavement without actual physical violence or
demand.

While relying heavily on images of male violence,

middle-class feminists admitted that, in their
understanding, women like themselves experienced less abuse
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than working-class women, for whom marital violence was
often a way of life.”

While including domestic violence as

an important part of their critique, many liberal feminists
began to stress the suffering of the spirit above the
suffering of the body as the true enslavement.

The story of

Flora illustrates how the slavery metaphor took on new
meaning in their hands, as they focused more and more on the
stifling of the will, talents, and independence as the most
serious consequences of women's bondage.
Descriptions of the courtship of Flora and the worldly,
wealthy rou6 who pursues her are shot through with the
language of mastery.

For months Flora resists LeRoy's

overtures, fearing to become his "slave for life."

Finally

catching her unawares one night on the veranda, he forces a
kiss on her, murmuring "my sweet trembling little prisoner,
you are fairly caught.

Give me your promise."

In the face

of his "irresistible will," "forceful eyes," "detaining
hands," Flora "remained passive, unable to escape."

After

the kiss, "she was no longer free, no longer belonged to
herself, she had received a master, and been compelled to
submit to the symbol of his power ... 'I have passed under
the yoke,' she thought, 'I am a slave.'"

Thwarted in her

devolution 6, no. 14 (Oct. 6, 1870), p. 216, "The
Slave Women of America."
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attempt to escape, Flora continues to struggle weakly
throughout the marriage ceremony, but "the iron clasp held
her fast," and the vows were taken.30
Predictably, the marriage is an unhappy one: LeRoy
forbids Flora to walk alone, see old friends, or follow her
own pursuits.

In defiance she takes up her writing again,

and out of her anguish produces an extraordinary poem, which
she secretly sends off for publication.

LeRoy's anger at

her independence precipitates a crisis and Flora's decline.
On her deathbed she tells him that she can only be well
again if he will lift his ban on the publication of her
works; he refuses.31 Her dying words to him are "Remember
that women, as well as men, need an occupation for their
energies, and marriage without love is worse than death ...
There is light above my head— light and freedom!"32
Fettered for Life is emblematic of much liberal feminist
thought, illustrating how the problem of wasted talents and

38Fettered for Life, pp. 73, 128, 129, 264.
31This is the first documented instance of the adage,
"Publish or perish."
“Fettered for Life# p. 351. Another of Blake's
publications, Woman's Place Today (New York, 1890), contains
a similar story of the atrophied and wasted talents of a
beautiful young girl, "now in an alien grave, dead by her
own hand" (p. 64).
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the quest for professional opportunity— subjects with
particularly middle-class appeal— became increasingly
intertwined with the antislavery rhetoric of the marriage
critique.”

The right to hold a job, to pursue a career or

profession, came to be seen as a critical part of woman's
emancipation.

Marriage and Freedom of Contract
Slavery's antithesis in nineteenth-century political
discourse was freedom, and feminists' equation of marriage
and slavery compelled their audiences to contemplate divorce
through its obvious analogy, emancipation.

The traditional

marriage was undergoing its own Reconstruction.

As Stanton

declared, the growing number of divorces was not a sign of
declining morals, but exactly the opposite: "Woman is in a
transition period from slavery to freedom, and she will not
accept the conditions of family life that she has heretofore
meekly observed."34 According to the feminist agenda, what
did freedom or emancipation entail for the married woman?

“Revolution 1, no. 18 (May 7, 1868), p. 278-79.
“Quoted in Ellen DuBois, "The Limitations of
Sisterhood: Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Division in the
American Suffrage Movement, 1875-1902," Women and the
Structure of Society, ed. Barbara J. Harris and JoAnn K.
McNamara (Durham, N.C., 1984), pp. 166-67.
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In the view of a growing number of liberal feminists led by
Stanton, its most important tenets were self-ownership
within marriage and a right to divorce if the marriage
became degrading.
Linda Gordon and other historians of women have talked
about "self-ownership" as a form of birth control
("voluntary motherhood") and as a radical assertion of
sexual autonomy within marriage, both critical parts of
nineteenth-century feminists' claims.35 The term itself—
clearly predicated on slavery and coined to signify its
literal opposite— drew on both abolitionist and free love
traditions.

As Gordon has pointed out in her chapter on

"Voluntary Motherhood," despite profound disagreement on
other scores, a wide range of women activists— including
free lovers, liberal feminists, and the more conservative
Christian suffragists of the Woman's Christian Temperance
Union— concurred that married women were entitled to choose
or refuse sex at will, according to their own desires and

3SGordon, Chap. 6, "Social Purity and Eugenics." See
also Daniel Scott Smith, "Family Limitation, Sexual Control,
and Domestic Feminism in Victorian America," Feminist
Studies. vol. 1, nos. 3/4 (1973), pp. 40-57, reprinted in
Clio's_Consciousness Raised: New Perspectives on the History
of Women, ed. Mary S. Hartman and Lois W. Banner (New York,
1974); and William Leach, True Love and Perfect Union: The
Feminist Reform of Sex and Society (New York, 1980),
especially Chap 4, "Sexual Ownership and the Rationalization
of Sexual Desire."
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their wish to conceive.

Thus, the "right to her own person"

became a key feminist concept, language with little
resonance in the earlier period.38 Stantonians claimed that
next to self-ownership, which should "determine the future
of the race," suffrage represented only a "simple question
of political privilege."37
In a larger sense, Stanton and her sympathizers, in
common with Victoria Woodhull, were attempting to
restructure the idea of "right" to eliminate "obligation"
altogether, broadly privileging the right to be free of
obligation above the right to insist on the performance of a
legal or contractual duty.

They declared that "woman's

degradation is in man's idea of his sexual rights."

Placing

woman's right to refuse above man's need for sexual

“Gordon, pp. 95-97. Despite their common belief in
such a right, mainstream feminists disapproved of the free
love movement. Stanton's views were complicated: she agreed
with Victoria Woodhull's basic philosophy that women's
sexual oppression must be ended before civil rights for
women would be meaningful. The free love movement provided
critical support for her insistence that the right of
self-ownership was central, not peripheral, to the cause of
women. On occasion she openly endorsed the philosophy: see
Ellen C. DuBois, "On Labor and Free Love: Two Unpublished
Speeches of Elizabeth Cady Stanton," Signs 1, no. 1 (1975):
257-268. At the same time, she did not go nearly as far as
the free lover Victoria Woodhull in urging the positive
value of erotic pleasure governed only by the lover's
immediate inclination; she herself maintained a strong
belief in monogamy.
37Woodhull and Claflin's Weekly. Sept. 10, 1870, p. 4.

with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

relations, they denied that there was any male right at all,
or any corresponding wifely duty.31 Drawing on the romantic
anti-institutionalism of antebellum reform, liberal
feminists transposed that language into an endorsement of
voluntarism and radical personal autonomy.

They decried the

coercion of "marriage as a compulsory bond enforced by law
and rendered perpetual by that means," and labeled every
action and every relation that resulted from external
coercion inherently corrupt.39
Woodhull and Claflin's Weekly took this road further
than even Stanton and Anthony did.

An article with the

suggestive title "Marriage Versus Freedom," whose author
claimed Stanton's and Anthony's blessing on her views,
declared that "Freedom is the only right worth striving for
... if, indeed, there are any other rights outside of and
apart from personal freedom."

She dismissed critics'

objections that mutual obligations rendered complete
personal freedom impossible:

“Theodore Stanton and Harriot Stanton Blatch, eds.,
Elizabeth Cady Stanton As Revealed in her Letters, Diary,
and Reminiscences (New York, 1922), vol. 2 (Letters). p. 82.
See also John Cowan, Science of a New Life (1874; reprint
New York, 1970).
“DuBois, "On Labor and Free Love," p. 265.
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no person has any right to assume, to impose,
such dependence on another as will make the
exercise of that other's free will a source
of unhappiness. Neither single nor mutual
obligations should extend any further than
the purest free will prompts; and then they
are not obligations at all, but favors
instead ...“
Although the writers for Woodhull and Claflin's Weekly
went beyond most mainstream feminists in their emphasis on
individual liberty, Stanton herself was in complete sympathy
with their claims.

She even publicly defended the position

of mistress over that of wife on the grounds that it was a
voluntary relationship and not legal bondage.11 This
inherent privileging of a right to be free of obligations
over any right to exact obligations impugned not just the
marital bond, but an older structure which rested on
reciprocal concepts of rights and duties: rights and
obligations derived from status, by which the law described
the roles and relationships of pairs like master-slave,
husband-wife, parent-child.

The rights that liberal

feminists asserted— the right to vote, to own property, and
to act as guardians of their own children— worked to destroy
some of the rights formerly vested in men, but put no one

“Sarah Norton, Woodhull and Claflin's Weekly. Oct. 22
1870, p. 7.
“Revolution 2, no. 15 (Oct. 15, 1868), p. 233.
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under any continuing obligation, and engaged no one in any
reciprocal relationship.

Liberal feminists repeatedly

expressed their legal strategy as an attempt to lift laws
that restrained and coerced, rather than as a way to
obligate or coerce others.

In the grand scheme, they sought

Freedom, freedom from all unnecessary
entanglements and concessions, freedom from
binding obligations involving
impossibilities, freedom to repair mistakes,
to express the manifoldness of our own
natures, and to progress on, to advance to
higher planes of development."
Such radical autonomy left little room for ties.

In

their desire for freedom, in that binary understanding of
slavery and freedom which construed any customary or legal
bond as making one unfree, liberal feminists predicated
their claims on the assertion that "the laws of the
individual sovereignty of women are more sacred than any
human tie."43
In this attempt to reconstruct the nature of
obligation, liberal feminists moved naturally toward legal
concepts.

Seeking to recast the marriage relationship on

more nearly equal terms, they groped for language that could
express their vision in ways harmonious with mainstream

"Dubois, "On Labor and Free Love," p. 266.
"Revolution 5, no. 20 (May 19, 1870), p. 309.
also Stanton, Letters, p. 82.
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See

thought.

Contract was an obvious choice.

The contractual

ideal was pervasive in nineteenth-century society, so much
so that to speak of feminists invoking contract as a
"strategy" is misleading; it was the common coin of
intellectual life, spreading far beyond its legal bounds to
influence notions of reciprocity, obligation, and personal
and business relations.

Use of the slavery paradigm brought

the issue of freedom of contract into play.

Effectively the

condition of slavery had less to do with disenfranchisement
than with a slave's more immediate inability to sever old
work ties and form new ones and to bargain for a fair wage
— powers which acquired almost mystical importance in the
years around the Civil War.

In addition to the more general

civil status, then, "freedom" took on a narrower definition
in the ability to make and break agreements at will.44
Contract provided women both with a theory of equal and
reciprocal duties within an ongoing relation, and also with
a model for breaking that relation when the bargain went

440n the place of contract in American legal and social
life see J. Willard Hurst, Law and the Conditions of Freedom
in the Nineteenth-Centurv United States (Madison, Wis.,
1956); Morton Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law
(Cambridge, Mass., 1977), pp. 160-210; Grossberg, esp. pp.
20, 23-24; and Amy Dru Stanley, "Conjugal Bonds and Wage
Labor: Rights of Contract in the Age of Emancipation,"
Journal of American History, vol. 75 no. 2 (Sept. 1988), pp.
471-500.
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sour.
In addition to seeking justification for their
interpretations of the marriage obligation in the law of
contract/ liberal feminists invoked God in their support as
the first author of the dissoluble marriage contract.
Stanton repeatedly pointed out in her voluminous writings
and travels up and down the countryside that any legal bond
which condemned one party to an unhappy and degraded
existence violated God's own first plan for human happiness;
the legal bond of marriage/ then, must give way to God's
most sacred decree/ reinterpreted by his zealous female
apostles in America as "what God hath not joined together,
let man put a s u n d e r . A c c o r d i n g to Stanton, then, God's
own laws now required of human beings that, rather than a
sacramental or covenant theory of marriage relations, they
subscribe to a theory of marital contract, with its inherent
destructibility. No bond in this new world could be
irrevocably formed, for "any constitution, compact, or
covenant between human beings, that failed to promote human
happiness, could not ... be of any force or authority; and

“Revolution 3, no. 23 <June 10, 1869), p. 362. See
also the resolutions offered at the 1860 National Woman's
Rights Convention, reprinted in History of Woman Suffrage,
vol. 1, pp. 716-717.
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it would be not only a right, but a duty, to abolish it."44
For Stanton, the concept of contract represented
largely the deregulation of marriage, the non-interference
of church and state in the private realm.

It is true that

feminists in the 1850s were on the cusp of change: initially
repudiating human regulation as inimical to self-government,
women activists were beginning to see law as a tool that
could be manipulated for their own ends.

But it was the

enabling rather than the enforcing power of law which
appealed to feminists who sought to reform the marriage
contract.

Their view of the law of contract, although

oversimplified, held that "all contracts, covenants,
agreements, and partnerships are left wholly at the
discretion of the parties."47
Stanton did give some credence to the power of
government to regulate the initial formation of contracts,
including marriage.

Citing the need for safeguards like

minimum age, competence, and full disclosure, she encouraged
legislators to remedy "the absence of form and dignity in
the marriage contract which is unknown in any other

“History of Woman Suffrage, vol. 1, p. 716.
"Elizabeth Cady Stanton, "Address ... on the Divorce
Bill Before the Judiciary Committee," p. 10. See also
Revolution 2. no. 17 (Oct. 29, 1868), p. 264.
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civilized nation" with a strict set of prior conditions."
But this list also reads as a set of contractual defenses,
setting out grounds on which she thought divorce should be
more easily granted or marriages annulled.

Stanton pointed

out that in other civil contracts, failure to comply with
the conditions of entrance
vitiates the contract, and it is annulled by
the mutual agreement of both parties. But in
the marriage contract, which the state allows
to be formed so thoughtlessly, ignorantly,
irreverently, the parties have no control
whatever, though ofttimes in its formation
and continuance all laws of decency and
common sense are at defiance ..."
Stanton sought tough entry and easy exit, but felt that
stricter regulation of the creation of a marriage contract
would cut down on failed marriages.
The notion of free contract served as a blueprint for
remodelling the marriage relationship as well as for ending
it.

A part of the liberal project on marriage entailed

demystifying it by applying to it the everyday terms of
bargain and exchange which governed arms-length agreements
for services.

Feminists used contractual analogies to

describe faithful adherence to their marital terms, despite

"Davis, p. 68; History of Woman Suffrage, vol. 1, p.
718; Revolution 2, no. 16 <Oct. 22, 1868), pp. 249-50.
"Davis, p. 68.
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men's repeated violations of their own.

Many men refused to

perform their own obligations while insisting that women
meet theirs, thus moving the agreement from the realm of
contract into slavery.50 Several different writers for the
Revolution in particular employed the language of employment
relations and free labor to urge woman's more equal
participation in "the marital partnership," lest the common
imbalance "involve the bank of matrimony in hopeless
bankruptcy."51 The Revolution's boosting of the free
labor/free trade positions was not purchased with George
Francis Train's money, but served as an integral part of a
system of thought in which external compulsion was
synonymous with imbalance or disfunction.52
The author of an unattributed four-part series of
articles entitled "The Husband of Today" seems to have taken
a leaf from the debate over the ownership of the craftsman's

^Revolution. vol. 1 no 24 (June 18, 1868), p. 381.
“Revolution, vol. 5 no. 6 (Feb. 10, 1870), p. 94.
”ln Revolution vol. 3 no. 15 (April 15, 1869), p. 233,
for example, Stanton in an article entitled "Free Trade"
denied that since Train dissociated himself from the
Revolution it had gone over to "Greeley and the
Protectionists." "Commerce is ever the pioneer of
civilization and Christianity, and every barrier in the way
of exports and imports blocks the wheels of progress and
retards the moral and intellectual development of all the
races of man."
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tools when she complains that the wife has "no legal right
to that home which she is dutifully expected to beautify and
make pleasant" because man has the "rightful ownership of
all the goods and chattels of the family," rendering the
wife little more than a slave.

Like any other artisan,

woman claimed more control of the workplace and of her
"tools."

When houses were designed by men, they misplaced

the pantries and the sinks, little understanding the uses to
which such objects were put: "The wife has, doubtless, good
reason for the hot fire, the open draught, the large wash
... she doubtless knows {her job) better than her husband,"
whose ignorant "sole management" only puts him in the
category of "officious intermeddler."

Sharply criticizing

the profit motive which made men unwilling to invest capital
in the home, the author cites many women who "complained in
the roundest terms, in the bitterest Saxon, that they were
the drudges, the household slaves of money-getting husbands,
who, provided they could lay by year after year money (one
lady said $3,000) of profits, are either indifferent to, or
do not appreciate, the cares, sorrows, and overtoil of their
wives ... with all the heavy claims of maternity, being made
to work full up to the mark, like the man day-laborer ... a
dreary slavery in the free states."

Women's rights included

the right "to herself, to the use of all the powers and
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facilities God has given her, and the rights to the profits
of her labor ...

Visions of the Family
This vision of women's marital enslavement and
emancipation through the recasting of marriage as a contract
dissoluble at will— largely Stanton's vision— remained
highly controversial within feminism itself, as well as
attracting bitter criticism and attacks from outside.
Opponents claimed that liberal reformers' programs
threatened the nuclear family, and in fact these reformers
did have a distinctive agenda with regard to the family's
role and function.

Within the larger debate, Greeley as

usual staked out the orthodox position with his contention
that the family's main function was, as the social agent of
breeding, to provide for the training and education of
children.

This rationale bolstered his argument that the

importance of life-long marriage outweighed the happiness of
the individual parties, because it best served the goals of
stability and social order.
Liberal feminists emphatically rejected this

“Revolution. "The Hisband of Today," part 1, vol. 3
no. 18 (May 8, 1869), p. 275; part 2, vol. 3 no. 20 (May 20,
1869), p. 310; part 3, vol. 3 no. 25 (June 24, 1869), p.
386; part 4, vol. 4 no. 1 (July 8, 1869), p. 3.
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utilitarian view,insisting that motherhood was simply one
incident of womanhood, not its defining parameter.54
Reacting against attempts to shame women back into the home
with stories of neglected children and motherly duty, they
downgraded the maternal bond from the primary place it held
in the nineteenth century to stand as only one of many other
rights and obligations which made up female life, foremost
among them the right to self.

The contract model of marital

relations could not easily be fitted to the parent-child
relationship; but in rejecting the covenant model of
permanent bonds, liberal feminists, with both intellectual
and emotional conviction, sought to loosen their maternal
ties by denying the aspect of demand or duty.

Stanton's

hypersensitivity to forced bonds led her to class all bodily
obligations as feudal in nature; the law of perpetual
physical union was an ancient horror from Mthose dark
periods when marriage was held by the greatest doctors and

54For example, Revolution 1, no. 15 (April 16, 1868),
p. 229. Stanton's own attitude toward domesticity was full
of ambivalence. The mother of a large family, she styled
herself a great matriarch and roamed public conveyances
giving young mothers unsolicited advice from the
idiosyncratic and advanced maternal theories of which she
was so proud. As her family grew, though, she acknowledged
a growing weariness at household tasks that confined her,
and it was in part resentment at the physical demands of
women's lives which fueled her own quest for autonomy. See
in general Elisabeth Griffith, In Her Own Right; The Life of
Elizabeth Cadv Stanton (New York, 1984).
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priests of the church to be a work of the flesh only."”
Such thoughts contributed to the accurate impression of
many of the movement's critics that woman's rights, at least
as Stanton envisioned them, would radically alter the
marriage relationship.

Indeed, that bond in its traditional

form would have been changed in its essence as interpreted
through the creed which held that "the moment any act
expected of a person becomes compulsory, it becomes
correspondingly irksome."**

In his writings Greeley had

emphasized the social bases of family relations.

Stanton,

Andrews, and Owen, by contrast, sought to establish marriage
as an affective relationship based on a romantic love that
was voluntary, ephemeral, spontaneous, and responded poorly
to legal coercion.

"Our laws on marriage are bound up with

a false assumption, viz, that the affections and judgment
are subject to the will."
Law could not create love, an argument which radicals
thought demolished the rationale for laws regulating
marriage and divorce.57 Marriage was not a legal bond or
social duty, but an affective relationship of mutual love

”Historv of Woman Suffrage, vol. 1, pp. 716-717.
5*Woodhull and Claflin's Weekly. Nov. 5, 1870, p. 6.
^Revolution, vol. 3 no. 8 (Feb. 25, 1869), p. 117.
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and kindness, "intended by God for the greater freedom and
happiness of both parties."5* Downplaying its physical
aspect, divorce reformers suggested that "It is not mere
physical infidelity but that adultery of the heart which
quenches conjugal love; thus destroying that which, far more
justly than your cohabitation till death, may be regarded as
'the essence of marriage.'"5' By this standard, marriage
"fulfills God's intentions so long as the domestic home is
the abode of purity, of noble sentiment, of kindness ..."
By this standard, too, a marriage is broken not just by
catastrophic upheaval, but when it becomes "the daily cause
of grievous words and heartless deeds— of anger, strife,
selfishness, cruelty, ruffianism."*9
Clearly a marital relation that existed only through
the rigor of the law and not the mutual love and ongoing
consent of the parties was not conducive to the highest
human development, and the furthering of happiness and human
growth became the new standard by which social and political
functions were judged.

Utilitarianism combined with the

developing creed of liberal Protestantism to produce a new

3lHistorv of Woman Suffrage, vol. 1, p. 860.
5,In Greeley, "Marriage and Divorce," p. 585.
*°In Greeley, "Marriage and Divorce," p. 577.
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rationale for institutions from the state down to the
family.

It was to accommodate this new vision of the family

as constituted by the ongoing consent of the parties rather
than by legal forms that Stanton sought to recast the
marriage bond to eliminate any element of irrevocability or
coercion from outside.

She denied that marriage vows were

anything but a voluntary, temporary mutual agreement for the
benefit of both.

Citing the "weakness and blindness" which

led human beings to make poor decisions in the choice of
business partners, legislators, teachers, and other public
officers, she urged that the far graver matrimonial bond
should be a "contract— no more perpetual than either or all
of the former."61 By 1870 Stanton declared that in the
Protestant world the question was no longer whether marriage
was a sacrament or a contract, but, as a contract, for what
reasons it might be dissolved.62
Stanton re-envisioned the family as reforming along the
lines of the republican state: it would consist henceforth
of a collection of free and independent individuals,
voluntarily contracting for a corporate existence during the
pleasure of the parties, each protected in its own autonomy

“History of Woman Suffrage, vol. 1, pp. 717-18.
“Davis, pp. 64-65.
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by inalienable individual rights.43 Many other feminists,
though, felt the limitations inherent in the wholesale
adoption of the personal liberty model of social change.
The strict dichotomy between slavery and freedom worked to
create a scheme of personal rights that could not
accommodate the genuine physical and emotional dependencies
of family relations.

Stanton's rhetoric often pitted

woman's right to herself against intimate demands pictured
only as cloying and confining.

For Stanton, "a single life

of self-reliance, dignity, individual growth and
development, is more sacred than a relation that subjects
(woman) body and soul, to the will of another.""
Many feminists and reformers from across the spectrum
resisted as pernicious Stanton's attempts to apply a
commercial theory of contract to the marriage relation.
Opponents of liberal divorce founded their arguments on the
importance of the ideal, if not always the reality, of
marriage as a permanent institution.

For them, Stanton's

use of contract theory provided a model of family relations
that neither worked realistically to redress inequality, nor
acknowledged the durability and permanence of parental or

"History of Woman Suffrage, vol. 2, pp. 18-19.
"Revolution 5, no. 9 (March 3, 1870), p. 136.
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marital ties.
Religious precepts helped to shape these differing
visions.

Feminists like Antoinette Brown Blackwell resisted

Stanton's contract theory, maintaining instead a covenantal
view of marriage.

Blackwell adopted a Christian ideal of

marriage, not through an unthinking adherence to scriptural
commands and injunctions, but through a belief in the
doctrines of salvation, redemption, perfectionism, and
atonement.

Stanton offered human incompetence and frequent

errors in choosing business partners, teachers, and other
important contacts as evidence that the ability to dissolve
such relations should always exist; and in marriage more so,
since mistakes were frequent and costly.
Blackwell too acknowledged problems within marriage,
but her faith in marriage as a relation encompassed the
"growth and assimilation of the parties" to each other, the
smoothing out of differences over time, that only the
permanence of marriage would promote.

The nature of moral

life required that human beings maintain, if not the
attraction and affection of their salad days, at least the
"devotion to the good of another, and especially to the good
of the sinful and guilty,

(which) like all

disinterestedness, must redound to the highest good of its
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author ... obedient to the highest laws of benevolence.
A husband's irresponsibility provided the opportunity for a
wifely redemptive intervention, for as a Christian she could
"never enjoy peace or rest until (she had) ... thus
reclaimed him and brought him out of his sins ... as (she)
would work to save (her) children, brothers, sister, and the
whole human family."”
Blackwell saw marriage not as a "tie" as Stanton had
suggested, with the inbuilt possibility of untying, but as a
"relation" which once formed can never be destroyed: one can
"untie" but not unrelate.*7 For her it was a critical,
defining element of human nature that individuals could form
a marriage relation through a single act of will that had
permanent consequences.

She frequently made analogies

between marriage and biological ties, asking,
can the mother ever destroy the relation
which exists between herself and the child?
Can the father annul the relation which
exists between himself and the child? Then,
can the father and mother annul the relation
which exists between themselves, the parents
of the child? It cannot be.**
Like Greeley, Blackwell believed that marriage by its nature
“History of

WomanSuffrage, vol. 1, p. 723.

“History of

WomanSuffrage, vol. 1, p. 726.

“History of

WomanSuffrage, vol. 1, p. 724.

“History of

WomanSuffrage, vol. 1, p. 724.
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continued for the lives of the spouses.

But, unlike him,

she did not base her claim directly in social good, or any
theory of society, but rather in an imperative for the moral
development of the individual.

For her the extraordinary

characteristic of human love was the way in which it
approximated divine love, in that it outlasted the span of
human life.
By contrast, in Stanton's vision of romantic love,
individual satisfaction described the nature of the bond.
She derided the concept of Christian love in marriage,
denying that husband and wife could ever act as saviors to
each other.

While her critics charged that love was a

compound of "forbearance, patience, forgiveness, endurance
...," she eschewed these virtues, seeing marriage not as a
process, a "soul perfecting itself through trial," but as a
spontaneous emotional reaction.

Stanton denied that love

was an act of will, or that it could be deliberately
prolonged by the parties once the fragile bloom was gone.69
Blackwell and Stanton differed fundamentally in their
understanding of the connection generated in marriage.
Stanton perceived marriage as a tie susceptible to
dissolution at will.

Blackwell described marriage as a

69See Leach, True Love and Perfect Union, pp. 10-11.
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relation whose very formation, although voluntary, entailed
a permanent bond.

For feminists such as Jane Croly, who

questioned such "connective" definitions of marriage, the
ties of circumstance and relation were inevitable, the
definition of life itself, without which it would be
impoverished.
We are tied from the moment we enter the
world, and are probably the better and
happier for it, though we may rebel against
it. We are actual slaves to circumstances,
which preceded our births, which enclosed us
in a skin, which governed our height, our
color, our shape, our strength or weakness,
and over which we had not the least control.
We are tied after birth to certain natural
laws, which we very imperfectly understand,
and of which we can only see the results. We
are tied with cords woven by time itself to
the habits and traditions which have preceded
us; and more strongly still are we tied by
our instincts and desires which, blind and
unreasoning as they are, we are compelled to
obey ... We see, then, there is very little
of the freedom of which we boast so much in
the matter.70
Denying the theory of radical individual and bodily
autonomy so important to Stanton, Croly saw interdependence:
"as parts of one great body, we are all dependent upon and
owe duties to each other.71 What autonomy does an arm have,
or a foot?

For Croly, a body isolated was a body devalued;

70Jane Croly, For Better of Worse: A Book for Some Men
and.All Women (Boston, 1875), p. 4.
71Croly, p. 221.
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such a fiction flew in the face of the authentic conditions
of life.

Stanton's refusal to acknowledge any social

function of the family, or any legitimate church or state
interest in regulating it, tended toward the complete
privatization of the family, marking that area off as
"personal" and impervious to regulation, for better or
worse.12 The family became an isolated sphere, governed by
a contractual ideal.

Although Stanton's vision of the

family did not go uncontested by her contemporaries, in fact
it is largely this view of family law that has prevailed in
courts and legislatures today.

Protectionism and Liberalism
Despite the resistance to Stanton's stand on divorce
both from within the movement and without, her influence
proved far greater than a polling of her opponents might
suggest.

Divorce itself remained controversial; but

pro-divorce arguments were a critical piece of the far
broader liberal rights theory of which Stanton was a chief
architect.

Political s a w y kept her from openly declaring

herself a free lover, but a common store of ideas with a

72In this sense, Stanton's .family design looked very
much like the privatized family Christopher Lasch describes
in Haven in a Heartless World: The Family Besieged (New
York, 1977).
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free love stamp became the basis of Stanton's political
creed.73 Indeed, in one sense self-ownership— construed
also as self-respect— came to replace more traditional
"virtue" in the feminist canon as the qualification for
citizenship, through the claim that all wise and virtuous
government rested on the foundation of a citizenry with a
strong sense of individual mastery.74 without these,
political rights were meaningless, for
if you go to a southern plantation and speak
to a slave of his right to property, to the
elective franchise, to a thorough education,
his response will be a vacant stare ... the
great idea of his right to himself, of his
personal dignity, must first take possession
of his soul, and then he will demand equality
in everything ... I repeat, the center and
circumference of woman's rights is just what
the slave's are. Personal freedom is the
first right to be proclaimed, that does not
and cannot belong to the relation of wife
75
• • •

The very concept of "right," then, was predicated here on a
world where those rights were to be exercised free of the
legal and social restraints imposed by obligation to others.
Liberal feminists sought to make the absolute right to

73DuBois suggests this in "On Labor and Free Love."
“Revolution 5, no. 10 (March 10, 1870), p. 147.
75Letter from Stanton to Susan B. Anthony, Nov. 24,
1856, Stanton papers, Douglass College Library, Rutgers
University.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

135

oneself the basis for the exercise of rights within the
state, and their rhetoric on personal rights and rights
within the family became the basis of their model for the
exercise of political rights.7* For Stanton, then,
questions of family governance were measured by the same
yardstick as questions about the role of the citizen in
society and in the state.
In addition to applying the forms of contract to
marriage, divorce reformers sought to tighten the
correspondence between rights in the family and the civil
realm by using constant analogies from other areas of law
and public policy, which they brought to bear on the law of
the family, as well.

To this end, Stanton, like Andrews and

Owen, drew on analogies from liberal economic theory, free
labor and free trade ideology, and the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of conscience and separation of church
and state to sketch in a new model of family law.

Sensing a

deep intellectual kinship, all three conflated such issues
as free divorce, free love, free labor, free contract, and

7*Matilda Joslyn Gage, one of Stanton's strongest
allies, restated this position at the NWSA convention in
1876, saying "without control of one's person, the
opportunities of the world, which are the only means of
development, cannot be used." Quoted in Leach, p. 81.
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free trade.77 Stanton herself confirmed the connection
between doctrines with the story of a man who refused Graham
bread, "for he had noticed that if anybody began with bran
bread, he was sure to end with infidelity"— a somewhat
eccentric formulation of a great progressive truth.7'
Their opponent Horace Greeley had little trouble
recognizing these reformers' organic approach.

He lumped

free traders, usurers, tax dodgers, and advocates of easy
divorce together in one morally bankrupt category, claiming
that "the free trade sophistry respecting marriage is on
every libertine's tongue.1,7* Andrews for his part commended
Greeley, saying "You rightly refer free trade, freedom of
the finances, freedom from state systw^s of religion and
education, and freedom of the love relation, to one and the
same principle, and that principle you recognize as the

77Historv of Woman Suffrage, vol. 2, p. 19. Theodore
Dwight Woolsey, foe of divorce, parodied these connections
as "free rum, free Sundays, freesuffrage, and free
divorce." Woman's Journal. Nov. 26, 1870, p. 372.
7'Stanton, "Free Love," p. 268.
7#"Love, Marriage, and Divorce," p.36. Greeley's main
concern was the protection of the working classes rather
than the emancipation of the spirit: perceiving free trade
as the enemy of the workingman, Greeley opposed it
vehemently (p. 54). His enthusiasm for the virtues of
association ended abruptly at the point at which advocacy of
personal or sexual liberty seems to threaten social or
economic stability through the deterioration of that stable
economic unit, the family.
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spirit of the age ...",0 Both sides, then, recognized that
reformers were working to make the regulation of families of
a piece with broader principles at work in areas of public
and private commercial law.

At heart, the problem in all

areas was the same: to secure the

removal of an external

structure of laws to allow natural governing forces to
assert themselves.
Although his proposals and his understanding of women's
sexual subordination were radical for his day (and perhaps
for ours), Andrews' political theory embodied strong liberal
tendencies through his belief in the resistless power of an
underlying order, and the need to eliminate all external
regulation to allow that order to work unimpeded, a
philosophy to which Stanton subscribed as well.

A devoted

disciple of Fourier, " (who really was about the most
remarkable genius who has yet lived),"

Andrews subscribed

to Fourier's "grand discovery that Attraction, which Newton
discovered to be the law and the regulation of the motions
of material bodies, is equally the law and the God-intended
regulation of the whole affectional and social sphere in
human affairs ..."“

When the artificial restraints of law

“ "Love, Marriage, and Divorce", p. 43.
,1"Love, Marriage, and Divorce," p. 9.
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and custom were removed, the powerful force of Attraction
would insure that human affairs were self-regulating, both
in the economic and in the more important erotic world.
Andrews saw the progress toward a fully self-regulating
world as inevitable:

"Freedom in love is the last

attainment of the progressive civilized world.

It is the

culminating point toward which all other reforms tend.

The

system of restriction or arbitrary order in which the world
was bound for ages is gradually dissolving.
Andrews and Stanton also analogized the growth of
religious tolerance to liberal (non-regulatory) family laws,
seeking to extend the established principles of freedom of
conscience and of theological persuasion to cover unorthodox
sexual relations as well.

Andrews poked fun at one of his

critics, suggesting that no "doubt ... he, too, is honest in
his statement of the doctrine of religious freedom, and that
he would, in practice, recognize my right to live with three
women, if my conscience approved, as readily and heartily as
he would contend for the rights to read the Protestant Bible
at Florence."13 Andrews claimed for himself "no better
right to determine what is moral or proper for you to DO

“ "Love, Marriage, and the Condition of Woman,"
(published with "Love, Marriage, and Divorce").
,3"Love, Marriage, and Divorce," p. 22.
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than ... to determine what it is religious for you to
BELIEVE," and likened such an attempt to the burnings at
Smithfield.

Any effort to regulate the moral lives of

others through the mechanism of the state, Andrews
suggested, would always end in the resort to such
time-dishonored sanctions as "public odium, the prison, the
gibbet, the hemlock, or the cross"— sanctions which may
punish or suppress but which never succeed in creating a
truly harmonious order.”

Stanton heartily concurred that

the rigid enforcement of the Christian ideal, of lifelong
monogamous marriage represented undue influence by church
and state in the private lives of individuals.
Stanton's own repeated advocacy of free labor, free
trade, and free currency shows that she extended her belief
in deregulation to the economy; and that there was more than
a superficial affinity between her views on marriage, her
philosophy of government, and classic liberal notions of
laissez faire.15 Indeed, reformers' efforts to meld those
elements together shows a more complex face of liberalism
than we usually see.

Liberal theory is often portrayed as

” "Love, Marriage, and Divorce," p. 78. Smithfield is
the site in London where religious martyrs were burned at
the stake.
,5See Leach on Stanton in True Love and Perfect Union.
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an amalgam of pessimism and human greed; but neither of
these could account for the grip it took on American
ideology.

Stanton's liberal leanings were based firmly in a

liberal Protestant creed which celebrated the innate
goodness of human nature and its ability to find its own
right course once external regulation was lifted.

Despite

her anticlericalism, Stanton was a child of the Second Great
Awakening, and subscribed to its tenets on the efficacy of
human will.'*

The Christian perfectionism of the antebellum

period— perfection of the soul— translated for many in the
post-war period into a perfection of the life and of the
work— human happiness.

Although their interests were not

the same, liberal reformers made common cause with business
interests on the best method of securing change of any sort:
deregulation.

Nineteenth-century liberalism, then, was not

a single strand, but a complex weave of economic, political,
and religious philosophies, and much the stronger for it.
The issue of protection had also been at stake in the
wrangling which went on among Andrews, Owen, and Greeley in
the decade before the Civil War.

As an anarchist, Andrews

was a strong proponent of self government or self
sovereignty, the idea that any authority exercised by one

“See Alice Rossi, The Feminist Papers (New York,
1974), part 2.
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human being over another interposed itself illegitimately
between the individual and God's governance— a belief shared
by abolitionists and feminists as well.

In the context of

free love, this concept expressed itself most radically in
terms of the freeing of the body from any obligations
imposed from without.

A chief architect of the free lovers'

creed of the absolute right of the individual to bodily
mastery and integrity, that independence became for Andrews
the single most important measure of social health; while
the physical subjugation of women in American society was a
prime indicator of its diseased state.

Like Stanton, he saw

bodily obligations as evidence of an ancient serfdom
repugnant to enlightened minds.

Andrews saw himself as a

revolutionary fighting against "the defenders of slavery,
and the fastidious aristocratic classes everywhere," as well
as against all vestiges of the feudal structure of
hierarchy, tenures, and paternalism which placed, protected,
and imprisoned the individual.
Stanton's composite writings and pronouncements tended
toward the disaggregation of the family as well, an outcome
she found personally, socially, and politically desirable.
Her philosophy of marriage emphasized the aspect of
individual development, and the severing of obligatory ties
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and dependencies contributed to this.17 Socially as well,
Stanton was convinced that only the removal of all
restriction on women— domestic, civil, physical— could bring
them into a position of full equality.

Politically, she

classed the patriarchal family with "despotic governments
(and) infallible churches ... Every new step in civilization
tends to individual awareness, dignity, responsibility,
alike in the church, the state, and the home ...""

Clearly

the democratic reorganization of the family required that
each individual be accorded full status and rights:

Stanton

denied that the "representative" theory of the family as a
"unit" was acceptable.

Government should deal with

individuals, not with families, or with certain of its
members as representatives of others.'9
Inherent in the push for the disaggregation of the
family was the recognition that, like slavery or the harem,
the protection offered by family membership was often at the
price of liberty.

For slaves, being "'a part of the

family'" had "protected" them from the onus of taxation, as
well as denying them a civil voice; leaving the "family"

"Stanton, Letters, p. 10.
"Revolution, vol. 5 no. 10 (March 10, 1870), p. 152.
"Ibid.
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changed both.40 Any physical obligation which owed its
existence to a code or rule was similarly discredited: just
as Horace Greeley denounced "the free trade sophistry
respecting marriage," the liberal feminists equated the
safety of marriage with the harem, with paternalism and
slavery, claiming "protection is the leech that preys upon
the heart of liberty."

"Protectors" take on a sarcastic

significance in Stanton's work as those who rape and seduce
women.91
In fact, discussions of the marriage question both
within and without organized feminism also centered on
another set of issues— economic protection and the
consequences of easy divorce for wives and mothers.

In

1860, Stanton's and Blackwell's optimistic beliefs in the
potential for the liberated and energetic woman to achieve
economic parity allowed both to ignore the problem of
dependence.92 A decade later, some feminists were more
skeptical.

Stanton's brash and public advocacy of divorce

was an irritant which contributed to the estrangement of the
New York and Boston feminist groups.

Although Lucy Stone

"History of Woman Suffrage, vol. 2, p. 169; "Address
in Favor of Universal Suffrage" (Albany, N.Y., 1867).
"Revolution, vol. 2 no. 11 (Sept. 17, 1868), p. 169.
"History of Woman Suffrage, vol. 1, pp. 716-22.
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and Henry B. Blackwell almost certainly agreed with Stanton
in private, they feared that her public stance would taint
the quest for the ballot, and lose the suffrage movement
crucial support.

They steadfastly refused to acknowledge

the link between civil and domestic inequality, naively
arguing that, once the lack of political rights for women
had been redressed, relations between the sexes would right
themselves as a natural consequence.
At the same time, writers for the Woman's Journal, the
paper of the Boston-based American Woman Suffrage
Association (AWSA), had another complaint to make: they
found Stanton's rhetoric naive and disingenuous in its
assumption that free divorce would primarily benefit women.
How many mothers, under the circumstances, could afford to
sweep grandly out and set up housekeeping on their own?
Stone and her followers intimated that "freedom" for a
divorced mother of six should be known by its other names,
immiseration and abandonment.

For the suffragists of the

AWSA, divorce was at best an unfortunate necessity in cases
of chronic spousal abuse; but free divorce in Stanton's
terms represented "practically, freedom of unworthy men to
leave their wives and children to starve, while it could not
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give similar freedom to mothers to leave their children."”
Neither wing of the suffrage movement showed any abiding
sensitivity to the problems of working class women, the AWSA
less than Stanton's group.

The Boston contingent, though,

grasped that the "right" of divorce must be seen in light of
prevailing economic conditions, where "a wife with children,
who has lost the help of her husband, has undertaken a
contest with fortune against heavy odds."94 The imperative
of self sovereignty, then, left little room for financial,
physical, or emotional obligation of any kind.

As Andrews

had earlier announced, "The great lesson for the world is
that human beings do not need to be taken care of.

What

they do need is such conditions of justice and friendly
cooperation that they can take care of themselves."

Stanton

concurred that the dangers of protectionism far outweighed
the problems of poverty.”

Conclusion
The adoption of the slavery metaphor for
marriage— with its reflexive counter, freedom— had weighty

Roman's Journal. Sept. 12, 1874, p. 294.
^Woman's Journal. June 4 1870, p. 173.
” "Love, Marriage, and Divorce," pp. 18-19.
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consequences for the development of feminist thought in
America.

It gave feminists an immediate and powerful

concept and language of personal independence with resonance
in the dominant culture.
vision of equality.

It also carried a transformative

There were several feminist traditions

in the nineteenth century; but it is this vision of
liberation which the woman's movement of the mid-twentieth
century has drawn on for support and sustenance.

The ideal

of personal freedom has proven durable as a spark to
political action that addresses women's deepest concerns.
More than a century later, well after political "equality"
was established by the Nineteenth intendment, the idea of
escape from bondage fueled a women's movement that has
changed the shape of American social life.
At the same time, the process of defining rights,
occurring both within feminism and in the larger political
culture, transformed their meaning through the paradigm of
slavery and freedom.

In Stanton's liberal view, shaped by

her post-Civil war contractual view of marriage, rights
originated in the private sphere, not within the context of
social or public life.

The Revolution argued that the

assertion of self ownership for women must become "the
paramount and controlling influence of her life, for
individual freedom of choice is the cornerstone of
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individual responsibility, and all virtue and wise
government must rest on this foundation.”

Only then, "when

responsible alone to God and herself, she shall possess the
right to life and liberty, she will occupy a position in
which she will logically be capable of becoming a Beneficent
Power."96 Departing from the antebellum formulation that
rights were both the offspring and the agent of performing
duties, Stanton insisted that rights were paramount and
antecedent to duties.

The earlier notion that the

perfection of individual rights was the only means of
protecting the rights of the community gave way to language
that pitted the individual against the community: Stanton
concluded that "the best interests of a community can never
require the sacrifice of one innocent being, of one sacred
right."97
The elevation of the individual right to a position of
absolute authority created a philosophical framework in
which it was easiest to recognize the negative right, the
right to be free from something; and where the balancing of
rights through the recognition of binding claims by one
person on another was made, if not impossible, at least

devolution vol. 5, no. 10 (March 10, 1870), p. 147;
see also Cowan, op. cit.
devolution vol. 2, no. 17 (Oct. 29, 1868), p. 265.
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conceptually dubious.

Sarah Norton/ a contributor to

Woodhull and Claflin's Weekly, spoke for much of
nineteenth-century feminism— indeed, much of
nineteenth-century liberalism— when she asked, "wherein,
then consists the value of a right that cannot be
appropriated at the option of the individual possessing it?
or how much of the value or usefulness remains, if it is to
be subject to the control of some greater right?"”
Liberal feminists, pushing the argument that "we do not
live by bread alone," were compelled to downgrade the
importance of financial security in marriage, in order to
establish it as an affective relationship between equals.”
This emphasis hindered meaningful discussion among
Stantonians of another set of issues— economic protection
and the consequences of easy divorce for wives and mothers.
Ultimately, despite her quick sympathy with the oppressed of
all sorts, Stanton's preoccupation with individual freedom
prevented her from developing a coherent class-based theory
that invoked systematic legal or institutional remedies to
women's position in marriage.

Stanton throughout her life

maintained a belief in the primacy of change at the personal

”Woodhull and Claflin's Weekly. Sept. 3, 1870, p. 7.
“Revolution vol. 6, no. 1 (July 7, 1870), p. 2.
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level.

She judged civil perfection to be the result of the

perfection of individuals, a belief that after the war was
translated into a defense of individual rights.
Stanton suggested that women's rise should follow the
projected path of the slave: "end all this talk of class
legislation, bury the Negro in the citizen, and claim the
suffrage for all men and women ..."

She rejected any

argument based on the "rights of races," and accepted as the
only rationale for reform the slave's "manhood; his
individual, inalienable right to freedom and equality; and
thus ... woman's case today."109
Such an idealistic response to the practical problems
of racism and sexism has left a mixed legacy for
twentieth-century feminists.

Ultimately, Stanton's

theories, by undermining the bonds between individuals
within the family and by placing the source of rights in
this deregulated private sphere, may have made it more
difficult to assert group rights in the larger social
setting.

The contractual theory of liberal individualism

has never proven a satisfactory mediator of family
relations; nor has the extension of that theory into the
civil sphere created a basis for the assumption by the state

^ Revolution vol. 3, no. 2 (Jan. 14, 1869), p. 25.
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of family obligations— day care, medical care for children,
parental leaves— that could genuinely have changed the lives
of all women.
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Chapter III - Self-Ownership and the Political Theory of
Elizabeth Cady Stanton
The emphasis on freedom or enslavement of the body, and
the issues which sprang from that focus, were feminists'
contribution to American liberalism, as well as their link
to radical thought.

Elizabeth Cady Stanton had drawn

arguments from the realm of political liberty and religious
tolerance to make the case for choice in private life; but
the vision of individual autonomy in sexual and domestic
matters served also as the basis for her definition of
citizenship, and as a paradigm for relations among citizens
and between citizens and the state.

Self ownership was the

unifying theme which ran through Stanton's political
development; it described for her the only appropriate
relationship between any individual and her family,
community, government, or God.
The nineteenth century saw the transformation of
liberalism by feminism, and by women's entry into the public
sphere.

Liberal women's claims to liberty,.equality, and

natural rights employed the language of the Founding
Fathers, but their content was quite different.1 Women's

^llen DuBois in Feminism and Suffrage: the Emergence
of an Independent Woman's Movement in America. 1848-1869
(Ithaca, New York, 1978) and Aileen Kraditor in The Ideas of
the Woman Suffrage Movement 1890-1920 (New York 1965) both
151
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formulations of their own rights were not echoes of the
eighteenth century; their definition of liberty was more
personal than that of the Founders.

Support for civil

rights was strong, but the feminist positions which roused
the most passion tended to be those claims for bodily
control which drew from the radical utopian and free love
agenda even when not explicitly acknowledging the debt.
Voluntary motherhood, the right to be free of conjugal
relations, age of consent laws, the right to divorce, the
availability of writs of habeas corpus for married women
against their husbands, custodial rights, abolition of the
double standard and of the husband's privilege to administer
corporal punishment— all of these issues became incorporated
into public political debate, and significantly pushed out
the limits of potential liberal personhood.

With the

exception of divorce, liberal women agreed on these claims,
and they became a part of the feminist agenda early on.
This is not to say that liberal feminists rejected
classic liberalism.

National Woman Suffrage Association

<NWSA) members in the post-war period espoused traditional
liberal positions on free trade, currency, the primacy of
contract, and freedom of religious thought, and generally

take the tack that feminist claims were essentially
replications of revolutionary republican rhetoric.
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supported deregulatory positions while emphasizing
individual liberties.2 The campaign for married women's
property reform fit easily into the liberal mold as well,
creating a liberal legal personality who expressed herself
in the control of and contracting for goods and services,
turning a "femme covert into a living, breathing woman— a
wife into a property holder, who can make contracts, buy and
sell."3 Claims for employment and equal pay, although not
pursued in the post-war period with the vigor of other
issues, sprang out of the growing equality rhetoric which
stressed the right to support oneself as a part of the
liberal scheme.

The franchise itself was the mark of a

liberal individual.
But feminism's contribution to liberalism was to re
enforce and greatly expand the individual's zone of privacy;
to widen the definition of rights past the rights of the
individual in his civil status to include the rights of the
individual in her private capacity.

The intellectual

genesis of these positions is most easily traced in the

2A good representative sample of this writing can be
found in the Revolution in the years Stanton and Anthony
edited it (1868-1870) .
3Letter from Stanton to Gerrit Smith, Seneca Falls,
n.d., Stanton Papers, Douglass College.
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writings of Elizabeth Cady Stanton.4
Stanton had always cast the traditional family, the
church, and the state as the three interrelated structures
which kept women in the position of bond-servants and
prevented their growth and development outside stultifying
traditional roles.

The Founding Fathers had taken a

definite step in the right direction in abolishing the power
of monarchy in favor of government by the people.

But they

had left intact intermediate structures of authority, the
hierarchies of family and church, and so "fastened their
broken chains on all they considered inferior to themselves
and incapable of resistance."5 Antebellum "government by
the people" brought self government to representatives of
groups rather than to individuals; Stanton argued that "to
build a true republic the church and the home must undergo

4Again, this chapter raises the problem of Stanton's
representativeness within the movement, mentioned in the
introduction. I am writing here about Stanton, but have
tried at the same time to make clear that although her ideas
were always more developed and usually more radical than her
co-workers in the NWSA, there were large areas of agreement,
and Stanton's opinions in their own right were highly
influential even where there was disagreement. Stanton did
serve repeatedly as president and officer of the NWSA; her
views were not so far outside the mainstream as to alienate
large numbers of the group's voting constituency, at least
as long as the NWSA remained a separate organization.
Elizabeth Cady Stanton, "Self Government" (ca. 1874),
Stanton Papers, Library of Congress, reel 3.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

155

the same upheavings we now see in the s t a t e . F o r Stanton
the move she made in the 1870s away from political analysis
and toward exploring inequity in the home and later in the
church was a move toward understanding and destroying the
deep structure of political inequality.7
To do so, Stanton set out to undermine traditional
sources of communal and familial authority.

A letter from a

reader of the Revolution asked if the family didn't need a
ruling head to prevent anarchy.

Stanton's reply lumped

fathers with kings and popes as despots to be overturned by
the emerging individual in the full exercise of her rights;
the representative theory of the family— whereby women were
to be represented in the public arena by their husbands and
fathers— worked no better for Stanton than that theory of
government.

She explicitly denied that the family was a

sub-unit or "governing power" in the state, charging
governments instead to deal with individuals directly: "The
law takes cognizance of family relations only as they are

‘Elizabeth Cady Stanton et al, eds., History of Woman
Suffrage, vol. 2 (New York, 1882), p. 152.
7Within the movement she succeeded to a remarkable
extent in fusing the issues; the theoretical question was
often conceived as "Woman in the Home, the Church, and the
State," an example being a talk given by Laura Cuppy Smith
through the American Literary Bureau, as advertised in
Woodhull and Claflin's Weekly, vol. 3 no. 22 (Oct. 14,
1871).
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brought to its notice."*

The patriarch was to be stripped

of his power in the home, and adult individuals returned to
full autonomy, thereby perfectly fulfilling the promise of
the American Revolution and bringing personal liberty back
to the most immediate level.
This agenda created a strong tension between public and
privare which has dogged the women's movement ever -ince.
As issues of domestic governance moved outside the "privacy"
of the home— often a euphemism for unchecked abuse of male
authority*— they necessarily becam.-* ’’public" in the broadest
sense, talked, written, and read about in the dominant
forums of the day.

In the process of women's integration

into the political realm— a fait accompli well before the
Nineteenth Amendment— women firmly nailed such formerly
"private" areas as family law jurisdiction, separation and
divorce, bodily autonomy, and the abolition of the sexual
double standard to the platform of liberalism.

Not everyone

who styled themselves "liberal" agreed on the details, but
there was a growing consensus that such issues were

'Revolution, vol. 5 no. 10 (March 10, 1870), p. 152.
*On receiving complaints that the Revolution was using
newsgirls to sell their papers to the public, Stanton
replied that they were better off in the public street than
in the "sacred privacy of the home" where they were at the
mercy of any drunken brute (Revolution, vol. 2 no. 3 [July
23, 1868], p. 37).
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appropriately handled in the realm of politics, rather than
by private authority.10

“Stanton's sense dating from the antebellum years that
private authority (church and patriarchy) was responsible
for the regulation of sexual and family life may have been
at odds with the history of local governance, although that
does not make it any less real a force in her own thinking.
William E. Nelson suggests in The Americanization of the
Common Law: the Impact of Legal Change on Massachusetts
Society. 1760-1830 (Cambridge, Mass., 1975) that at least in
the North, the discovery and punishment of moral crimes was
the primary responsibility of the judicial system up until
the time of the Revolution; then the focus on morality gave
way to concern for crimes against property. However, the
close identification in revolutionary New England between
church and state justifies Stanton's assumptions. Also,
moral crimes usually involved acts outside marriage; even in
colonial New England Stanton is correct that intrafamily
disputes were often left to the discretion of the father, a
power she sought to have voided, thereby destroying the
distinction which for purposes of jurisdiction is still very
important in family law today between the married and the
unmarried; or between acts done within the context of an
ongoing family relationship, and acts done outside of or at
the end of one.
In addition, Stanton was deeply concerned with the
separation of the two branches of authority, church and
state, and was committed to describing a neutral central
authority which could take over from the church.
A second question is whether either patriarchy or the
church ruled as forcefully by Stanton's day as she suggests;
or whether she was beating a dead horse. I think she was
beating a sick horse. Both pure patriarchy and pure
Calvinism were already well in decline by the mid-nineteenth
century, with Stanton enthusiastically preparing to pound in
the coffin nails.
(See Michael Grossberg, Governing the
Hearth; Law and the Family in Nineteenth-Century America
[Chapel Hill, 1985]; Jay Fliegelman, Prodigals and Pilgrims:
The American Revolution Against Patriarchal Authority. 17501800 [Cambridge, Mass., 1982]; and Ann Douglas, The
Feminization of American Culture [New York, 1977]. But cf.
Carol Weisbrod on the continuing vitality of religious
authority, "Family, Church, and State: An Essay on
Constitutionalism and Religious Authority," Journal of
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At the same time feminists sought to bring these issues
to the attention of the public, and within the legal
jurisdiction of a liberal state, for the explicit purpose of
asserting that decisions about marital and domestic matters
were highly personal and subject only to individual
jurisdiction.11 The Revolution reader was right in marking
that the father's fall as head of household left a vacuum of
authority.

Stanton's work sought to put the individual into

the position of ultimate authority, a configuration which

Family Law, vol. 26 [1987-88], pp. 741-770.) Stanton
certainly understood the dangers and possible costs of
enhancing judicial or legislative jurisdiction over private
behavior, even to spite the church; in fact, probably due in
large part to the weakening of "private" authorities,
government intervention in the family seemed to be on the
rise in the nineteenth century, despite the new
' laracterization of the family as "private," a result
Stanton would have hated; see Lee Teitelbaum, "Family
History and Family Law," Wisconsin Law Review 1985, pp.
1135-81. Thanks to Dirk Hartog for talking this over with
me.
“ I don't mean to suggest that this interpretation—
individual sovereignty over issues of family governance—
became the dominant one. Michael Grossberg's Governing the
Hearth is convincingly devoted to showing the development of
a "judicial patriarchy" composed of judges who substituted
their own decisions on family disputes for those of the
father and clearly felt it their business to do so. Liberal
feminists themselves were more likely to admit judicial or
state intervention when the dispute involved the custody of
children than when it concerned regulating the status
particularly of married adults; see Stanton, letter to E.L.
Godkin, Jan. 1, 1898, Stanton Papers, Douglass Colle;ge. The
tone of this letter is quite uncharacteristic of Stanton,
though; she softened in her attitude toward the state in the
last years of her life.
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made it difficult for her to develop any coherent model of
the state, or any notion of the public interest.

Self-Ownership Within the Family
The right to control one's body was the pre-eminent
personal and political right for Stanton from a very early
age.

In her autobiographical writings she portrays herself

as a rebel from birth; and even accounting for the later
gloss on the facts she would seem to have been a strongwilled girl, confident in her own opinions, traits she
retained all her life.12 Her account of her own childhood
is one of ongoing resistance to a strictly orthodox
upbringing designed to intimidate with godly fear; and of
frequent punishments for tantrums which with hindsight she
saw "were really justifiable acts of rebellion against the
tyranny of those in authority. "1J

“As she reports in her autobiography, "I was always
courageous in saying what I saw to be true, f^r the single
reason that I never dreamed of opposition. What seemed to
me to be right I thought must be equally plain to all other
rational beings.” Stanton, Eiahtv Years and More:
Reminiscences 1815-1897 (1898: reprint, New York, 1971), p.
216 .
“Stanton, Eighty Years, p. 12. Eighty Years contains
the most complete autobiographical account; see also
Elisabeth Griffith, In Her Own Right; The Life of E l i z a b e t h
Cady Stanton (New York, 1984). On Stanton's rebelliousness
see also Gail Parker's introduction to Eighty Years, pp.
xviii-xx.
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Stanton despised the morbid Presbyterian regime under
which she grew up, whose goal for children was to keep them
"embalmed as mummies."

Her instinctive dislike of

Calvinism's strict and gloomy passivity was soon bolstered
by intellectual arguments.1* While at school in her teens
Stanton sat under the preaching of Charles Finney, and
temporarily fell prey to the sleeplessness and morbid
terrors of the fearful unconverted.

After a bad bout of

nerves she was rescued by her brother-in-law, who whisked
her off to a spa for a spell of reading in liberal theology.
Its "rational ideas based on scientific facts" helped to set
her free from "the old bondage of fear of the visible and
the invisible ... and, no longer subject to absolute
authority, I rejoiced in the dawn of a new day of freedom in
thought and action."15 This episode fueled Stanton's
dislike of religious orthodoxy and impressed on her the need
to fight enslavement in all of its guises, although despite
her vehement anti-clericalism she never entirely erased the
idea of God from her mind.
With seven children, an absentee husband, and sporadic
household help,

Stanton spent a great deal of time being a

“Eighty Years, p. 12.
“Eighty Years, pp. 44, 45.
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mother.

Unlike the evangelical feminists, she made little

attempt to use motherhood as a platform for political
participation, but her views on the parent's role and the
nature of child-raising nonetheless shed light on her notion
of relations between citizens and the state.
Stanton's carefully constructed character as a mother
seems a little too large for life.1* As with all she
undertook Stanton threw herself into domestic life, and at
least early on took a great deal of pleasure in developing
her own domestic skills and running her own household.
Pride in her competence and skills moved her to master
domestic arts not perhaps of much intrinsic interest to her;
and child-bearing and raising offered a splendid opportunity
to pit her wits against male professionals.

Refusing to

trust doctors' advice (which she called as "confusing and
unsatisfactory as the longer and shorter catechisms and the
Thirty Nine Articles") or the accepted wisdom of the day on
the care of infants, she substituted her own judgment and
instituted for her children a regime based on her most
dearly held principles.

Swaddling, bandaging, binding,

“Elisabeth Griffith arrives at this conclusion as well
in In Her Own Right, pp. xvii and xix. She cites one of
Stanton's contemporaries who charged that Stanton had
"secured much immunity by a comfortable look of
motherliness" (p. 196).
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closed windows, any kind of restrictive practices were out;
her children were unbound, thrust into the fresh air,
allowed to eat and sleep as they demanded.

"Show me a child

that is snubbed, cribbed, crippled, thwarted in every way
and I will show you incapacity, weakness, disease,
misery."17 Stanton took enormous pride in her self-taught
expertise, and in later years explained that on her many
cross-country trips "I was of great use to the travelling
public."

Seizing bundled and crying children from startled

mothers, Stanton would rip off their wraps and hang them out
the window, expounding on the virtues of free movement and
fresh air; many babies, she suggested, were "emancipated"
through her ministries.1*
At the same time, the role of the mother as idealized
in the dominant culture, as well as the fact of the loss of
autonomy which motherhood necessarily entails, were
troubling to Stanton.

Few nineteenth-century American women

could have been as wonderfully unsentimental as Stanton, and

"Stanton, "Self Government" (1874). So convinced was
Stanton in her own powers that the lesson she drew from
child-rearing was to trust "neither men nor books absolutely
after this, either in regard to the heavens above or the
earth beneath, but continue(d) to use my 'mother's
instinct,' if 'reason' is too dignified a term to apply to
women's thoughts." E l c r h t v Y e a r s , p . 120.
"Eighty Years, pp. 112 ff; pp. 271-72; Griffith, In
HenO w n Right, pp. 10-12.
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in quoting Matilda Gage's favorite motto she dismissed in
one master stroke all the favorite sentimental symbols of
the day— "There is a word sweeter than Mother, Home, or
Heaven— that word is Liberty."1* For Stanton, the home was
not, as it was for evangelical feminists, a sanctuary
surrounded by protective maternal love; such an image
confirmed most of the things she hated about the traditional
family.20 Stanton herself— again unlike many of the
evangelicals — did not strongly identify with her own
mother, and in fact seems to have gotten on rather poorly
with her mother for most of her life.21
Whatever her personal feelings about motherhood— and
they were almost certainly mixed— maternity presented a

“Eighty Years, pp. 328-29.
20A part of her vehement feeling about cloying family
life clearly came from her own domestic frustrations. She
laments that "I pace up and down these 2 chambers of mine
like a caged lioness, longing to bring to a close nursing
and housekeeping cares" (Stanton, Elizabeth Cadv Stanton as
Revealed in Her Letters. Diarv. and Reminiscences. Theodore
Stanton and Harriot Stanton Blatch, eds. [2 vols., New York,
1922], vol. 2 [Letters], letter to Susan B. Anthony, June
10, 1856, p. 66. See also Griffith, In Her Own Right, pp.
79, 88ff.)
21In many ways Stanton was not strongly womanidentified, either. Despite membership in suffrage
organizations, she hated the meetings, much preferring to be
on her own lecturing in the west. Women in groups smacked
of the neurotic for her, rather than of the safe and loving;
see Eighty Years, pp. 41, 197.
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troubling political problem for the women's movement-

For

men and women alike women's capacity for motherhood remained
the best argument against suffrage, political participation,
and work outside the home.

Stanton saw biological

determinism— or maternal fatalism— as an off-shoot of the
Protestant church's teachings on sex roles, and in her
articles and lectures struggled to convince women that they
were not doomed to a miserable maternity "through one fatal
interview in the Garden of Eden."22 Stanton repeatedly
refuted the "insulting notion that our physical sex
constitutes our womanhood," casting motherhood as just an
incident in the life of a woman, whose role as an individual
with her own conscience and moral faculties was the primary
one.23
The obsessive, hovering, maternal style in fashion in
the dominant culture was anathema to Stanton as well; she
did not equate beneficent authority, or even good care, with
protectiveness.

The ideal childhood should be, as she

believed her own had been, "one long struggle against
arbitrary power; one continual protest in favor of self

22"Religion for Women and Children," Stanton Papers,
Library of Congress, reel 2.
23See Revolution, vol. 1 no. 15 (April 10, 1868), p.
229; and vol. 3 no. 10 (March 11, 1869), p. 148.
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government."”

Rebellion against authority was the state of

nature.
Even children at the earliest age are always
in a chronic condition of rebellion against
the control of nurses, older brothers and
sisters, parents and teachers, ever showing a
decided preference to have tbair own way, in
other words to govern themselves. Boys in
schools and colleges find their chief
happiness in disobeying rules, circumventing
and defying teachers and professors with
their youthful pranks; so many declarations
of independence affording one of the most
pleasing topics of conversation in after
life. The general unrest of the people under
kings, emperors and czars, in secret
plottings or open defiance against self
constituted authority, shows the settled
hatred of all subjects, to any form of
government to which they have never
consented.”
Actually even the power to consent to a form of government
did not satisfy Stanton:

she believed it her own, and any

other child's or adult's prerogative, to exercise a line
item veto over any act of authority which stunted or
confined.
The fundamental governing principle of the liberal

“ftanton, "Self Government" (1874).
“Stanton, "Self Government the Best Means of Self
Development," in National Woman Suffrage Association, Report
of the 16th Annual Washington Convention...1884 (Rochester,
N.Y., 1884), p. 62. There can be little doubt that Stanton
practiced what she preached in raising her own children;
they were infamously ill-behaved and Stanton seemed to get a
great deal of pleasure out of their scrapes once it became
apparent that no one had actually been killed.
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household remained that for any one person to rule over any
other person constituted despotism.”

Conservative

defenders of the family often labeled its gender roles
"natural" or God-ordained.

Echoing the abolitionist

anarchists from the pre-war period Stanton and others
labeled such prescriptions a usurpation of God's direct
authority over the individual, demanding that the "selfconstituted deputies of God Almighty ... either relinquish
their claims to divine authority, or ... produce credentials
from headquarters to that effect."21 God alone could
dictate the parts men and women played, and he employed no
intermediaries.2' But how can one distinguish good

”See Chap. I for a fuller discussion of this concept
in the context of abolitionism, and Chap. II for a
discussion in the context of marriage and divorce.
27Woodhull and Claflin's Weekly. Sept. 3, 1870/ see
also Woodhull, "Principles of Social Freedom" (1871), p. 9.
For similar statements on this subject by Stanton and others
see Chap. I.
2*For the most part in Stanton's thinking this includes
Christ as well. While approving of his teachings as
representing the true and uncorrupted Christianity, she
never gives any indication that she sees him as a deity, or
a conduit to God. Unlike the evangelicals, for whom the
suffering and atonement of Christ played a critical role,
Stanton seems to reject the idea of Christ as an
intermediary, and tacitly to subscribe to a Quakerinfluenced sense of the inner light. (At least she is
convinced of her own direct connection.) On the other hand,
one doubts her full appreciation of the Quaker experience on
reading her account of a meeting of Friends she attended
with a female doctor: "I was moved to speak, the doctor was
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authority from bad authority in this context, particularly
for children, where the case for authority of some kind is
the most compelling? The best regime, for children and
citizens both, was not absolute authority: no tyranny in the
home or in the state.

Stanton argues that the training

which is most likely to produce the good citizen— which is
after all the goal of schooling— is the rule which forces
the students to rule themselves, which presents both right
and wrong to the student and "demands an act of judgment, a
decision between the two."

Absolute authority, Stanton

admits, is more likely to produce order; but order is not
the goal.

Rather, the goal is to teach children, not

domination over others, but the more difficult mastery over
themselves; only in a society of self-governing people can
the principles of individual growth be fully realized.

Stanton and the Liberal Individual
The love of freedom was more than a child's attribute:
unfolding first in childhood, it persisted as long as life
itself.

As evidenced by her view of childhood, Stanton

defined liberty as a human being's natural state; to critics
who attributed a naturally passive role to women she

not, tho I urged her to be" (letter to Susan B. Anthony,
Aug. 20, 1883, Stanton Papers, Douglass College).
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responded bitterly that it had taken centuries of
persecution, "the whole power of the civil and canon law ...
under all forms of religious fanaticism, culminating in
witch-craft" prosecutions to control and subdue women, who
had nonetheless "shown her love of individual freedom, her
desire for self-government, while her achievements in
practical affairs and her courage in the great emergencies
of life have vindicated her capacity to exercise this
right."29
The premium Stanton placed on individual freedom was
the theme of "Solitude of Self," the address that Stanton
gave in 1892 before the congressional Judiciary Committee
and later to the annual suffrage meeting.

It is often

acclaimed as her greatest speech, and its beauty is
piercing.

At the same time, it is a bleak statement of

social relations, one almost without hope.30

In it Stanton

”The full speech is published as Stanton, "Hearing of
the Woman Suffrage Association Before the Committee on the
Judiciary, 1892" <n.p., n.d.); there is a lightly edited
version reprinted under its common name,"Solitude of Self,"
in Ellen DuBois's Elizabeth Cadv Stanton. Susan B. Anthony.
Citations in this chapter are from the "Hearing" text but
will be cited as "Solitude of Self." This quotation is from
pp. 62-63.
“DuBois points out that it anticipates "the
existentialist philosophy associated with the rebirth of
feminism in our time, and modern feminism's concern with the
'personal' elements of women's experience." DuBois, Stanton
and Anthony, p. 246.
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denies the possibility of human contact, human
communication, in any but the most superficial sense.
Common pleasures are fleeting; "even our friendship and love
we never fully share with another; there is something of
every passion in every situation we conceal" (p. 2) .

The

critical moments of each life are those— however brief—
when isolation is total.

During bereavement, imprisonment,

poverty, war, abandonment, crisis, old age, "alike mid the
greatest triumphs and darkest tragedies of life we walk
alone" (p. 2).

Stanton denied the possibility of community

which sparked so many women's groups in their associational
efforts; the woman who took an interest in questions of
health and sanitation, foreign policy, education, or other
social functions, for example, could never knit together
human beings but could only make her own solitude
"respectable" and provide work— if futile work— for her
hands (p. 3).
Even the human Christ never rose above such mortal
limits. Stanton proclaimed his command, "Bear ye one
another's burdens," beyond the individual's scope.

The idea

of the atonement, the shifting of weight onto stronger
shoulders, had never appealed to the individualist in
Stanton.

"In fitting out an army we give each soldier his

own knapsack, arms, powder, his blanket, cup, knife, fork,
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and spoon.

We provide alike for all their individual

necessities, then each man bears his own burden" (p. 2).
Her summary of Christ's life is selective, a litany of
failures; neglecting triumphal entries, righteous wrath, and
even the Resurrection, she concentrates instead on moments
of abandonment and betrayal.

Christ's experience on earth

is most fully realized, not even in the Crucifixion, but in
the more bitter moments of despair alone in the garden at
Gethsemane (p. 4) .
For Stanton, the individual's life did not lack a
purpose; but its purpose was not to establish any particular
set of relations among human beings.

The social gospel

movement and the more socially oriented feminists championed
a kind of counter-Reformation in their rejection of faith
over works.

They thought that in the context of an

industrializing America, the need for works was great, and
that it rendered the contemplative life and the dead
theological intricacies of salvation selfish and outmoded.
Far from criticizing the Reformation, Stanton invoked it
constantly, interpreting it as a movement in support of
"individual rights, individual conscience and judgment ...
the basic principles of our republican government and
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Protestant religion ..."n

Critical as she was of the male-

dominated church hierarchy and the tyranny of superstition,
the great Protestant principle of freedom of conscience
represented for her the core of truth at the heart of a
rotten institutional body— approximately the same way she
looked on the principle of liberty in the Constitution.32
Stanton too had no time for the creeds and codes of the
church fathers.

But the state of the individual soul was

still paramount for her; although as a thorough-going
antinomian she consistently denied that any outside
authority could dictate, judge, or influence the state of
her soul.

As compared to social feminists, Stanton was a

great spiritualist emphasizing the state of the soui over
charitable deeds even while moving ever farther away from
orthodox religion.33
The most compelling metaphor for human life in
Stanton's vocabulary is that of the "solitary voyage;" fov
"no matter how much women prefer to lean ... they must make

31"Suffrage a Natural Right"
(Chicago, 1894), p. 2.
See also History of Woman Suffrage, vol. 2, p. 437 for a
NWSA resolution to that effect.
32Revolution. Nov. 26, 1868, p. 324.
33Aileen Kraditor in Ideas of the Woman Suffrage
Movement describes "Solitude of Self" as an elegy for "a
solitary human soul in the Protestant tradition responsible
for its own destiny" (p. 48).
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the voyage alone,

(relying on) their own skill and judgment

in the hour of danger, and, if not equal to the occasion,
(man and woman) alike they perish."31 The voyage metaphor
allows for nothing of the social, nothing of the rooted or
familial; the "solitary voyager" is not with mess mates but
"upon the deck of the ship at midnight ... (with a) feeling
... of utter desolation and loneliness; a little speck of
life shut in by a tremendous darkness ..."”
not aimless.

The voyage is

Stanton carried over from antebellum feminist

rhetoric the belief in a liberal Protestant mandate for the
full development of God-given capacities, and insisted that
woman's goal is the achievement of "the highest development
of which they are capable."3* For the end of human life is
the growth of the individual; and the individual has the
duty to resist whatever restricts her growth.37
The duty to resist often pitted the individual against

“ "Solitude of Self," pp. 1-2.
“ "Solitude of Self," p. 5.
“Stanton, "Self Government the Best Means of Self
Development," p. 67. See Chap. I for the influence of
liberal Protestantism on antebellum rhetoric. In "Solitude
of Self" Stanton suggests that the rights and duties of
women are "individual happiness and development" (p. 1).
“Revolution, vol. 1 no. 21 (May 28, 1868), p. 361.
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others.”

Particularly toward the end of her life Stanton's

arguments for woman suffrage take on a foreboding air; women
will need the ballot in emergencies, as solitary marooned
voyagers, as a woman trapped in a burning house needs selfreliance.”

Again, it is tempting to attribute this

sourness and sense of danger and isolation to old age and
exclusion from the mainstream of the woman's movement after
the NWSA's reunion with the more conservative American Woman
Suffrage Association in 1890; but in an article in the Lily
of 1852 Stanton fully anticipated her later message that
woman is her own "self-supporter, self defender, and self
protector, compelled to stand or fall, live or die,
alone."4’ Time probably increased her isolation; but her
fundamental perception that woman is "an imaginary Robinson
Crusoe with her woman Friday on a solitary island" didn't
change — and Stanton was often happier to do without
Friday.41
”One particularly stirring speech on this subject was
Stanton's on the famous McFarland-Richardson murder trial;
see DuBois, ed., Stanton and Anthony, pp. 125-130. See also
Elizabeth Pleck, Domestic Tvrannv; The Making of Social
Policy Against Family Violence From Colonial Times to the
Present (New York, 1987).
5*See "Solitude of Self"; "Self-Government the Best
Means of Self-Development"; and "Suffrage a Natural Right".
40Lily, vol. 4 no. 5, p. 40 (May 1852) .
41"Solitude of Self," p. 1.
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Throughout her career Stanton, as well as other liberal
feminists, showed an overriding concern for corporeal
integrity, and a vivid apprehension of the possibilities of
violence to the person.

Nineteenth-century feminists across

the ideological spectrum shared a belief in voluntary
motherhood and sexual choice for women, and condemned in
particular drunken male aggression against women and
children.

But the evangelicals, despite their focus on

intemperance, devoted significantly less time to the issue
of male violence against women, and were far less willing to
condemn orthodox marriage itself as a breeder of violence.
Liberals, far more than the evangelicals, dwelt in detail on
the potential for male violence against women, recounting
each new horror and indignity almost with relish, as though
justifying their world view.

Their constant litany of

physical crimes against women both made public an important
source of "private" oppression, and re-enforced liberal
feminism's special fearfulness about physical violations and
infringements.
Human beings' natural state was not only constant
rebellion against illegitimate authority, but constant
peril; in her defense of political rights for the individual
Stanton often pictured the polity as a dangerous place for
the liberal individual.

Suffrage in particular ssrved the
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adult as a weapon of self-defense against abusive authority
when "youthful pranks" no longer sufficed-

In her 1894

speech "Suffrage a Natural Right," she drove home the
analogy between the ballot and the bow and arrow with which
early man "exercised his natural right of self protection."
Stanton characterized the ballot as the "substicute in
civilization" for the "rude weapons of savage life,"
proclaiming it tyranny to take away the means by which the
individual defended person and property.

Not impressed by

any social compact which had made so few provisions for
women, she declared that in compacting for the establishment
of government and mutual protection no one gave up a
"natural right to protect themselves and their property by
laws of their own making, they simply substituted the ballot
for the bow and arrow."42
Only individual ownership and individual control gave
protection in Stanton's world.

Protection when provided by

one for another is always a paternalist trap; no two
individuals disparate in power can form a protective
relationship without fatal harm to the liberty of the
protected, in the same way that no class can legislate for

4*Stanton, "Suffrage a Natural Right," pp. 2-3; NWSA,
Report of the 16th Annual Washington Convention (n.p.,n.d.),
p. 64.
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or represent another class.

In classic liberal style she

sees the individual constituted and protected through the
ownership of property, including rights in that category as
things owned by the classic possessive liberal individual.43
Children again illustrate the "natural" human response:
"whoever touches their playthings without their consent
arouses their angry resistance, showing the natural desire
to own property."44 Property is one of the ways in which
the vulnerable individual protects herself in a cold world;
like physical assault, "to deny the rights of property (is)
like cutting off the hands," to disable the body
completely.45

Feminism. Fourier, and Free Love
Stanton's endorsement of free love philosophy was a
position which followed naturally from her earlier
intellectual leanings.

The legacy of slavery, as explored

in Chapter II, helped form Stanton's strong antipathy to
physical and legal restraints; the metaphor of slavery never

43See fn. 3 supra.
“ "Suffrage a Natural Right," p. 7. Rachel Weil points
out that in pre-Lockeian terminology "childlike" is a
derogatory epithet; while for Stanton descriptions of
children's behavior are used as evidence of a natural order.
“"Solitude of Self," p. 2.
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lost its power for her, leaving her hypersensitive to the
potential for abuse in any human relationship, particularly
where there was a disparity in the parties' power.

Much of

Stanton's respect for and attention to the laws of nature
resulted from her discovery that they confirmed her belief
that humans thrived in freedom and solitude. She often used
the metaphor of planetary orbits to describe optimal social
arrangements in which individuals whirled around each other
at a safe, orderly distance— planets rarely leaving their
orbits to attach or enslave other planets.4* Stanton
endorsed Bloomers, physical exercise, and fresh air, and the
general removal of all physical badges of female servitude,
stressing the freedom of the body from all burdens and
entanglements imposed from without.

The Revolution in 1869

even endorsed a health reformer's position that no one
should regularly sleep with another person, adding that
there "is a great physical law that all would do well to
obey.

Every man, woman, and child should have a bed to him

or herself."47

4<See, for example, "Solitude of Self."
^Revolution. vol. 3 no. 24 (June 17, 1869), p. 379.
Stanton's thought here coincides with the growth of new
religions— Christian Science, spiritualism, faith healing—
also centered around physical health and culture; see
Elizabeth B. Clark, "Women and Religion in America, 18701920," in John F. Wilson, ed., Church and State in America.
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For Stanton, as for Stephen Pearl Andrews, the physical
subjugation of women was a prime indicator of America's
diseased state; the indissoluble marriage relation was a
carnal horror from "those dark periods when marriage was
held by the greatest doctors and priests of the church to be
a work of the flesh only."”

Similarly, voluntary

motherhood and the right to full and free divorce provided
above all release from an unwanted and often brutal physical
bondage.

The enlightened nineteenth-century attitude toward

the body sought to release it, particularly women's bodies,
from the corrosive hold of superiors in "feudal" relations
of slavery and orthodox Christian marriage.”
It was in this context that Stanton endorsed the
doctrine of free love— a concept which meant many things to
many people.

Ellen DuBois suggests that her 1870 speech on

marriage and divorce clearly establishes Stanton as a
partisan of free love.*0 Certainly the works of radicals

vol. 2 (Westport, Conn., 1987), pp. 375-79.
“Elizabeth Cady Stanton et al., eds., History of Woman
Suffrage, vol. 1 (New York, 1881), pp. 716-717.
”See William Leach, True Love and Perfect Union; The
Feminist Reform of Sex and Society (New York, 1980), passim.
S0Ellen DuBois, ed., "On Labor and Free Love: Two
Unpublished Speeches of Elizabeth Cady Stanton," Signs vol.
1 no. 1 (1975), pp. 257-268, at p. 263. DuBois points out
Stanton's commitment to monogamy as well.
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like Robert Dale Owen and Frances Wright, and later Victoria
Woodhull and Annie Besant, influenced her profoundly.*1 She
agreed with many of their positions, and above all learned
from them even when she didn't agree; along with George Sand
and Mme de Stael they were in the small group of nineteenthcentury figures who could out-radical her, and she admired
their intelligence and daring.
At the same time, her philosophical agreement with the
free love position had more to do with setting limits than
with exploring sensual experience.

In a letter of 1880 to

her cousin and confidante Elizabeth Smith Miller she
expressed her private view that she could not support free
love where it was equated with promiscuity, but did support
it where it meant women's right to "give or withhold her
body, bear children or not, and be her own absolute
sovereign.”

In the same letter she declared her continuing

belief in monogamy: for "anything short of this makes a

“For references see Stanton, Letters, p. 61 (on
reading Thomas Paine and Frances Wright she comments "I am
quite surprised to find them such rational and beautiful
writers”); Revolution, vol. 3 no. 14 (April 8, 1869), p. 212
(agrees with Robert Dale Owen on the marriage question in
his debate with Horace Greeley); letter to Lucretia Mott,
April 1, 1872, Stanton Papers, Douglass College (supporting
Victoria Woodhull); Stanton, Eighty Years, p. 355 (on Annie
Besant). See also Leach, True Love and Perfect Union: and
Barbara Taylor, Eve and the New Jerusalem: Socialism and
Feminism in the Nineteenth Century (New York, 1983).
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mongrel, sensual, discordant progeny ... soul union should
precede and exalt physical union."”
Stanton was certainly no prude, and there is evidence
that she found women's sexual appetites to be as healthy and
appropriate as men's.”

At the same time, she might more

accurately be described as a partisan of self-ownership than
of free love in its full erotic sense: her chief expressed
interest in championing free love was to limit the powers of
the state to intervene in sexual relations, as in other
aspects of individuals' lives.”

Her belief that "we are

all free lovers at heart" posited a conviction— one she
believed many others shared— that in "a good time coming"
men and women would be "a law unto themselves," and the
police court, the state legislature, and "Recorder Hackett"
would no longer interfere in relations of the heart;
whatever resulted from the liberty to choose would be free

“Letter to E.S.Miller, Aug. 11, 1880, Stanton Papers,
Douglass College Library.
"Griffith, In Her Own Right, pp. 96-97; DuBois,
Stanton and Anthony, pp. 94-98.
“Other partisans of free love were much more explicit
in celebrating erotic pleasure; in "A Speech on the Garden
of Eden: or, Paradise Lost and Found" Victoria Woodhull
imagines an Eden that would have profoundly shaken Biblical
scholars (1875). See also Leach, True Love and Perfect
Union; and Sidney Ditzion, Marriage. Morals, and Sex in
America: A History of Ideas (New York, 1953).
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love.59 Stanton drove home the point that "freedom is one
and indivisible" whether intellectual, sexual, religious, or
political.

Of course freedom could always be misused, but

Stanton felt that the misuse of sexual freedom, like a
misuse of economic freedom such as a bad investment, was
simply "the unavoidable friction of the machinery. n5‘
Despite her reluctance to see free love as sexual
license, Stanton was influenced by Victoria Woodhull, and
was in thorough agreement with her that the question of
women's political equality was moot without similar gains in
sexual equality.

For both Stanton and Woodhull, social and

sexual rights, though they might define them differently,
were the key to women's full empowerment, and that the
possession of civil rights alone could not challenge women's
subordination.
Woodhull herself was strongly influenced— some say
ghost-written— by Stephen Pearl Andrews, who was himself for
many years immersed in Fourierism and the communitarian
movement.

To describe a chain linking Stanton at one end to

Fourier at the other would be misleading.

At the same time,

communitarianism was an important source of radical thinking

"Stanton, "On Labor and Free Love," p. 266.
"Stanton, "On Labor and Free Love,"

p. 267.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

182

during Stanton's formative years and was certainly a part of
the universe of ideas out of which she constructed her own
theories.

What American communitarians culled from Fourier,

and what feminists picked and chose from communitarian
thought, is revealing both about the cultural conditions for
the American reception of Fourier, and about where liberal
feminists' hearts lay on the spectrum of social reformers.
Charles Fourier's social philosophy rested on a vision
of gratified desire.

At a time when most of the civilized

world was retreating only slowly from a belief in human
nature's native state of sin, Fourier's sympathy for the
depth and mutability of human passions— for work, love, and
everything in between— produced one of the most bizarre and
humane utopian blueprints ever committed to paper.
Fourier's critique of existing institutions was damningly
thorough, as reflected in his list of the 144 permanent
vices, including slavery, the wage labor system, and
hurricanes; his solutions were equally detailed, and equally
grandiose.57 Not a Lockeian liberal, Fourier believed that
individuals were neither malleable nor rational— no tabula

"Jonathan Beecher, Charles Fourier: The Visionary and
His World (Berkeley, 1986), p. 197. This is the most
comprehensive work on Fourier that will ever be written and
is wonderfully readable. See also Beecher and Richard
Bienvenu, eds., The Utopian Vision of Charles Fourier
(Boston, 1971).
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rasa— but were moved by fundamental instinctual drives or
passions.5' He sought to liberate rather than to repress
the passions, to provide an environment in which each could
be gratified in its turn.
Fourier at cacked existing institutions on two main
fronts: work and love.

Harshly critical of the tedium of

the new "wage slavery," his idea of "Attractive Labor" was
at bottom a repudiation of the work-curse placed on Adam.
Fourier reasoned that if humankind was given an appetite for
the fruits of labor, it must have been given an appetite for
production, as well, and he employed a variety of techniques
in his phalanx to make labor varied and pleasurable for
everyone.5*
The other main prong of Fourier's attack, the one which
most concerns us here, was the assault on the isolated
nuclear family.

Fourier took the enlightened stance that

"the extension of the privileges of woman is the fundamental
cause of all social progress.It<0 Since he saw sexual
passion as a quantity to be let loose rather than
restrained, Christian marriage seemed a form of "conjugal

5,Beecher, Charles Fourier, p. 220.
‘’’Redelia Brisbane, Albert Brisbane: A Mental Biography
(Boston, 1893), p.180.
“Beecher, Charles Fourier, p. 118.
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slavery," one of the repressive authoritarian forms which
warped human experience.

Marriage laws imposed a false

constraint and permanency which ran counter to the human
inclination to spontaneity and diversity; like commerce they
produced deceitful and inefficient practices.*1 Fourier saw
women as the primary victims of the existing social system-"a piece of merchandise to be put up for sale to the
highest bidder."

He suggested that only the combination of

economic and sexual independence— what he called the
economic and the sexual minimums— which were guaranteed in
the phalanx would restore women's dignity and status and the
integrity of sexual relations in general.*2 The isolated
household proved an indignity in labor terms as well:
according to the communitarian critique the work of a single
household sentenced women to domestic drudgery, an
inefficient, piecemeal approach which could be improved
through communalizing domestic labor.
In tune with popular economic principles of his day,

“Beecher, Charles Fourier, p. 205; and chaps. 11 and
15.
“Beecher, Charles Fourier, p. 173. Fourier's
fascination with the corruption of sexual norms under
capitalism led him to muse, for example, on the 49 varieties
in the "Hierarchy of Cuckoldom," which included the "Warlike
or Swaggering Cuckold," "the Supportive or Straw Man
Cuckold," and "the Trumpeter Cuckold"
(Beecher and
Bienvenu, Utopian Vision, p. 183-85).
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Fourier believed that energies became distorted and
destructive when regulated and repressed, but when allowed
to run their course worked in beneficial harmony for both
the individual and society; in fact, "the man who devotes
himself most ardently to pleasure becomes eminently useful
to the happiness of all."63 Although Fourier shared with
Adam Smith and others a common belief in the invisible hand
and the inefficacy of human regulation, his system went far
beyond economic liberalism toward the creation of a new
religious philosophy.

In reaction against religious

orthodoxy, Fourier wholly rejected the notion of original
sin, celebrating a capacity for human happiness and a
liberation from long-faced Calvinism which owed much to
Enlightenment thought.”

But there was a God in Fourier's

universe, one who.had created humans with a capacity for joy
and who had their best interests at heart.

It was this

God's divine plan Fourier saw behind the working social
harmonies he envisioned.

In this way, religion and economic

liberalism were fused into an optimistic belief in the Godgiven power of individuals to produce, create, desire, and
enjoy— a much more potent mix in a world still tied to

“Beecher and Bienvenu, Utopian Vision. Introduction.
“Ibid.
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religious forms than a theory of economic deregulation
standing on its own.”
In Fourier's utopia, the communaliNation of work and
love were inextricable, critical elements of human
liberation; in fact, Fourier at times hinted that the
question of free love was actually "the most important
branch of the theory of a t t r a c t i o n . A m e r i c a n students of
Fourier, most notably Albert Brisbane his translator,
largely ignored the call for sexual liberation,
concentrating instead on the doctrine of Attractive Labor
and the promise of a revolution in the wage labor system.*7
Brisbane's patron was Stanton's opponent Horace Greeley, who
opened the front page of his newspaper to Brisbane for a
daily column on utopian associationism, and who actively
rejected Fourier's vision of deregulated marriage.

The

Greeley-Brisbane associationists were bound to traditional
forms of moral

authority within the family.

“Beecher,

Charles Fourier,pp. 224-25.

“Beecher,

Charles Fourier,p. 120.

Brisbane

“Beecher, Charles Fourier.Introduction; p. 297.
Brisbane's writings from the 1840s, the high water mark of
Fourierism in the United States, dismiss the "social or
Affective Passions" as too "vast and abstruse" a terrain to
cover (the Phalanx, vol. 1 no. 2 [Nov. 4, 1843], pp. 2526); he also admits that in speaking publicly he never
broached Fourier's critique of traditional marriage (Redelia
Brisbane, Albert Brisbane, p. 210.)
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suggested that while the nuclear household was badly
organized, marriage itself was an eternal type, for it and
the family "exist in the moral nature of man."**

Marriage,

like commerce, like religion, would be preserved in its true
form once institutional distortions were removed, although
individualized labor and not monogamy itself was the
distortion in question for both Brisbane and Greeley.
Brisbane, no fan of organized religion, still hungered
for a spiritual system to replace the one lost, and felt
that the invisible hand was sure to have a God attached to
it somewhere.

His quest for a comprehensive social system

was millennial in its belief that "'The Kingdom of Heaven'
was to come to us in this terrestrial world by the
establishment of a true Social Order."**

A perpetual

tension between the individual and the group plagued
American associationists; but in Brisbane's vision it was
held in check by the idea that selfless Christian 3eve was

“Albert Brisbane, A Concise Exposition of the Doctrine
of Association (8th ed., New York, 1844).
“Phalanx, vol. 1 no. 1 (Oct. 5, 1843), pp. 8-9. Some
reader of the Concise Exposition agreed with Brisbane, and
left a marginal note in a nineteenth-century hand reading
"all this can be realized only in the coming Kingdom of God
same is not of this age over which Satan has a
Principality..." (Brisbane, Concise Exposition, p. 19 of the
copy in Firestone Library's rare book room, Princeton
University.)
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the basis of the spiritual attraction which led to
association, love which "leads (associationists) to identify
others' interests with their own— to bear one another's
burdens— to feel the wrongs of others as their wrongs, and
to seek the good of others as they seek their own good."70
By contrast Stephen Pearl Andrews, although he was also
engaged in a search for the underlying harmonious principle,
refused to look to Christianity as a model.

His major

treatise, The Science of Society, proclaimed itself as
dealing "in no vague aspirations after 'the good time
coming' ... (it) will propound definite principles which
demand to be regarded as having all the validity of
scientific truths."71 Andrews' theology too renounced the
Calvinist assumption that human nature is sinful, and
celebrated free love over monogamy, private property over
communal ownership, and individualism over groupness, in
sharp contrast to Brisbane.

One commentator calls Andrews'

theories "The Theology of Man."72
Andrews was torn throughout his life between his

70Phalanx, vol. 1 no. 1 (Oct. 5, 1843), p. 14.
71Stephen Pearl Andrews, The Science of Society (2
vols., 1851, reprint, Boston, 1888), p. 6.
72Charles Shively, "The Thought of Stephen Pearl
Andrews (1812-1886)," University of Wisconsin, M.A. thesis,
1960.
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attraction to Fourier's system and to the more
individualistic associational principles of Josiah Warren,
whom one biographer calls "the chief
architect of libertarianism."13 Warren's creed was marked
by an intense dedication to the rights of the individual.
Though an associationist— he and Andrews co-founded a
utopian community, Modern Times, on Long Island— Warren
believed fervently in private property and in the right of
the individual to be free of any compulsion whatever.74
Although Warren saw the principle of association as a way of
addressing inequalities, the right to dissociate was as
important to him as the right to associate.75 Warren's
community was built on the complete separation and autonomy
of each individual— "each being 'the law unto himself.'"76
Andrews enthusiastically adopted the doctrine of
individual sovereignty, interpreting the thrust of Fourier's
73Writers on Andrews conflict over whether he made a
straight-line progression from Fourier's thought to
Warren's, or wavered back and forth. See Shively, "Thought
of Stephen Pearl Andrews;" and James Martin, Men Aoainst the
State (DeKalb, 111, 1953).
74William Reichert, Partisans of Freedom: A Study of
American Anarchism (Bowling Green, Ohio, 1976), sect. 2,
chap. 1.
75Martin, Men Aoainst the State, p. 39.
76Josiah Warren, Equitable Commerce (1849), p. 18,
quoted in Shively, "Thought of Stephen Pearl Andrews," p. 3.
Stanton had a strong affinity for this phrase, as well.
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doctrine of the affections as a guarantee that each person
could choose his own destiny and therefore " 'be a law unto
himself.'1,77 For Andrews, the freedom of the individual is
the logical result of the three great movements in history:
the Protestant Reformation, which made the individual
conscience paramount; the American Revolution, which
established the individual's political sovereignty; and his
own movement, "socialism," which would ensure personal
sovereignty as well.7' In its most extreme formulation,
Andrews declared, "the essential condition of freedom is
disconnection— individuation— disintegration of
interests."7* Ultimately, only the individual can be the
judge of his or her own actions, in the political as in the
personal sphere: "I claim individually to be my own nation,
I take this opportunity to declare my National Identity, and
to notify all other potentates, that they may respect my
sovereignty.

I may have to fight to establish my claim, but

^Andrews, Science of Society, vol. 1, pp. 9-11.
7*See Shively, "Thought of Stephen Pearl Andrews," pp.
13-14; Andrews, Science of Society, vol. 1, pp. 9-10. Note
the similarity to Stanton's thought here, although her
trinity would probably have been composed of the
Reformation, the Revolution, and the woman's movement.
7*Quoted in Shively, "Thought of Stephen Pearl
Andrews," p. 47.
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... sooner or later I will come to the recognition of it."10
But here, too, Andrews' vision followed Fourier's.
Although the individual was the highest unit of social and
political life, Andrews did not see public life as millions
of "monads" in conflict, but as monads working together in
the harmony produced when each obeyed the law of its own
attractions.

"Objects bound together contrary to their

nature, must and will seek to rectify themselves by breaking
the bonds which confine them, while those which come
together by their own affinities remain quiescent and
content."81 Andrews, then, did not jettison the good of the
group entirely; he supported "cooperation" rather than
"combination" or "amalgamation," defining cooperation as
when "each, in pursuing his own pleasure or benefit,
contributes incidentally to the pleasure or benefit of
others."*2

'“Quoted in Shively,
"Thought of Stephen Pearl
Andrews," p. 44. Andrews was not completelywithout concern
for consequences; he claimed that each individual was
sovereign as long as he could assume the consequences of his
actions— which Andrews labels "costs"— by himself and not
turn them into moral or economic externalities, the burden
to be born by others (Andrews, Science of Society, vol. 1,
p. 36).
"Andrews, Science of Society, vol. 1, pp. 15, 23; see
also Reichert, Partisansof Freedom, p. 85.
“Quoted in Shively,
Andrews," p. 47.

"Thought of Stephen Pearl
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Andrews admits the paradox of "socialism"— that the
individual in exercising his own sovereignty may throw the
burden of his actions on others, and that the attempt to
function as a community may infringe on the individual as
well.

Sometimes self-sacrifice and the compromise of

individual rights was necessary; for this reason,
communities may need governments as an interim measure.”
But still protesting that "dependence and close connections"
are the roots of despotism, as disconnection is the root of
freedom, he condemned communities like the Shakers and the
Rappites as based on "religious submission ... to despotic
rule."

Andrews was ultimately willing to abandon society in

favor of the individual, on the theory that socialism itself
can become a form of tyranny; its form, he admitted, might
be antagonistic to the ends of human freedom.”

This

commitment to individualism raised a thorny internal
contradiction within Andrew's communitarian scheme, and
proved a bone of contention between him and more traditional

“Andrews, Science of Society, vol. 1, p. 7, p. 37.
“Andrews, Science of Society, vol. 1, pp. 37, 11.
Andrews does distinguish between the "natural" connection
between the mother and child which is not destructive, and
the artificial connections of adults, which are (ibid., p.
37) .
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associationists like Brisbane and Greeley.'*
Yet despite disagreement over the liberating power of
individualism and sexuality in restructuring human
relations, Fourier, Warren, Brisbane, and Andrews shared an
enthusiastic support for woman's rights and a critique of
the isolated household as a work unit.

An article in the

Phalanx in 1843 included "Domestic Service" in the list of
"Servitudes to be abolished," labeling it a branch of the
system of hired labor which created its own class, one
composed largely of housewives."

Thus, these male utopian

socialists recognized early that the gendered division of
labor characteristic of industrial society created a sexclass— what Brisbane called a "low sphere of action."
Brisbane in his later writing was increasingly explicit
about the need to turn households into cooperative
arrangements, collectivizing domestic labor and child care
both.

These arrangements would leave the monogamous family

intact and would allow women a large measure of autonomy

"American socialism in the second half of the
nineteenth century was in general more anarchistic, more
oriented toward the individual than its European
counterpart, which tended more toward a state socialism.
Charles Fourier himself attacked the liberal conception of
"personal freedom" as it evolved in America as empty and
formalistic, without the surrounding communitarian structure
(Martin, Men Against the State, pp. 5-6).
"Phalanx, vol. 1 no. 2 (Nov. 4, 1843), p. 17.
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over their own households; particularly in child-rearing,
where mothers could exercise as much or as little direct
supervision as they chose, leaving tne rest to nurses called
"collective mothers."

He believed that only when isolated

drudgery was abolished— and similar suggestions were made by
the other associationists— would women be able to elevate
themselves from a condition of "domestic servitude."*7 In
the minds of communitarians, conditions of material
inequality far outstripped conditions of civil equality in
importance: Andrews states categorically that while "woman
herself is confiscated," her right to own property or vote
would be of minimal value.**
Despite associationists' support for woman's rights and
the fact that they shared a core of reform and feminist
sympathies with suffragists, many in the woman's movement
viewed the associationists with suspicion and hostility;
associationist ideas were only incorporated in feminist
theory in a partial and roundabout way.

Perhaps

understandably, when so few of the women involved in

*7Albert Brisbane, The Theory of the Functions of the
Human Passions (New York 1856), pp. 141 ff.
''Stephen Pearl Andrews, "Love, Marriage, and the
Condition of Woman," published in Love. Marriage, and
Divorce, and the Sovereignty of the Individual. Charles
Shively, ed. (Weston, Mass., 1975),p. 11, pp. 34 ff.
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organized suffragism worked at industrial jobs, the issue of
"attractive labor" did not draw a crowd; to the extent that
women reformers were concerned in this period with labor
issues it was with working women, and expressed itself more
in immediate concern over wages, hours, and working
conditions.

The suffrage literature gave little or no space

to labor reforms proposed by Brisbane, Warren, or Andrews.
In addition, the utopian community offered women a
mixed bag of restraints and opportunities.”

Housework

collectivities and the destruction of gendered work
categories found in communities like Oneida appealed to many
women seeking to escape from the rigid separation of
domestic and public work.

The first generation of liberal

feminists did not glorify domestic work as more homecentered women did, and often complained of the toll such
drudgery took on women's health.

Stanton, again in the

forefront, lashed out at the
immense amount of nonsense talked about the
isolated home ... for a poor farmer with wife
and child in the solitude of a prairie home,
a cooperative household with society would be

”Paul Johnson and Sean wilentz, "The Kingdom of
Matthias: Sex and Salvation in Jacksonian New York." Paper
delivered at the Charles Warren Center, Harvard University,
November, 1983; Elizabeth B. Clark, "Women and Religion in
America, 1780-1870," in John F. Wilson, ed., Church and
State in America, vol. 1 (Westport, Conn., 1986), pp. 374377.
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inestimable blessing. Woman's work can never
be properly organized in the isolated home.90
Stanton on several occasions voiced admiration for Fourier's
arrangement of communalized domestic chores.91
But despite the attractions of communalism, most
feminists still found the idea of running their own families
too attractive and too much a part of their cultural
heritage to completely relinquish.

The destruction of the

nuclear household was never an articulated goal of the
woman's movement (although Stanton occasionally hinted
darkly that it would be changed beyond recognition), and
relatively few women in the immediate post-Civil War period
even broached the subject of household collectives.92
Feminists well understood the problem of the isolated
household, but did not accept the communitarian solutions,
perhaps as giving up too much.93
"Stanton, Letters, p. 346.
91For example, in Eighty Years, p. 147. Reversing the
worst fears of 1960s parents, Victoria Woodhull suggests
that sexual freedom will ultimately lead to cooperative
households ("Tried as By Fire; of the True and the False
Socially" [1874], p. 44).
920n the general subject of domestic collectivization
see Dolores Hayden, The Grand Domestic Revolution: A History
of Feminist Designs for American Homes. Neighborhoods, and
Cities (Cambridge, Mass., 1981).
”The second generation in the Oneida community saw a
revolt by women pressing for a return of many functions of
domestic work and child rearing to the nuclear family, as a
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In addition, in the minds of many, communitarians were
tarred with the "free love" brush.

Liberalization of

divorce laws remained controversial in the suffrage movement
until the next century, in part because of the (realistic)
fear that association with radical social positions could
taint the suffrage cause.

Free love posed this problem in

spades; and genuinely shocked many ladies' sensibilities to
boot.

Although careful to distance themselves from the free

lovers, the NWSA platform reflected a willingness to link
issues of personal and political freedom together, and a
commitment to women's autonomy in their personal lives which
took much— in part through Stanton's mediation— from the
utopian socialist commitment to bodily autonomy.*4 Self

way of strengthening their power base. See Louis J. Kern,
"Ideology and Reality: Sexuality and Women's Status in the
Oneida Community," Radical History Review, vol. 20 (1979),
pp. 180-204. Other than her distaste for housework, it's
not clear that Stanton ever felt any strongly communitarian
urges; evidence in fact points in the other direction.
*4The disagreement on that score came from the Bostonbased AWSA, whom Woodhull and Claflin's Weekly accused of
deliberately ignoring women's social wrongs to pursue the
limited ends of the ballot and financial equality; as the
Weekly said, "taxation without representation merely has a
hollow sound." Woodhull's position as an outlier— and
reputation as a loose cannon— allowed her to express herself
more freely on the subject of the "Boston ladies" than
Stanton was able to do in politic fashion, but it is easy to
imagine Stanton savoring Woodhull's charge that the StoneBlackwell group heaped scorn on free lovers and others "who
choose to walk in their own way rather than to be led by the
immaculate Athenians." The Bostonians, Woodhull suspected,
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ownership was a hard nut for the rank and file of the NWSA
to crack at first, harder for many than suffrage.

By the

mid-1870s, though, the issues of prostitution and the double
standard, marital abuse, and voluntary motherhood were

found "all the acts necessary to
reproduce...constitutionally and inherently
disgusting.Woodhull (this article is unattributed but I
believe she wrote it) goes on to suggest helpfully that
perhaps the Boston ladies do not trust themselves and need
to have a code of laws "restraining any lustful sheeps-eyes
glances...toward their friends of the masculine gender."
See Woodhull and Claflin's Weekly, vol. 3 no. 25 (Nov. 4,
1871), pp. 10 ff.
Woodhull's broadside was perhaps a response to a
resolution from an earlier meeting of the American Equal
Rights Association— or at least to the attitude behind it—
repudiating the free love movement, introduced by Henry
Blackwell and supported by Mary Livermore and Lucy Stone,
all key members of the Boston AWSA (see History of Woman
Suffrage, vol. 2, p. 389). Victoria Woodhull's fitful
relations with the NWSA are recounted in Johanna Johnston's
Mrs. Satan (New York, 1967); DuBois, Elizabeth Cady Stanton.
Susan B. Anthony; and Griffith, In Her Own Right. Woodhull
was briefly a hero of the movement following her successful
1871 speech to Congress, and many people adopted the
strategy she outlined there. When Woodhull's part in the
Beecher-Tilton scandal became known, however, even her
partisans felt some pressing need to get in line with the
rest of the immaculate Athenians, and she was dropped from
the NWSA roster. Woodhull's presence on the platform never
signalled any acceptance of her free love views by the rank
and file; her "new departure" strategy was largely free of
such rhetoric, although the strategy itself— that women
already had the vote as a matter of prior right and
constitutional entitlement through the fourteenth and
fifteenth amendments— was grounded in the same theory of
natural rights as her philosophy of sexual freedom; see
DuBois, Stanton and Anthony, pp. 101-107.
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openly discussed and added to the organization's agenda."
In no small part due to the influence of Elizabeth Cady
Stanton, woman's "natural right" to her body had become a
pillar of mainstream liberal feminist thought.

The Natural Roots of Natural Rights
In a tract published in 1894 Stanton most clearly
spells out her philosophy of natural rights.
We argue the rights of persons from their
necessities. To breathe, sleep, walk, eat,
and drink, are natural rights, necessary to
physical development. So the right to think,
express one's opinion, mould public
sentiment, to choose one's conditions and
environments, are necessities for psychical
development ... in the study of human beings,
we see their wants and needs, their
capacities and powers and from their
manifestations, we argue their natural
rights.9*
Commentators have long pinpointed natural rights as a
cornerstone of liberal feminist philosophy, using the phrase
as shorthand for the set of claims and principles adopted by
the Founding Fathers, equality foremost among them.97 In
fact— as the quotation from "Suffrage a Natural Right" shows

“DuBois, Stanton and Anthony, p. 97; Leach, True Love
and Perfect Union, pp. 85 ff.
"Stanton, "Suffrage a Natural Right," pp. 6-7.
97See Kraditor, Ideas of the Woman Suffrage Movement,
and DuBois, Feminism and Suffrage.
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quite clearly— Stanton and other liberal feminists'
expression of natural rights philosophy, although it employs
the same vocabulary, departs sharpiy from the male
eighteenth-century revolutionary tradition.

Unlike the

Founding Fathers, Stanton saw freedom of physical movement,
autonomy, as the root natural right.

Revolutionary

philosophy did not deny self-ownership; on the contrary, it
was in many ways a given, since rights were being sought for
white men of clearly independent position, whose status as
self-owning was not challenged and not at issue.

Because

there had not been any significant group of unfree white
laborers, the issue of universal male suffrage in the early
nineteenth century did not raise the question of self
ownership in the same way it was raised by later efforts to
enfranchise women and black Americans.
The philosophy of universal male suffrage laid down few
requirements for citizenship.

Nonetheless, a vestigial

notion of "citizen” still centered around attributes
commonly associated with citizenship which in practice most
women and blacks could not share— autonomy, ownership of
property, education, participation in the public sphere.

In

fact, across the spectrum of potential voters from the ex
field slave to the lady Athenians of Boston, their common
humanity lay in tenanting a human body; and it was around
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this common chord that much of Stanton's natural rights
argument was built.
From the earliest days of the movement, women stressed
rights as rooted in physical autonomy.

This is shown by a

comparison of the grievances enumerated in the Declaration
of Independence and those in the Declaration of Sentiments
penned at the first woman's rights meeting at Seneca Falls
and modelled on the earlier document.”

Eighteenth-century

American revolutionaries protested "slavery," but it was not
the slavery of physical abuse, marital rape, or forced
labor.”

Many of the Declaration's eighteen counts against

George III complained of the colonists' inability to
participate in government and public life, or the imposition
of harsh measures without participation or representation.
Their natural rights tradition posited an overarching set of
principles guaranteeing rights which could largely be
described as civil rights, insuring consent to government on
issues such as representation and taxation, and protection
from arbitrary legal and political power.

The rights of

individuals were indeed paramount; but the personality

”Historv of Woman Suffrage, vol. 1, pp. 70-71.
**For the claims of American revolutionaries see
Bernard Bailyn, Ideological Origins of the American
Revolution (Cambridge, Mass., 1967).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

202

constructed was largely a civil personality, the needs
largely civil needs.
Rights for Stanton did not originate in some conception
of the civic individual, but in the inviolate body.

The

Declaration of Sentiments, in which Stanton played the part
of Thomas Jefferson, laid out eighteen grievances of its
own; many were directed at the procurement of women's civil
rights, such as the right to vote and own property.

But

others explicitly attacked men's "absolute tyranny"— which
made woman the slave of her husband and allowed him to
imprison and chastise her; which formulated the double
standard of sexual conduct so denigrating to women; and
which framed the laws of divorce so as to effectively deny
women escape from a bad or violent marriage.

Yet another

area of discontent, unthinkable in the eighteenth-century
original, was that man "has usurped the power of Jehovah
himself" in assigning woman a sphere of action, deliberately
stunting her education and full development.
Not content simply to rectify woman's place in the
public sphere, the founding mothers aimed to reconstruct
woman's view of herself and her most intimate relations, as
a necessary preliminary to revamping her public personality.
From Seneca Falls onward, feminist natural rights theory
looked to human behavior and needs, the physical patterns of
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life, to determine what "natural" or God-ordained laws
were.100 It became a commonplace in the movement to refer to
human rights as based on "natural necessity."101 Early on
Stanton refuted altogether the positivist school of rights
thinking when she complained that "Mr. Higginson belongs to
the Jeremy Bentham school that law makes right.

I am a

discipline of the new philosophy that man's wants make his
rights."102 Natural rights philosophy as she constructed it
did indeed spring from and was closely identified with
physical needs; although it resulted in meaningful claims
for civil rights as well, civil rights for Stanton served

100The fact that women modeled the Declaration of
Sentiments so closely on the Declaration of Independence—
its language is virtually identical except for the specifics
of the charges themselves— is often cited as evidence that
women followed closely in the founding traditions.
Imitation is the sincerest form of flattery etc., but to
indict men in exactly the same terms in which they indicted
the tyrant George III seems a back-handed compliment, as
well as an acknowledgment of the power of the argument.
101Belva Lockwood, "The Right of Women to Vote,
Guaranteed by the Constitution..." (Washington, 1871);
reprinted in Woodhull and Claflin's Weekly, vol. 2 no. IS
(Feb. 25, 1871), p. 1. For similar language see also
Stanton's speech in Proceedings of the First Anniversary of
the Equal Rights Association (New York, 1867), p. 8
(suffrage as necessary to protection of person and property
"as are air and motion to life; women and blacks "not
outside human laws and necessities.") See also Chap. I for
the antebellum origins of this line of thought within
American feminism.
102Stanton, letter to Susan B. Anthony, July 4, 1858,
Stanton Papers, Douglass College Library.
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ultimately to protect the individual's safety.103
In Stanton's view, all rights sprang from the fact of
self-ownership.

She was convinced that for both the woman

and the slave, civil rights such as the rights to vote and
to own property would be worthless until "the great idea of
his right to himself, of his personal dignity ... take(s)
possession of his soul.”104 As Woodhull claimed, "a
statement of woman's rights which ignores the right of self
ownership as the first of all rights is insufficient to meet
the demand."1”

"The rights of the individual and the

citizen have the same origin and their public and private
interests demand the same protection.

Individual freedom

and self-government, citizenship and suffrage, are
synonymous."10* Stanton fused the personal and the political
in a way which expanded the concept and scope of citizenship
considerably, while at the same time stressing personal
growth and freedom as the basis and end of those rights.

103Supra, pp. 20-22.
104Stanton, letter to Susan B. Anthony, July 20, 1857;
and letter to Lucy Stone, Nov. 24, 1856, Stanton Papers,
Douglass College Library.
U5This is from Victoria Woodhull's "Principles of
Social Freedom," p. 5, where she also said that "the woman's
movement means no less the complete social as well as the
political enfranchisement of mankind."
106Stanton, "Suffrage a Natural Right," p. 8.
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The Founders would have agreed with her that the rights of
governments flow from the rights of individuals; but would
not have gone on to add that the individual has the duty to
resist whatever restricts his personal growth in preference
to all "constitutions, creed, and codes."101
At the same time, predicating rights on the most
elemental needs also posits a kind of equitable allotment,
or at least heads off substantial inequity.

In her address

to the constitutional convention of New York in 1867 Stanton
claims for each individual the "right to everything on earth
and air, on land and sea ... to all that is needful for body
and soul, and there is no limit to the exercise of your
rights but in the infringement of the rights of another
..."10* Here, and throughout her work, Stanton shows the
influence of liberal thought in her belief that the widest
scope of freedom to consume, act, enjoy was possible for all
individuals, and that no conflicts between the needs of
individuals would arise.10’ "Infringement" in Stanton's
terms was the classic legal punch in the nose, and could not

167Stanton, Revolution, vol. 1 no. 21 (May 28, 1868), p.
361.
10,Stanton, "Address in Favor of Universal Suffrage"
(Albany, 1867), p. 13.
10*For example, Stanton, Eighty Years, p. 231; DuBois,
Stanton and Anthony, p. 129.
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come about through the simple fact of needing; shaped by the
early liberal optimism that unfettered human energy could
produce limitless amounts, the problem of redistribution, or
the conflict of rights between individuals, rarely arose in
Stanton's thinking.
This definition of natural rights as rooted in the
safety and well being of the body makes sense of the idea of
civil rights as defensive weapons.

The ballot signified

"bread, education, self-protection, self-reliance, and selfrespect; to the wife it means the control of her own person,
property, and earnings

Such a definition also

theoretically does away with the idea of qualified suffrage,
life itself and the instinct of self-preservation being the
only qualification.

Isabella Beecher Hooker in a speech to

Congress eloquently claimed her right to vote although
I may have been born with less capacity than
the least among you, with small chance of
growing to your mental stature, or reaching
your standard of moral elevation; but I have
a perfect right to sit in your midst, pygmy
that I may be ...111

ll0Resolution passed, recorded in Proceeding...Equal
Rights Association, p. 52.
m Mernorial of Elizabeth Cadv Stanton...to the Congress
of the United States (Washington, D.C., 1872). Although
this position represented the moral high ground, in fact
liberals were a little wishy-washy on suffrage
qualifications. Women often reiterated the argument, a
staple of Sumner's theory, that unacceptable qualifications
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Women demanded that nthe qualifications which a state may
require of electors must be such as can be acquired by all
persons by the same means."m
The nineteenth-century liberal feminist natural rights
tradition transfigured its eighteenth-century parent.

The

earlier tradition rooted its theory of natural rights in the
civil self.

By focusing political demands on the right to

vote, represent, and to legislate— to be independent in the
political sphere— it automatically defined rights in such a
way as to exclude women, who did not inhabit that world.

In

feminist eyes, natural rights derived from natural laws, and
from the physical conditions of life common to pygmies and

could be distinguished by their immutability; i.e., youth
and insanity could be overcome, but sex and race never could
be, leaving the door open to some restrictions. In fact,
Stanton went back and forth on the question of educational
qualifications for suffrage, and often expressed her
feelings about ignorant foreign-born rabble by supporting
such a conditional suffrage; see "Educated Suffrage," The
Independent. Feb. 14, 1895, Stanton Papers, Library of
Congress, reel 2. On the basis of Stanton's original claims
to self-ownership, however, it is difficult to make the
argument that any sentient being of any age or condition can
be denied the vote; and in fact the basis of the regulatory
authority over children and other dependents have sometimes
proven difficult or impossible for courts to uphold in the
years since.
luVictoria Woodhull, "A Lecture on Constitutional
Equality" (New York, 1871), p. 23.
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giants alike.113 Those who could claim to own nothing but
their souls were rich in natural rights.

The Antinomian State
Elizabeth Cady Stanton's extreme individualist
orientation made it very difficult for her at any stage in
her career to develop a substantive theory of the state, or
a theory of class action within the state.

Her religious

and political antinomianism were inseparable, as expressed
by one of her favorite phrases, "a law unto herself."

Both

depended on the ideal of the individual consulting his or
her own conscience in rigorous Protestant, "republican"
fashion for the final ruling on the law.114 Chapter II
showed Stanton's hostility to law within the family setting,
but concern for the individual's privacy was only one part
of her disaffection with legal means.

Stanton felt strongly

that in any setting, public or private, the imposition of

113The revolutionary natural rights tradition itself
was a departure from the medieval natural laws tradition as
taught by Thomas Aquinas and others, which looked to the
habits of physical life to determine natural laws.
114Stanton used the term "republican" often and
approvingly; republican as she defined it had nothing to do
with common good but was synonymous with "self-governing."
As such, she felt she was moving the country in the
direction of a true republic by endorsing individualism, and
would have been horrified at the recent academic
construction of republicanism.
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external norms was doomed to fail, a belief she shared with
Fourier and his followers.
One commentator, writing in the Revolution about
marriage, suggests that "the morality which consists in
doing no harm ... can be enforced by external restraints,
(but) is essentially different from the morality which
consists in loving God, and which is acquired by faith and
prayer alone."us

These two categories approximated

Stanton's division of tasks performed by the state and by
the individual: the state could be entrusted to do a small
number of things in a limited way under strict scrutiny,
usually negative rather than positive action; while all that
was creative, vital, loving, constructive could only be
undertaken through the free will of the individual.
Ultimately the state (as represented in the pedestrian
bureaucrat, Recorder Hackett) will wither away, and humans
will be fully self-regulating.11*
Such skepticism about positive law's capacity had
several sources, and it was particularly acute in liberal
reform circles.
authority.

Divine authority still always trumped human

Conservatives like Greeley were willing to

^ Revolution, vol. 3 no. 8 (Feb. 25, 1869) .
u*Stanton, "On Labor and Free Love," p. 266.
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dishonor human law if it conflicted with the overriding
authority of God's laws on the permanence of marriage;
Stanton argued divine jurisdiction to refute the
legislature's authority to enact restrictive marriage laws.
A variation on this theme was the ease with which reformers/
particularly these influenced by abolitionism, interpreted
the exercise of human authority as illegitimate and
corrupt.117 Finally, the influence of Fourierism, bolstered
with arguments from liberal economic theory, combined with
liberal Protestantism's continuing strong belief in natural
laws of divine origin to create a widespread confidence in
an all-encompassing system, not the invention of mankind but
"deduced from and based upon universal Principles,

(which)

is the application to the social relations of mankind of the
laws of Order and Unity which govern the Universe.1,110
Stanton was a true believer in a universal set of laws,
"immutable in the moral as in the material world" that

117For the antebellum roots of this attitude in
abolitionism see Lewis Perry, Radical Abolitionism; and
Chap. I.
U0Brisbane, Concise Exposition, p. 3. See also
Shively, introduction to Andrews' "Love, Marriage, and
Divorce;" and Arthur Bestor, "Albert Brisbane: Propagandist
for Socialism in the 1840s," New York History, vol. 28 no.
2, pp. 128-158. Victoria Woodhull urges faith in the "self
regulating efficacy of freedom" ("Principles of Social
Freedom," p. 40).
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governed individuals by themselves and also in their social
relations; one infringement could "breed disorder and
confusion in the whole social system.119
One of the most important tenets of the day, with
implications for public attitudes toward the legal system,
was that the activation of this self-regulating system
"proceeded by the liberation of inner resources rather than
the imposition of external forms."120 In their universal
belief in a grand social order regulated by natural laws
lately come from the presence of God, most reformers
repudiated the idea that human laws, acting from without,
could mold or coerce human behavior.

Andrews spoke for many

in his assertion that "marriage is a contrivance to regulate
nature instead of studying her laws," and that "order,
combining with freedom and ultimately in harmony, is to be
the work of science, and not of arbitrary legislation and
criminal codes."121 Stanton stressed that the task was not

U9Stanton, "The Pleasures of Age: An Address Delivered
by Elizabeth Cady Stanton on her Seventieth Birthday" (n.p.,
n.d.); and "Address in Favor of Universal Suffrage," p. 13.
Needless to say, Recorder Hackett was not the Author of
these laws.
^Howard Feinstein, Becoming William James (Ithaca,
1984), p. 83.
121Andrews, "Love, Marriage, and Divorce," p. 49. Many
of these attitudes sound more like pre-Civil War anti
institutionalism of the kind George Frederickson writes
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to rule others, but the much more difficult one of ruling
oneself; and that it was the duty of women to own and
control themselves through government, not others.122
Such attitudes toward regulation proved a shifting
foundation on which to build any theory of the state.

In

their dislike of the state, liberal feminists had many plans
for hobbling it.

Its limited functions were defined

primarily as the protection of the weak and the protection
of personal rights; Woodhull was emphatic that any enacted
law which contradicted those purposes was not binding, and
unconstitutional as well.123

about in The Inner Civil War: Northern Intellectuals and the
Crisis of the Union (New York, 1968) than his description of
post-war life. The generation of reformers I am concerned
with here came of intellectual age in antebellum America and
never lost the turn of mind they acquired then.
122Stanton, "Self Government" (1874), Stanton Papers,
Library of Congress, reel 3; and the Revolution, vol. 1 no.
5 (Feb. 5, 1868), p. 69.
U3Woodhull, "Principles of Social Freedom," p. 8. See
also Revolution, vol. 2 no. 11 (Sept. 17, 1868), p. 169,
which suggests that the proper role of government is not to
protect the weak, but to provide them with the means whereby
they can protect themselves. In 1894, Stanton made a strong
push for leaving family regulation to the state, so that "we
can judge of the working of different laws under varying
circumstances, and thus learn their comparative merits."
Actually it was an attempt to stave off a proposed national
anti-divorce bill then riding a wave of popularity.
Stanton, Eighty Years, p. 228.
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Paradoxically, though, the NWSA had based its agenda on a
program of national suffrage, rather than on a state by
state basis.

Stanton's fear and dislike of the state were

greater than most of her colleagues in the NWSA.

Perhaps

the more common attitude toward the state was represented by
Matilda Gage, who believed that the centralization of
government in the United States had marked an increase
rather than a decrease in liberty, and found the idea that
states had jurisdiction to define the individual's natural
rights to be dangerous.124 Theory aside, Stanton and Gage
had a political movement to run, and operated on the
strategic hope that centralized government cpuld protect
women's rights.

Both women see-sawed between anti-statism

and hope for a woman suffrage amendment, Stanton coming down
more often on the anti-statist side.
One area where Stanton fought in a sense to augment the
jurisdiction of the state was family relations.

In

destroying the basis of private authority, Stanton thrust
sexual and family matters into the public sphere, one which
included both men and women.

She was emphatic that cases of

124"Arguments on Behalf of...A Sixteenth
Amendment...1880" (n.p., n.d.), p. 10. Gage suggests here
that questions such as placement of cemeteries and bridges
should be left solely to local powers; in such matters women
"believe in the diffusion of the power of government" and
seek a return of control to local institutions.
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infanticide and sexual misconduct brought against women
should be tried by a jury of female peers; and that abuse
within the family should be brought out from behind the
shield of the single-family household and into open court.
Dwelling on the details of one pathetic infanticide— unwed
pregnancy/ desertion, prolonged puerperal fever— Stanton
over and over presented the details of women's physical
lives to public forums, as she also did repeatedly with her
lyceum lectures on marriage and divorce and on motherhood as
well.125 Oppression flourished within an atmosphere of
secrecy, privacy, closed doors; the body itself and all its
workings must be revealed, and removed from the confining
influences of the church and family.12*
At the same time, Stanton mapped out the sphere of
personal life in public only to label it private; and sought
to enforce privacy rights for individual behavior while
destroying the privacy of the home.

Self-ownership's

essential characteristic was that the individual served as
the sole judge of his own needs— "a man's wants make his

125Revolution, vol. 2 no. 23 (Dec. 10, 1868), pp. 358,
360; vol. 2 no. 25 (Dec. 24, 1868), p. 393.
l2*See Leach, True Love and Perfect Union: and John
Cowan, Science of a New Life (1874; reprint, New York,
1970) .
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rights.1,127 Clearly rights based on such a criterion— one
which exalts the subjective judgment of the wanter over any
external decision making process— sets a standard which is
unreviewable by any outsider or institutional authority.12'
Because so much of politics for Stanton consisted of issues
of individual autonomy, huge areas of decision making fell
into the preserve of individual sovereignty.

Stanton sought

to label much behavior "private" or "personal" in a way
which defined it as outside the regulatory sphere, and only
within the competence of the individual.

Such a subjective

standard— literally "my body, my right"— is open to
unilateral change at any time, with no basis for discussion
or dispute.12'

“7Stanton, letter to Susan B. Anthony, July 14, 1858,
Stanton Papers, Douglass College.
“'See fn. 35 supra.
12'ln the arguments in front of the Supreme Court in the
Webster abortion-rights case in April, 1989, the attorney
for the plaintiffs was quoted as saying "the conclusion...is
when you have an issue so divisive and so emotional and so
personal and so intimate, that it must be left as a
fundamental right to an individual to make that choice" (New
York Times, April 27, 1989). This conclusion is striking
both because it is such a complete reversal of eighteenthcentury thought, where a decision "so emotional and so
personal" would have been described as "so moral and so
religious" and exactly for that reason subject to regulation
of some kind; and because it seems a direct descendent of
the argument Stanton set up initially, that sexual and
family matters were "personal" and not moral, and therefore
impervious to public scrutiny.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

216

The dualism of radical associationism stuck with
Stanton all her life— no half measures, one was white or
black, slave or free, a slave of government or an individual
sovereign.

Because her final question was always whether

the individual was paramount it was very difficult for
Stanton to develop any workable theory of a public interest,
or any positive theory of the state.”0 Stanton may not have
fully foreseen the consequences of her theory of the dwarf
state, or adequately considered the question of whether in
fact a central government was a necessary partner in
ensuring women's equality.
The vision of citizenship and suffrage Stanton put
forward was as impoverished as her view of the state.
Stanton's articulated definition of the ballot was extremely
narrow, almost never going beyond its protective function.
This is citizenship in a republic. The
natural right to life, liberty, and happiness
... the right to protect one's perron and
property; to govern one's self; to have a
voice in the law and rulers; to enjoy all the
advantages and opportunities of which one is
capable.131

130Stanton calls the idea that the interests of society
are paramount to those of the individual the "Roman idea,
the Pagan idea that the individual was made for the state"
(Eighty Years, p. 231.)
131Stanton, "Women Do Not Wish to Vote," National
Bulletin, vol. 2 no. 3 (April, 1894), in Stanton Papers,
Library of Congress, reel 2.
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This position is in many ways a retreat from antebellum
feminism, which fully subscribed to political rights as
enhancing the development of the individual, but tied them
also to the performance of duties and the provision of goods
and services for all.132 The vote for antebellum feminists
was tied into a web of relationships often described in the
phrase "rights and duties."

Stanton categorically rejected

conditioning one's rights on one duties, or on anything but
self-ownership.

She was not without a broader vision of the

potential for human development; in fact, this was her creed
and her religion.

But her individualistic stance left

little room for a positive view of government, or its
potential to act as a force for good in people's lives; or
for politics as an institution in which people come together
to govern themselves jointly.
Nor did it allow for any real theory of economic class,
or class action within the state.133 Far more than her

132See Chap. I.
133Toward the very end of her life, Stanton began to
come to terms with some of the limitations of her
philosophy, to appreciate the possibilities of some type of
socialism, and speak more realistically about the reality of
class conflict in an industrial society. See for example
"Suffrage a Natural Right," p. 3-4. In another letter,
undated but written from Basingstoke, England, sometime in
the 1890s, she writes in an uncharacteristic moment of
doubt, "My mind is not yet clear on the subject of paternal
government, whether we have too much or too little." (Letter
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peers, Stanton understood women as a sex-class, joined in
oppression, but any real sense of economic class eluded her;
her sympathy for slaves and workers was always strained.134
Stanton retained all her life a conviction formed in the
America of the Second Great Awakening, that civil perfection
is gained in the perfection of individuals and their rights:
denying arguments from "the rights of races" she demanded an
"end to all this talk of class legislation ... bury the
Negro in the citizen. "13S The identification of common
interest perhaps necessary for class consciousness was
lacking in Stanton, who believed that "no mortal has ever
been, no mortal will ever be like the soul just launched on
the sea of life.”136 The liberal Protestant notion of the
individual, the primacy of individual conscience, worked

to Elizabeth Smith Miller, undated, Stanton papers, Douglass
College).
134Gail Parker in the "Introduction" to Eighty Years
says "I cannot help but wish that she had manifested a less
invidious sisterly love for her sex and that her
championship of the slaves, and later of the working
classes, had been marked by a genuine feeling of involvement
with their fate, instead of a vicarious pleasure in being
able to share in their rebellious feelings. Elizabeth
Stanton was never going to be caught depending on someone
else's revolution" (p. xviii).
13SFor the influence of revivalism on Stanton see Alice
Rossi, The Feminist Papers, introduction to part II;
Revolution, vol. 3 no. 2 (Jan. 14, 1869).
136"Solitude of Self," p. 2.
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against the possibility of mutual interests as well.
Indeed, class could be an oppressive structure, one that
blurred the outlines of personhood in the group, or dictated
wants and needs.

Stanton's failure to account for class

occurred in part because she had no conception of potential
conflict between the individual and the state; Fourier's
universal harmonies worked to assure that the highest good
of society and the individual always lay in same direction;
that if you "take care of individual rights the nation will
take care of itself."131 Perhaps in this seeming harmony the
chance to transform the idea of natural rights as rooted in
physical being into economic rights was lost.
Nevertheless, Stanton's political philosophy and view
of natural rights had a great influence on feminism; and
feminism, as well as women's entry into the public sphere,
helped to transform liberalism.

In the eighteenth century,

the liberal individual (male) was defined by owning
property, voting, participating in the‘public sphere.

By

the end of the nineteenth, there was a consensus, if not on
the details, at least on the fact that the liberal
individual, male or female, was autonomous in personal life,
as well; that rights extended to privacy of the body,

137Stanton, "Free Speech," p. 2; DuBois, Stanton and
Anthony, p. 129; Eighty Years, p. 231.
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freedom from physical coercion.139 Commentators on Stanton
have suggested that over the span of her career she moved
away from an early interest in legal and political reform,
switching in the late 1860s and 1870s to more intimate
concerns of marriage, sexuality, maternity; and finally in
her last twenty years to religion and the church.139
Although her interest in all these questions was lifelong,

13*0f course the causal question, which I have begged
here, is how much liberalism changed as a result of any of
the campaigns of organized feminism; or as a result of the
entry of women into the political sphere, an established
fact by the later nineteenth century (Stanton, Eighty Years,
p. 265); or as a result of gendered division of labor
whereby women needed rights in order to fulfill sole duties
within the home (see fn. 14, chap. II) (this also seems not
to explain the emphasis on bodily autonomy); or as a result
of the other great movement for freedom of the body, anti
slavery and Reconstruction. Rejecting monocausal history, I
think all were important, and am not focusing on liberal
political theory to suggest that other developments were
not; at the same time I do think, unlike some commentators,
that organized liberal feminism was highly visible and
influential in defining the questions in post-Civil War
America; the tremendous publicity given to them in
newspapers, their incessant lecture tours, their constant
stream of publications all helped to redefine the liberal
individual.
139See Maureen Fitzgerald, "Religion and Feminism,"
chap. 3; DuBois, Stanton and Anthony, p. 94; and Leach, True
Love and Perfect Union, who also suggests (p. 143) that
after the Civil War Stanton's preoccupation with
individualism gave way to an attempt to "combine
individualism with structure, organization, and
centralization." She does indicate that she knows these
possibilities exist in her last years, but I question the
extent to which she ever effectively moved away from
individualism in her political theory.
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her focus on sexual and family concerns certainly
intensified during the 1870s.

At the core of her

transitions, though, is continuity and not change.
Commentators have claimed that the explicit natural rights
language of bodily ownership peaked in the 1870s, losing its
force after the end of Reconstruction.140 But the language
of autonomy lived on in Stanton's work, and lay at the core
both of her work on the domestic question and the religion
question.

For the whole of her career from first to last,

the concept of self-ownership was at the root of Stanton's
political thought, its protection the ultimate goal of any
form of government or social arrangement.

140See fn. 139 supra.
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Chapter IV - The Woman's Christian Temperance Union
and Moral Governance
In 1875 the American Woman Suffrage Association (AWSA)
sent a telegram signed by Lucy Stone and Mary Livermore to
the newly formed Woman's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU),
reading "the AWSA bids your convention godspeed.

Soon may

women, armed with the ballot, help make the laws which
concern human welfare."

By return wire Frances Willard and

Eliza Thompson politely replied, "the WCTU returns your
kindly greetings and in Christian faith and charity abides
God's will awaiting His future providence.1’1 Apparently God
had suffrage work in store for temperance women; by the
early 1880's their national organization had endorsed the
woman's ballot and they were working, if not arm in arm, at
least side by side with women's suffrage groups for that
common goal.

A focus on that important point of agreement

obscures a world of difference.

A number of scholars have

explored the WCTU's instrumental vision of the ballot as an
agent of social reform, comparing it (usually unfavorably)
to groups like the National Woman Suffrage Association
(NWSA) and the American Women's Suffrage Association with

Stevenson, Katherine L., A Brief History of the
Woman's Christian Temperance Union (2d ed.; Evanston, 111.,
1907), p.12.
222
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their more abstract vision of fundamental rights.2 Unlike
more liberal groups, which sought to elevate the individual
woman through civil rights, the WCTU's strategy linked
woman's welfare inextricably with that of her family,
seeking both to control the behavior of other members of the
family (husbands and children) through a series of moral
regulations, and to shore up the working-class family in
particular through a series of programs and provisions,
Christian socialist in flavor, designed to provide a stable
basis for family life.
The liberal and evangelical programs represented not
merely different political strategies; they were different
at the root, from their first assessment of human nature and
the fundamental relations to their blueprint for a polity.
A similar rift divides feminists today.

Likeness and

difference of male and female, family and self, have been
the basis of much dispute in the last decade of feminist
writings.

Without trying to collapse time— much has changed

in women's lives between then and now— the WCTU is an
interesting study in themes we still debate.

2See in particular Barbara Epstein, The Politics of
Domesticity: Women. Evangelism, and Temperance in
Nineteenth-Century America (Middletown, Conn. 1981); and
Ruth Bordin, Woman and Temperance: The Quest for Power and
Liberty, 1873-1900 (Philadelphia, 1981).
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Arguments from women's difference, whether they see
difference as socially constructed or as essential, usually
center around the experience of child-bearing and -raising,
and the caring, noncompetitive style which results.

For

temperance women, too, the construction of themselves as
mothers was central, to their own identities and to their
politics.

The WCTU was clearly a mothers' movement; their

slogan, "organized mother love," shows their delicate
perpetual balance between the maternal and the programmatic.
The WCTU represents the largest and most influential
mothers' movement in our history, actual practitioners of a
kind of "connective politics" of which many cultural
feminists dream today.3 How did they mediate between the
love and intrusion which constitute personal intimacy and
social compassion?

How does maternalism compare to

paternalism, or liberalism, or other styles of governance?

The Relational Basis of Temperance Politics
For evangelical suffragists, motherhood was not merely
a political strategy, as some have suggested, but part of a
larger world view.

Unlike Stanton, unlike other liberals,

evangelical women did not glorify the absolute freedom of

3Robin West, "Jurisprudence and Gender," Chicago Law
Review, vol. 55 no. 1 (1988), pp. 1-72.
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the individual from ties and obligations to others, whether
family or strangers.

Far from being their ideal,

evangelical women pitied the unattached, even condescending
sympathetically to Stanton's kingly libertarian hero,
Robinson Crusoe, who "had a sorry time of it, and wasn't so
useful by half as he might have been under more social
influences.”4 For Frances Willard, Crusoe's absolute
liberty was compromised when he saw footprints not his own
on the shore of his island: "From that moment his personal
liberty was divided by two; from that moment self-hood ...
had to take cognizance of otherhood.1,8 Far from being a
comedown, though, the presence of another was what gave the
self definition, purpose, rootedness.

The idea of bonds, so

repugnant to many liberals in the aftermath of slavery,
signified for temperance women their binding, submissive
relationship to God; as well as the second great
commandment, love to neighbors.
obligation she liked.

Stanton had never met an

But evangelicals found such

assertions of personal independence misguided and
unrealistic, and raised obligations to define the highest

4Frances E. Willard, "An Open Letter," scrapbook 4,
WCTU Series, reel 30.
5Frances E. Willard, Woman and Temperance (Hartford,
Conn., 1883), p. 491.
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point of humanity and spirituality both.

In some very real

way they took on themselves the identity of a "'bond
servant' ... and the bondage is— love."*
polity as a collection of discrete

Far from seeing a

individuals, it was a

group that"like all creation is bound together by

invisible

cords, and through all pulsates a common life ...n1
Family life, love for spouse and children, represented
the closest, most common manifestation of such bonds.

In

WCTU ideology the family became the paradigm for social
relations.
foundation

The Christian ideal of brotherhood was the
of a relational view ofcommunity where

"whosoever will do the will of my Father, who is in heaven,
the same is my mother and sister and brother ... "* Family
ties between union members were stressed insistently; every
woman was "sister" to every other, and a title conferred to
honor a few of the Crusade's leaders was "Mother."

Frances

Willard and others travelled the remotest parts of the
country ten months a year stressing the essential kinship of
the union members with each other and with the rest of

*Willard, Woman and Temperance, p. 36.
’w.C.T.U. Declaration of Principles, in Stevenson,
Brief History, p. 99.

‘Bessie Lathe Scovell, A Brief History of the Minnesota
W.C.T.U
1877-1939 (Minneapolis, 1939), p. 55.
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society; her greatest compliment, paid to some audiences,
was that she felt as much at home with them as with her own
mother.’ As WCTU members often expressed it, their goal was
"to -make the whole world kin."10 Self-proclaimed sisters to
each other, union members saw themselves as mothers to the
community— a powerful image in a society which had elevated
"mother" to a uniquely revered position.
In this world, one's rights, duties, even one's selfworth were measured by the fulfillment of obligations to
others.

Willard's favorite book, one she constantly

recommended as embodying the core of the WCTU's philosophy,
was Frances Power Cobbe's The Duties of Woman.11 Duty
itself— a concept which liberals held in low esteem— was the
backbone of evangelical feminism, far more than rights.
Cobbe lights into the subject of duties with relish.

Her

hierarchy of duties has three main categories: Religious,
Personal, and Social Duties; and she subdivides Social

*Willard, "An Open Letter."
10A typical poem ends, "will not every wife and mother/
seek to help some erring brother?/ Will not every loving
daughter/ seek to lift some fallen father?/ Will not
sister, wife, and mother/ help a brother, son, or father?"
Quoted in "The Granite State Outlook," vol, 1 no. 2 (Feb.
1891) .
“Frances Power Cobbe, The Duties of Woman (Boston,
1881) .
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Duties in four parts.

Duties for Cobbe arise out of

relationships, the most important being the "natural ties of
proximity in blood— the reciprocal first claims of Parents
and Children, and then of Brothers, and so on."

The second

are duties arising out of those claims founded on contract,
among which Cobbe includes marriage.

The third category is

that of prior indebtedness, those who have been benevolent
to us in the past; and the fourth the claims of "local
Propinquity." or neighbors.12 Duties, then, were all
around, both contractual and involuntary, and impossible to
shake; you could incur a duty to someone simply by living
near him.
Union members who were housewives had their share of
home tasks, and like all housewives sometimes found them
wearying.

Indeed, a clear strain in Stanton's brand of

liberal feminism was an acknowledgement of the dehumanizing
burden of home and child care, and a plea to women to reject
the primary identification as domestic workers.

Evangelical

women, though, never expressed such weariness in public.13
The obligations to family, neighbors, strangers were not the

“Cobbe, Duties, p. 94.
“Except for one wonderful jailed Crusader who, when
her husband pleaded to be allowed to bail her out for the
sake of the baby responded "Baby? What baby? I wouldn't be
got out of here for twenty babies!"
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punitive weights imposed from without# as Stanton pictured
them# but willingly assumed— "faith which turns as readily
to works as steam to water."14
Nor is it clear that this difference between liberals
and evangelicals can be traced to different material
circumstances: one comparative study of leaders of both
movements found that in terms of class# education# and
amount and type of work outside the home# the two groups
were remarkably alike.”

Religion# this study suggests# was

the break point between the groups.

Liberal suffragists

were far more likely to fall within the "liberal" sphere of
religion— Congregational# Quaker, Unitarian Universalist—
while temperance women more likely belonged to the
evangelical denominations# particularly Methodism.

The

liberal God— offstage most of the time— demanded more in the
way of individual growth and autonomy# while the
evangelicals' God— center stage— stressed kinship and care.
Evangelicals measured their own happiness and self-worth by
their lovingkindness to family and others; one hoped to have

14Willard, Do Everything, p. 79.
15Janet Zollinger Giele# "Social Change in the Feminine
Role: A Comparison of Woman's Suffrage and Woman's
Temperance# 1870-1920," Ph.D. diss., Radcliffe College,
1961.
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as her epitaph "she was dependable."16

Maternal Governance
Glorification of home and family did not mean that
those institutions could not be improved.

Historians have

been critical of the WCTU for accepting the monogamous
nuclear family as it stood.

In fact, the WCTU early on

mounted a campaign to transform governance in the home as
well as the state quite radically.

Traditionally labeled

"conservative" in their religion, they nonetheless shared
with liberals a common enemy, the twin-headed orthodoxy of
patriarchalism and Calvinism.

The stories nineteenth-

century women activists tell of their religious experiences
are varied.

But for the first generation of reformers there

are common themes: all grew up in Charles Finney's America,
were deeply touched by the Second Great Awakening, and
wrestled in their own lives with Calvinism's harsh legacy.
Feminists as different as Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Frances
E. Willard shared the experience of sitting under the
preaching of Charles Finney, terrorized into insomnia by his
visions of the hell awaiting the unsaved.
The archetypal woman's story was of a childhood made

“Footnote on deposit in the Widener Library.
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miserable by a harsh, authoritarian Calvinist father,
buttressed by a threatening (male) minister and a distant,
unloving (male) God.

Fathers in these stories exercised a

sole, arbitrary authority without consultation or leniency.
In one of the richest accounts, Mary Livermore's father
imposed a severe Sunday regime on the family— no cooking, no
reading but the Bible, incessant prayer meetings harping on
the frailness of the hope of salvation until "I was
sometimes shaken to the center of my being, and ...
frequently felt a bitter regret that I had ever been
born.”17 Snuffling, creeping sextons, austere ministers,
cold dark specter-filled churches scared her so as a child,
Mary Livermore recounts, that she would cling to her father
for hope and reassurance which he could not give.

One

Sunday, her eighth birthday, she received a beautiful, rare
gift, a copy of Robinson Crusoe bound in red leather.
Unable to leave the book alone, she was caught reading it
several times by her father, who finally threw it in the
fire— an act of gratuitous cruelty Livermore recounts with
rage in her autobiography over sixty years later.11 Reform

17Mary A. Livermore, The Story of Mv Life, or the
Sunshine and Shadow of Seventy Years (Hartford, Conn.,
1899), p. 56.
“Livermore, Story, p.59. The story of the attempt to
break Mary's spiri<: is recounted in detail in Willard, Woman
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women depicted such displays of patriarchal authority as
common, and as abusive, arbitrary, damaging— the exercise of
blind, unreasonable, unloving force designed to break the
spirit of the child.

Liberals and evangelicals both

unanimously rejected this male model of governance through
fear in home and church both, substituting a loving,
suffering, feminine Christ for the feared, patriarchal God
of Calvinist religion.

Livermore even substituted "Our

Jesus" for "Our Father" in her childhood prayers.1*
The idea of a womanly model of domestic and religious
authority began to assert itself with the feminine Christ,
and was one which women eagerly developed and applied.

"Our

Mother" became the counter to "Our Father" in temperance
women's writing, and she exercised a radically different
style of authority.

Mary Livermore as a child was deeply

concerned with religious things, and despite her hatred of
abusive authority, was torn for many years by the process of
working out her stance toward God.

She hated the distant,

frightening ministers, but loved the more jovial ones, and
longed to preach herself; often as a child she did preach to

and Temperance, p. 427.
"On the feminized nature of Christ in the nineteenth
century see Ann Douglas, The Feminization of American
Culture (New York, 1977), chaps. 3 and 4.
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an audience of logs.

Occasionally her mother consented to

sit as one of the congregation (impossible to imagine her
father there, even in play): when Mrs. Livermore laughed,
Mary "rebuked" her "severely," telling her that "laughter
did not become God's house."20
Her deep conflict between the patriarchal and maternal
models, between her father's influence and her mother's,
also expressed itself during one visit from her cousins,
when the children eagerly devoured the "ghastly chronicles"
in Fox's Book of Martyrs.

They were especially taken with

the story of the burning of Archbishop Cranmer, a tale her
father used to illustrate the nobility of martyrdom.

Later,

alone, the children decided to reenact the story using
Mary's best toy, an expensive London wax doll.

Like

Cranmer, the doll perished quite satisfactorily in the
flames; Mary was immediately overcome with "the remorse of
matricide," and was for months inconsolable that Christian
zeal had led her to "sacrifice" her only child— a sacrifice
which fathers might but mothers would never make.21
Occasionally this conflict over styles of governance
showed itself in open warfare between mother and father for

“Livermore, Story. p. 70.
“Livermore, Story. pp. 93-96.
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control of the children.

Despite women's deprecation of

power, the home was clearly a charged environment; they very
often spoke of it in military terms as their "domain," their
"kingdom," their "fortress."

Conflict could arise between

individual parents within the home; and clearly despite the
lip service paid to equality it was not in sorrow that Mary
Livingston reported that although her mother never argued
with her father, "no man was ever more completely under the
control of another."22 A father who flouted mother's
authority and instincts about.children often brought down
tragedy, as did John Mason in The Voice of the Home when he
became a drinking companion to his son, whose appetites he
could not curb.

But mothers engaged in a larger fight as

well, with the "traps and snares" which the wide male world
set, particularly for sons but for daughters as well.23 For
without their children women were without their raison
d'etre.

Frances Raymond, a Civil War widow and mother of an

only son, looked to her country for help: "if it could not
provide so tender, yet should it not a larger fatherhood?"
Yet in her battle against her son's drinking she was scorned
and challenged by a bartender to provide "superior

“Livermore, Story. p. 40.
“Sarepta Henry, The Voice of the Home (New York,
1882), p. 312.
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attractions" to keep her son at home, a competition in which
the state sided with the man.2* Often providing "superior
attractions" in these texts leads to an eroticized motherson relation at the expense of the conjugal.

Temperance

women hoped to be "adored by their sons, depended on by
their husbands and friends."2S In one of

thebestknown

cases in which the father used overriding influence, one
woman commended the son, Christ, who "in

hishour of mortal

agony did not forget his mother."26
For the child in temperance writings, the home as
governed by maternal authority was a far more congenial
place— safer, warmer, more loving.
disrupt families.

Fathers tended to

They were bossy; they drank; frequently

and against mothers' wishes they uprooted families from
loved homes to seek their fortunes on inhospitable land,
"like Eve driven from Paradise."27 Frances Willard's father
committed an act of unthinkable cruelty; when Frances was in
2<Sarepta Henry, Frances Raymond's Investment: Or. the
Cost of a Bov (Chicago, 1889), p. 36.
2SOne article on the children's page of the Union's
official organ, the Union Signal, urged boys to "fall in
love" with their mothers (vol. 9, no. 45 [Nov. 22, 1883]);
see also Arena, vol. 6 (1892), p. 371 (the definition of a
clubwoman is given as "her children adore her. Her husband
and friends rely on her good sense.")
26Willard, Do Everything, p. 163.
27Livermore, Storv, p. 42.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

236

her early twenties her sister Mary died, and in an effort to
wipe out her memory Josiah Willard, over the protests of his
wife and daughter, sold at auction not only their family
home but all of their personal possessions— the household
goods of thirty years.2* Critics have portrayed home for
temperance women as stuffy, stilted, inegalitarian.

But the

motherly home was a haven, not for men but for women; an
alternative to the harsher, unforgiving love of the
patriarchal God and father.

Mary Livermore recounted a time

when, as children lost in a storm, parental love had rescued
them, father bringing them home to the "beloved mother ...
with dry clothing; a good supper, and the unspeakable
blessedness of home, love, and welcome."

As an adult she

longed for an equally loving God and a similar resolution to
problems by the "clear voice of our Father sounding out from
the gloom, 'Lo, I am here.'"29
The home as governed by mother was even safe from the
gravest danger— eternal damnation.

In another archetypal

story, the death of the sister {or brother, or lover), the
father is unable to assure his grieving family that the
sister has been saved.

In Mary Livermore's account, a

“Frances E. Willard, A Great Mother: Sketches of Madam
Willard (Chicago, 1894), p. 65.
“Livermore, Story. p. 117.
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minister reinforces her doubt and counsels the family to
"accept the inevitable."

Years later, the elderly Mary

Livermore is still anguished over the death of the young
girl; "not one intimation that she had entered a larger,
nobler, and happier life.

Flung out of existence into the

dark, a delicate, white-souled child ... "30 Doubt
precipitated a crisis; Mary needed reassurance that her
sister was not lost, which no male figure could give.

"My

mother alone was able to comfort me ... No amount of
theological disputations removed her from her anchorage ...
(a) belief that religion is love to God and love to man;
that it is not possible for God, whose very nature is love,
to send into life any creature, knowing that eternal torment
awaits him."

Again, the figure Mary Livermore later came to

call "God the Mother" would not sacrifice even one child to
the harsh regime of God the Calvinist Father.
Female intuition in WCTU literature is repeatedly posed
against loveless male disputation; the mother's love and
experience is privileged over the father's theology.
preach a creed; women will declare a life.
formulas, women in fact.

"Men

Men deal in

Men have always tithed mint and

rue and cumin in their exegesis and their ecclesiasticism,

“Livermore, Storv. p. 135.
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while the world's heart has cried out for compassion,,
forgiveness, and sympathy ... "3l The evangelical reform
women were part of a liberal movement within the church that
rejected Calvinist orthodoxy, Biblical literalism, hair
splitting disputations.

Temperance women would put in their

place a simpler religion based on the two great
commandments— love for God and man— interpreted not through
the intricacies of ancient languages but through love and
common sense, virtues which mothers held in equal measure
with fathers.

Temperance leader Hannah Whitall Smith's

popular religious tracts were all based on a "theology ...
learned in the nursery with my children."32
Many of the first generation of suffragists, liberals
and evangelicals alike, were formed in their early years by
struggles against Calvinist patriarchy and its male
authoritarian model: despite their differences, Stanton
shared with evangelicals a real dislike of orthodox "creeds
and codes."

The alternative models of governance which both

liberals and evangelicals advocated shared some features; a
commitment to a tolerant, liberal, reasoning style (words,
however, which evangelicals and liberals could interpret

“Frances Willard, Woman in the Pulpit (New York,
1888), p. 47.
“Quoted in Willard, Woman and Temperance, p. 199.
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quite differently) which eschewed the use of force or
coercion.

But unlike the liberals, temperance women

developed a science of maternal government as a prototype
for the exercise of power in both home and state, a deeply
gendered model based on women's biosocial role.

But

although it was a style any woman could aspire to, it was
not instinctive: at times it seemed the WCTU had taken on
the task, not just of mothering the world, but of first
teaching women how to be mothers.

Huge numbers of tracts,

pamphlets, books, speeches, and meetings were devoted to
celebrating good motherhood or developing it in others.33
Temperance mothers told their stories in first-person
narrative or lightly disguised as fiction; mothers' meetings
were at the heart of the Union's program.

The mothering

blitz was directed, not just at the new immigrants or the
poor, but at the middle and upper classes, the Union's own
rank and file, past mothers, future mothers— any woman who

33Willard, A Great Mother; Mary Allen West, Childhood:
its _Care and Culture (Chicago, 1892); Hannah Whitall Smith,
Educating. Our Mothers, or. Wise Motherhood (London, 1896);
Sarepta Henry, Studies in Home and Child Life (New York,
1887). See also leaflets of Union's Mothers' meetings,
W.C.T.U Archive, Evanston, 111. Occasionally there were
slip-ups. The Boston temperance ladies accidentally put out
a cookbook called Massachusetts W.C.T.U. Cuisine (Boston,
1878) in which several of the recipes were found to be
"poisoned with wine. It is impossible to testify to the
sorrow of the committee in charge of the book..." (errata
slip).
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would listen.

For union members identified a variety of

personal and social evils as resulting from poor mothering
in the home, and saw improving the quality of mother-child
relations as fundamental to social change.
The new good mother was in every way the reverse of the
patriarch.

She led, not drove; used smiles and rewards

rather than stress and punishments; never imposed arbitrary
judgements on her children but reassured them instead.

One

such mother reinterpreted the biblical rod— man's punitive
staff— as a mere "symbol," representing not chastisement but
the care and love of the shepherd.34 The watchword here was
not coercion but "voluntary compliance."

A Minnesota

temperance worker coined an optimistic slogan which became
popular: "no labor strikes, no strikes in the family; the
best-governed children are those who seem to govern
themselves."”

Like the government of God where "no

coercion is found but absolute liberty," such a home was an
"ideally practical democracy."

The family government was

approved and rejoiced in by each child.

There was equality

and deference "to parents and children alike, and children's

34Henry, Studies, p. 95. See also Willard, Great
Mother, pp. 134 ff.; Smith, Educating Our Mothers, p.34.
”Emily H. Miller, quoted in scrapbook 10, WCTU Series,
reel 31.
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voices were heard in the settlement of difficult questions
in the counsel of the whole."”

Unlike the traditional

family, mother and father were equal partners sharing both
power and responsibility equitably.
Mothers secured voluntary compliance with prizes,
rewards, encouragement as the tools of persuasion.

Many

evangelical suffragists had used such theories in their work
as teachers as well and had first tested them out as Frances
Willard did at Northwestern Women's College, where girls who
routinely obeyed the code of conduct advanced to the "corps
of the self-governed. "37

"Voluntary" here held a rather

different meaning for evangelicals than it did for liberals,
though, and the contrasting uses lay at the core of the
conflict between the two groups.

Despite the emphasis on

"voluntary" action, the writings of the WCTU overall do not
manifest the same belief in human choice and free will that
the liberals often did.”

"Free will" for evangelicals

retained its older sense, not of unlimited human freedom,
but of choice exercised in the context of God's will: choice
to do or not to do wrong.

With the declining emphasis on

“Henry, Studies, pp. 84 ff.
"Willard, Woman and Temperance, p. 26; Livermore,
Story, p. 368.
“See Chap. III.
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sin, the phrase was often used by temperance workers to mean
"the exercise (of) that free choice of duty wherein virtue
consists."3* Willard, for example, writes in her later
years that watching her father sign the Washingtonian
temperance pledge as a child was her first lesson in
personal liberty.40 One temperance paper, The Granite State
Outlook, laid out a three-pronged scheme of family
governance which encapsulated both the common program of
evangelicals and liberals, and their splits.

"Household

tyranny" or old-style patriarchy, the common opponent of
both groups, was one extreme.

The other extreme was

characterized by "Household anarchy," presumably the
domestic environment which Stanton advocated and fostered.41
The third option, happily placed in the middle, was a house
governed through the mechanism of "cheerful, trusting, loveinspired confidence in the parent's will."42
Occasionally, of course, some child's (or spouse's)
cheerful self-government broke down; but writers on
mothering assured women that praise not blame, the carrot

3*Cobbe, Duties, p. 28.
40Frances Willard, "Address Before the 22nd Annual
Meeting of the National WCTU...Oct. 18-23, 1895," p. 3.
4ISee Chap. III.
42Granlte State Outlook. June, 1891, p. 2.
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not the stick, was the way to secure "voluntary
compliance."°

Temperance women were hypersensitive to the

open exercise of power, and to the unsexing that came with
coercion and the use of force— so much the patriarch's role.
Sometimes a temperance matriarch would vent righteous anger
at barkeepers or saloon owners, and took pleasure in
dressing them down with a kind of brutal maternal authority
that made grown men quail like small boys.”

But usually,

toward all the world but barkeepers, temperance women
rejected the confrontational tactics of liberal suffragists,
adopting as a policy methods of control which drew on
womanly "influence," like gentle persuasion, coaxing,
imploring— considered the traditional weapons of the weak.
Temperance women sought to "suggest without the slightest
appearance of arbitrary dictation."4* The best power was
that with fewest outward manifestations, like the message of

43Smith, Educating Our Mothers, p. 34.
Livermore, Storv. p. 41.

See also

"Union Signal, vol. 4 no. 6 (Feb. 8, 1883), p. 3; vol.
9 no. 49 (Dec. 20, 1883), p. 3. Despite their own efforts
and self image, the WCTU ladies were often perceived as
confrontational and forceful in the public literature (see
the cartoon from Grip, next page); alternately they were
cast as whiney, as on the stone grave marker some wag put on
the site of a former saloon reading "Died, A Saloon, Nagged
to Death by a Woman" (Additon, Twenty Years, p. 61).
"Union Signal. 4 January 1883, p. 3.
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comfort a wife sent to a sick husband miles away which
simply "by the power of that woman's will" soothed him into
his first restful sleep in days.4*
This style of persuasion was unconfrontational,
artificial, and highly gendered.

But one of its better

characteristics was its reluctance to adopt male models of
force.

For one thing, in a society still deeply Christian

in its ethos, if not wholly in its belief, the victory of
force over gentleness was not a foregone conclusion; the
figure of the loving, forebearing, womanly Christ which
temperance women adopted as their emblem still held a
powerful charge, though less than in the antebellum period.
Frances Willard and many others stressed that it was
Christianity which had raised human society above the level
of brute force to a plane where women could share the rule
of brain, heart, conscience, love.41
In addition, noncoercion was a critical part of the
WCTU's political agenda as well, which in its Department of
Peace and Arbitration anticipated the special nexus which
exists today between feminism and the peace movement;

As

“Union Signal. 5 November 1885, p. 7. Another letter
suggests that members sidle up to a drunk, slip their hands
into his side pocket, and replace the flask with a copy of
the New Testament {scrapbook 9, reel 31, WCTU Papers.)
47Willard, Woman and Temperance, pp. 392 ff.
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they rejected the brutal, forceful God of the Old Testament
and of Calvinism, so temperance women rejected
authoritarianism in the home and in the administration of
both domestic and foreign politics.

Rather, they saw

themselves as gifted arbitrators, painting Mother as a
skillful diplomat who "drew up treaties, subdued kingdoms,
and wrought righteousness" in settlement of disputes within
her domain.4*
The repudiation of force and of a confrontational
stance is not the element of the WCTU agenda most at odds
with a liberal feminism; both broadly rejected as a matter
of theory and principle violent restructuring measures
imposed from without.

But the WCTU's alternate model of

maternal care was deeply illiberal in some of its
presumptions.

In rejecting an authoritarian God temperance

mothers also rejected traditional privileges of the (male)
Creator as "architect to shape the young immortal according
to ... (his) preconceived plan."

Rather, mothers were

gardeners, growers, assistants in the natural practice of
evolution; children were trees not to be pruned or clipped
but "to grow with sun and soil, dew and shower and growth
unhindered and untransformed; the work of parent and

"Willard, Great Mother, p. 143.
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instructor being to remove hindrances, to see that no
deforming influence had power, to feed and stimulate, never
to repress or abridge its beneficent possibilities."”
This description recalls liberal strictures about the
value of care, education, and the opportunity for unfettered
development.50 But the liberal garden held a wild variety-no genus, no species, but each plant once blossomed
entirely individual and distinct.51 Evangelicals focused
instead on the process of growth and the teleological forces
which, if conditions were right, would produce a homogeneous
field.

Within the gentle structure of maternal evolutionary

thought the child found nurturing and license; but not
license for the acorn to grow into an elm or a tulip.

As

Hannah Whitall Smith described the sowing, "voluntary
obedience is a deed which is performed after the right state
of

feeling towards the thing has been induced.

Compulsion

is

an attempt to manufacture the fruit without planting the

seed."52 In a similar vein, WCTU literature eschewed the

“Willard, Great Mother, p. 138; Henry, Studies, p. 54.
50See Chap. Ill on

Stanton's mothering practices.

“The most extreme statement of this comes in Elizabeth
Cady Stanton's speech "The Solitude of Self," printed as
"Hearing of the ..'oman Suffrage Association Before the
Committee on the Judiciary...1892" (n.p., n.d.), p. 2.
52Smith, Educating Our Mothers, p. 34.
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open-ended question.

But one of the most common formats for

their material for children and adults both was the
catechism, or pamphlets consisting of questions and answers,
to be read chorally, resolving even the most complex moral
issues and leaving nothing open to doubt.”
Temperance women also drew on evolutionary thought to
recast the biblical notion of sin, a staple of Christian
theology which plagued religious liberals throughout the
nineteenth century.

The sin which drew down the lightening

wrath of God was a relic of orthodoxy, as the physical
punishment of a child was a relic of patriarchy.

Punishment

became rather a natural operation which resulted
automatically from the infringement of one of God's natural
laws, teaching the sorrowful child (or adult) a healthy
lesson without the need for punitive parental
intervention.”

The WCTU's philosophy took perfectionism to

new heights in their sunny confidence that sin was not

”Willard, Woman and Temperance, p. 401; Sarepta Henry,
A Manual of Evangelical Temperance Work for All WCTUs (New
York, 1881); "Annual Leaflet of the National WCTU" (Chicago,
1898).
“Smith, Educating Our Mothers, p. 40; Prances E.
Willard, "Address Before the Second Biennial Convention of
the World's Christian Temperance Union...," p. 53 ("the law
of ethics is the law of cause and effect"); Union Signal. 14
January 1886, p. 4. See also an article by Henry Wood, "The
Universality of Law," in Arena, vol. 5 (1892), at p. 201.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

248

inherent in the human condition but could be permanently
vanquished.

Not for them the anguishing, life-long struggle

and self-examination of their Calvinist ancestors: the WCTU
wholeheartedly endorsed the liberal tenet that all were
saved, as consonant with loving parenthood.
But in protecting children from the dark, mortal
terrors of their own childhood, the good mothers also
seemingly denied them something of the autonomy towards
which liberal religions strove.

In the WCTU's philosophy, a

child, hedged around by God's "natural” laws (a
comprehensive code) and full maternal guidance, no longer
had the responsibility of facing God directly, and little
experience of the ongoing process of self-government through
daily struggles with moral and ethical questions, learning
to resolve them on her own rather than through mother's
guidance.

Good mothers tended to make doing right an

irresistible, even a thoughtless process, believing that
individual struggles with sin and temptation could be
circumvented by a loving regime of guidance and care.

”The Home Going Forth Into the World”
The WCTU in the last quarter of the nineteenth century
relied heavily on motherhood as the source and model of its
power.

But in order to expand its program outward from the
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home, it was important not to base women's authority
strictly on essentialist arguments, thereby limiting it to
relations between biological mothers and tlieir children.
Rather, Union literature showed the qualities of motherhood
as common, even to women who had never borne children;
Sarepta Henry thought it possible for a woman to actually
bear a child without even knowing "one throb of genuine
motherhood," while a virgin aunt could be the sweetest
mother of all.”

Hannah Whitall Smith cast her argument as

a spiritual, rather than a biological essentialism, and felt
that there were very few women in whom the elements of
"spiritual motherhood" could not develop "unless they be
utterly abnormal."5*
The Union's "science of motherhood" and maternal
training and education programs conveyed the message "any
woman can."

Another common story is of temperance woman

whose skills were not innate, whose clothes were spotted,
whose biscuits were not light and whose floors were not

“Henry, Studies, p. 23. See also the poem for Mother
Stewart in scrapbook 10, WCTU Series, reel 31 ("Our physical
law makes that grand word [mother}/ A natural consequence/
But when 'tis born of spirit/ And unselfish love
" then
mother becomes like George Washington); and the poem for
Frances Willard in Lucia F. Additon, Twenty Eventful Years
of the Oregon WCTU. 1880-1900 (Portland, 1904) .
“Smith, Educating Our Mothers, pp. 12-13.
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clean.

Mary Livermore was one who represented herself as

lacking intuitive domestic skills, and feared that through
an angry household god she had been "elected to ... (a)
desolate future of shiftlessness and celibacy."

But, using

the means and agency so celebrated by Finney, upon marriage
she "put myself under instruction as I had done when I
wished to know a language, and found the domestic arts not
difficult to acquire."87 Detaching motherhood from actual
childbirth and making it an art which virtually all women
could learn laid the groundwork for the exercise of
mothering as a social and political skill.81
Another strong appeal to women to extend their mission
outside the home came from the Union's mandate to work for
other mothers' children as well as one's own.8* Mrs. A.E.
Hall undertook a municipal post to purify the streets of
Chicago as "a work of salvation for other mothers' little

"Livermore, Story, p. 90. But see also Mrs. A.M.M.
Payne, "One of Them," in the Union signal. 12 November 1885,
where a suffragist earns respect for her ideas through her
beautiful housekeeping. Livermore's language is reminiscent
of the language of means to salvation which Charles Finney
made common during the Second Great Awakening.
”ln contrast to the story of non-intuitive domestic
skills, Frances Willard's political skills came to her in a
revelation after a marathon prayer session.
“Frances E. Willard, "The Daughter of the Republic,"
in Scrapbook 3, WCTU series, reel 30; Union Signal. 15
November 1883, p. 2.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

251

children” after her only child died of diphtheria.”

Such

potential for public good through maternal care could be
multiplied until with "ten thousand local unions, everybody
in this country has ten times ten thousand mothers willing
to look after him and help him to the good."61
Such arguments were especially appealing tc mothers
whose sons and daughters were beyond their command, caught
up in the swirl of distant big-city life.

The mother in her

small home was no match for a big world, for the saloon, the
vice dens, the "cunning avaricious monopolists" out to
seduce and ruin her child.”

But through motherly

surrogates in Unions in other cities she could perhaps
exercise a proxy control, as in Sarepta Henry's popular
novel Voice of the Home.

There Roy Mason begins a downhill

slide into fast company and drink when the railroad comes to
town; he is eventually forced to leave, with no word of his
whereabouts to his heartbroken mother Mary.

Mary pours out

“Frances E. Willard, Occupations for Women (New York,
1897), p. 360.
“Willard, Do Everything, p. 155. The exchange was not
quite one for one; a midwestern town had an ordinance
allowing any parent or guardian, or any three respectable
citizens, to commit a wayward juvenile to a home. Union
Signal. 26 November 1885, p.4. The idea of "ten times ten
thousand mothers" sounds like a Woody Allen nightmare.
“Sarepta Henry, Frances Raymond's Investment, p. 39.
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her maternal love and good works on another troubled young
alcoholic, a Masonville bartender named Frank Barton— whose
own mother, it turns out, is nursing Roy in the town where
Frank grew up."
The Union's philosophy of connection stressed a theme
common to the broader culture of the late nineteenth century
as well, in everything from religious tracts to beer-hall
songs: though men and women alike may abandon or be wrenched
from their birth-family ties in an increasingly anonymous
world, "every girl is someone's daughter" (a parson's
daughter?), every boy is someone's son."

The abandoned,

the dispossessed, are only temporarily outside the network
of relations, and deserve to be treated and valued— not as
the liberal individual— but by the loving family ties they
once had, and in an effort to restore them, to redeem the
loss of one mother by "ten times ten thousand mothers."65

"Sarepta Henry, The Voice of the Home (New York,
1882).
"The Temperance Songbook. edited by Emmet G. Coleman
(Canada, 1971) is full of songs with titles like "The
Prodigal Girl" (p. 8); "Oh Johnny Come Back To the Farm" (p.
12); "Breaking Mother's Heart" (p. 27) (with a chorus
"She'll break the heart of her old gray-haired mother/She'11
break it, yes, break it tonight (tonight"); "The Orphan
Girl" (p. 30); "Somebody's Boy" (p. 52); as well as the
famous "Father, Dear Father, Come Home With Me Now" (p. 60).
"Willard, Do Everything, p. 40.
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For the hand that rocked the cradle the reach out into
the world was easier when its object was extended mothering.
Nor did evangelicals feel that they were breaking a barrier;
they emphatically rejected the classic liberal formulation
which split the world in two.

Elizabeth Cady Stanton and

other liberal feminists in this period urgently pressed a
split between public and private, promoting a home insulated
from external and regulating influence.

Liberal feminists

sought to break dor' 'he boundaries of women's sphere while
leaving the division between public and private intact;
Ellen DuBois has commended as liberal suffragism's greatest
strength its bypassing the domestic sphere entirely to seek
equality in the public sphere.“
Evangelicals sought to deconstruct the two barriers
simultaneously, understanding them in fact as
interdependent, common borders of one problem.

The idea

that public and private could be separated was repugnant to
their fundamental belief in accountability under a single
Christian law and moral code, which was the measure of all
actions.

God's stricture, "inasmuch as ye have done unto

the least of these thy brethren, ye have done unto me,"

“Ellen Carol DuBois, Feminism and Suffrage: The
Emergence of An Independent Women's Movement in America.
1848-1969 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1978).
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precluded a double standard for male and female, rich and
poor, officeholder and housewife, family and stranger.

The

evangelical model for relations between social spheres was
not bifurcation but concentric circles; the rings extended
outward from the human heart to encompass the home, the
church, and then society; and finally government, "a circle
that includes all hearts, all homes, all churches, all
societies. "*7
The circle theory acted as a radical counter to
bifurcation.

Through a theory of reverberation it set up a

standard of accountability based on a cause-and-effect
process that worked like ripples in a pond.

"There is a

theory ... that anything once started never ceases its
actions; the sound, once wakened, goes on and on in endless
vibrations, as if it were a chain, whose ever-added links
went on to infinity.

If this is true in the natural world,

something quite like it is true in the moral world __ "
where ever widening circles of influence agitate "to the
remotest bounds" first the home, then society and the
nation.4* The home here is not a rival kingdom to the state

"Willard, Woman and Temperance, p. 46, p. 29; Henry,
Studies, p. 51. This metaphor was commonplace in temperance
circles.
“Jane Stebbins, Fifty Years: History of the Temperance
Cause (Hartford, Conn., 1876), p. 183. Such language is
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but incorporated into it.

The concentric model, each ring

nestled into the next and affecting it and all the others,
laid the groundwork for evangelical feministsf efforts to
make the outer rings— corporations, industry, government—
accountable by standards of social justice derived from the
governance of the middle-class home.

A mother realizes that

"the safety of the cradle is dependent on the purity of the
executive mansion; and the father sees that the nation is
served by every pair of baby shoes he buys, and that
international justice is linked with the sweetness of his
own fireside."”
The march of the WCTU was "the home going forth into
the world," both symbolically and literally.70 Many
historians of the WCTU have noted its reformist agenda for a
maternal politics, its emphasis on the special womanly
qualities of moral vision and integrity.71 The WCTU
subscribed fully and unhesitatingly to a women's agenda,
casting themselves as coming to a sleazy world of male

very reminiscent of ante-bellum feminist rhetoric as
explored in Chapter 1.
”Scrapbook 10, WCTU series, reel 31.
70Frances E. Willard, Glimpses of Fifty Years (Chicago,
1889), p. 471.
71See in particular Epstein, The Politics of
Domesticity; and Bordin, Woman and Temperance.
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politics as they would to a bachelor's hall, armed with
brooms and dustpans, to clean and ventilate the place.72 On
a material plane, WCTU women were "homemakers" in the most
literal and persistent sense.

Following their goal of

making "the world more homelike" they made homes in unlikely
places— jails, churches, halls, rented rooms.

WCTU meetings

were famous for their domestic decor, replacing the dusty
halls of early nineteenth-century reform meetings—
eccentrics on hard benches— with auditoria adorned with
bunting, curtains, cushions, plants, pictures, furniture—
anything to create a homelike atmosphere.

Local, state, and

national Unions were constantly opening "homes"— not
institutions or asylums— where the wayward, the orphaned,
the lost, the needy, the drunken could heal in an atmosphere
which recreated the discipline and love of the ideal birth
family.
The agenda of many local WCTUs was ambitious.

"Rest

cottages" at resorts and state fairs provided temperance
refreshments in a cozy atmosphere.73 Perhaps the most

72Willard, Glimpses, p. 594. Note that liberal
feminists used this language sometimes as well.
73Addition, Twen y Years, p. 70; Harriet Van Meter,
First Quarter Century of the WCTU of Salem. N.J. (n.p.,
1909), p. 60; Monroe Countv WCTU Annual Report (New York,
1888), pp. 27 ff. The ladies of Monroe felt that such
efforts "may save us from a horrible revolution in our
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common mission local unions undertook was to provide "noon
rest" rooms for local working women.

One Oregon worker

called their apartment a "headquarters for industrial
womanhood" and suggested that the work emanated from "the
study of the ethical side of the great labor question."
That room was actually open all day for "rest, advice, and
loans to working girls 1 The local WCTU in charge planned
eventually to broaden their agenda to encompass much of what
was included in "settlement work."

Unions in Portland,

Oregon opened in quick succession the "Baby Home," which in
1888 took in 132 babies, and the "Industrial Home," later
called the "Refuge Home," for working women needing
shelter.74 The WCTU attributed many of the ills of the
residents to being "left motherless in childhood ... (they)
have been allowed to roan the streets and form such
acquaintances as their restless fancies dictated ... Some
have mothers living, and have been ungrateful and
disobedient, and some poor girls have not had good homes or

social fabric." Their booth at the State Fair was soon
wrecked, seemingly by vandals.
74This kind of work was typical of local unions across
the country, although typically also from my reading the
projects didn't last more that several years, seemingly from
lack of organization rather than from lack of success,
although the WCTU's own records and local histories
obviously don't tell the whole story.
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careful mothers."

The workers hoped that the "organized

mother love" they provided would help heal their charges.7*
Nor was politics immune from the Union's domestic
labors.

The Littleton, New Hampshire Union, for example,

served lunch at town meetings, seeking to create a pacific
environment.

On one occasion they actually interrupted a

brewing fight by bursting into song; "the voters had no more
trouble that day."7*
Another common tactic was carried out enthusiastically
on an election day in Iowa when prohibition was on the
ballot.

In towns around Iowa the night before the vote

women decorated polling places with pictures, evergreens,
flowers, and mottos like "the father's constituency is his
family."

On election day in Marion the WCTU opened a homey,

decorative lunchroom right across from city hall with a
banner saying "WCTU Free Lunch for All," where they wooed
male voters with meat, pie, and good coffee.

At the

instigation of the WCTU, ministers and small children roamed
the streets with songs and flowers, pressing themselves
imploringly on potential voters; more than one succumbed and

75Additon, Twenty Years, pp. 50, 70-72.
7*Historical Sketch of the WCTU of Littleton. N.H..
1881-1896 (Littleton. N.H., 1897), p. 10.
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cast the ballot "for Sallie and the children.1,77 The WCTU
here countered the male brand of electoral politics with its
own slightly more dignified street theater, answering the
bartender's challenge to Frances Raymond to keep her men at
home with "superior attractions."

Nor were Union members

under any illusion about the nature of the contest; as
Frances Willard said of a similar successful election
strategy, "hundreds of voters were fed and won."78 The
evangelical image of the home was sentimental, sweet and
cloying.

At the same time it represented a clear critique

of male politics— the smoke-filled hall, the vote-buying
candidates, the sodden, corrupt electorate.

The WCTU did

their best to bring their counter image, the well-run
rational home, into the public sphere.
How can we evaluate the WCTU's efforts at a
"connective" politics, or mothering the world?

Their reform

of household discipline— the replacement of punitive,
Calvinist-based patriarchy

by a more rational, affective,

mother-centered household— seems all to the good; it was
this part of their agenda that they shared with liberal
feminists.

In addition, most Union members were motivated

77Willard, Woman and Temperance, pp. 404 ff., p. 416.
78Willard, Woman and Temperance. ;p. 360-361.
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at least in part by a genuine desire to improve the lives of
those around them out of their own plenty.

In addition to

"rest" rooms and refuges, local unions, with complete
autonomy over their own programs, worked variously on
nutritional programs, kindergartens, prison reforms
(largely, it is true, supplying them with Bibles and
temperance literature), campaigns for an eight-hour day and
a living wage— all out of a sense of obligation to others
which did not motivate Stanton or many of the liberals.
Evangelical feminists shared a strong sense, based in their
understanding of the Christian ethic, of taking and giving
back; "To the large number of saleswomen who so graciously
wait on us at the stores," Lucia Additon wrote, "we ask the
privilege of also being gracious to them, by supplying them
with a comfortable convenient place to rest . . . Willard
in particular strove to extend the claims of "local
propinquity" widely, particularly toward the needy.
On the inevitable other hand, the class and racial
assumptions of the WCTU workers— some relatively benign,
many malignant— were never far below the surface.

The

suggested regime for "wayward" girls in the "Hope and Help
Rooms," for.example, is described in a leaflet put out by

’’Addition, Twenty Years, p. 51.
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the National Union's Social Purity Department and sent to
all interested locals.

The regulations admonish the girls

to "conform strictly to the rules, be neat and industrious,
and listen attentively to such advice as may be given them
by the ladies in charge."

The girls must submit to being

thoroughly searched on entering for liquor, firearms, or
"objectionable literature;" letters written and received
must be read by the Matron; and all "inmates" must learn
general housekeeping skills.

The leaflet dictated that the

discipline of the home should be "strictly parental,"
including "family" worship in the morning and the evening.*0
Perhaps this was an effort by Union workers to recreate what
they believed to be the atmosphere of the birth home their
"inmates" had grown up in; most likely they did not search
their own daughters for firearms when they came home.
Clearly the Union was out not just to "help" but to
reform.

An early history of the temperance movement, Joseph

Gusfield's Symbolic Crusade, made much of the panic which
Protestant, Anglo-Saxon Americans felt at the influx of
disorderly foreigners and the consequent decline of their

,0"Rules and Regulations for Hope and help Rooms,"
Social Purity Department, WCTU (n.p.,n.d.).
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own status and culture.11 The "social control"
interpretation has been rightly viewed with suspicion by
subsequent historians,12

in part as caricaturing the

motives of reformers; and certainly temperance women had
every good reason to fear the effects of male.alcoholism on
the family, a concern they shared with all other feminists.
Class concerns were a real issue for temperance women,
though.

They did fear the changing nature of Protestant

culture as it became more heterogeneous; diversity
threatened the commonality that marked the evangelical
feminists' view of society.

More important, perhaps,

the fears they had for their own children.

were

"Class," not as

a concrete assignment to a category but as an experience of
social relations, constituted a set of expectations, in this
case expectations mothers had for children.

In the changing

“Joseph Gusfield, Symbolic Crusade: Status. Politics,
and the American Temperance Movement (Urbana, 111., 1966).
“Starting with Lois Banner, "Religious Benevolence as
Social Control: A Critique of an Interpretation," (Journal
of.American History, vol. 60 no. 1 (1973), pp. 23-41) social
historians have enthusiastically insulted the social control
theory of reformer-reformee relations in addition because it
posits a lifeless and passive lower order who sat around
waiting to be reformed. Recently Linda Gordon's book on
family violence, Heroes of their Own Lives: The Politics and
History of Family Violence. Boston. 1880-1960 (New York,
1988), also treats with sympathy and understanding the
middle level caseworkers in social service agencies.
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work settings of the late nineteenth century, and with the
wholesale departures of sons and daughters both for the
city, "class'1 expectations were confused.

Who they would

be, where they would work, who their friends would be, what
they would do with leisure time, how well they would live—
answers to these questions were vaguer than in the pre
industrial world, and left mothers fearful.

In seeking to

reform the "wayward" sort according to their own lights,
mothers tried to establish a middle-class milieu for their
children as they knew it, and eliminate dangerous
alternatives.

Often this was done at the expense of their

"clientele."
On occasion, class concerns emerged in an even more
self-interested way, as with the Salem, New Jersey's, local
Kitchen and Garden Dept., which functioned openly as a
training school for household help, rescuing girls from a
looming "shiftless, indolent womanhood" and maintaining "its
reputation for efficient table servants."

The work was

supported one year by a public exhibition, to which 400
tickets were sold to watch pupils set tables, "accompanying
their work with songs and recitations."”
The maternal politics of the WCTU presented

"Harriet Van Meter, First Quarter Century of the WCTU
of Salem, New Jersey (n.p., 1909), pp. 42-52.
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particularly acute problems in a country with the large
racial and ethnic minorities of the United States, and
raises questions about what kind of society a "connective
politics" could flourish in.'4 £

?t-ernal relationship is

loving; but it is not a relationship of equals, and is not
the obvious appropriate paradigm for the relationship
between citizens within the state.

A conversation between

parent and child, or people who have taken on those roles,
differs greatly from a conversation between adults: There is
an overlay of obligation, judgment, perhaps guilt or fear,
that sets it off from a conversation between rational
strangers at arm's length.

Further, the tendency of the

mother, properly in the early period of life, is to
infantilize the child by caring for it, making decisions for
it, tending to its needs.

But the goal of good parenthood

is to have your children leave home; and while the WCTU had
a strong sense of charity, they also envisioned a kind of
permanent dependence, of children and the working class
both.
Consciously or not, the Union's "maternalism"

,4In her article Gender and Jurisprudence Robin West
does not go far toward defining what a "connective politics"
would actually mean when translated into a political system;
nor is it clear exactly how a feminist "connective" politics
would differ from a socialist politics.
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particularly toward racial and ethnic minorities was
extremely offensive and condescending.

This attitude was

manifest in frequent parodies of heavily accented speech,
transcribing it cutely as they would baby talk.
particularly

One

awful pamphlet, "A Temperance Picnic" by Mrs.

Nellie H. Bradley, was an original temperance musical based
on the story of the old woman in the shoe, updated to give
her a large adopted brood of mixed heritage.

The speech of

each group— represented by Fat Fritz, Lean Pat, Hop Sing
Choo, and Saucy Sambo— was caricatured relentlessly by "von
laty mit leetle vite ribbons."

Fat Fritz— and Germans in

general as the chief beer guzzlers— were the main targets;
one story showed the low type of humanity who insisted on
his "rights" to drink or sell liquor by parodying a German
saloon keeper

who, when closed down by the law, rushed off

"to see mein gounsel when I no got some right to mein own
proberty."M
Stories like these were of a piece with the WCTU's
attitude towards other ethnic practices; their ruthless
campaign against the German family beer hall showed how
little tolerance they had for customs that outraged their
own sensibilities.

Intolerance is not confined to mothers;

,sNellie H. Bradley, A Temperance Picnic (New York
1888); Willard, Woman and Temperance, p. 70.
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but the license which WCTU women felt that a "maternal"
politics gave them seems to have exacerbated the perception
of dependency and the distance between themselves and the
people they were trying to influence, and to re-enforce the
inegalitarian nature of the relationship.

Perhaps in

another time and a more homogeneous society, a "maternal"
politics would come out looking quite different.

But at

least in nineteenth-century America, with the heavy
ideological baggage already attached to the maternal role,
and the deep class and race divisions,

maternal politics

had to work against heavy odds to be truly democratic.

The

paradox of maternal governance, in the home as in the state,
lies in the tension between care and coercion; the WCTU
seemed to have mastered both.
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Chapter V - "Organized Mother Love"
and the Maternal State
Under the curse, man has mapped out the state
as his largest sphere, and the home as
woman's largest; under the blessing, man and
woman shall map out home as the one true
state, and she who, during centuries of
training, has learned how to govern there,
shall help man make the great, cold,
heartless state a warm, kind, and protecting
home ... The White Ribbon women would invade
the masculine ... hierarchy of church and
state; and ring out in clear but gentle
voices the oft-repeated declaration of the
Master whom they serve: "Behold, I make all
things new.”1
With these words Frances Willard, the president of the
Woman's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU), revealed a
cherished goal of the temperance movement: the
transformation of national, state, and local governments
into agents of moral reform.

Its achievement required a

revolutionary reinterpretation of the relations between
church and state, and the creation of a maternalist
government with Christ as its acknowledged head, caring for
the needs and regulating the moral behavior of its citizens.
Dissatisfaction with social conditions led temperance
women initially to imagine a more perfect state.

The

Frances E. Willard, WCTU presidential address of 1887,
quoted in Nancy Hardesty, Women Called to Witness:
Evangelical Feminism in the 19th Century (Nashville, 1984),
p. 154.
267
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regulation of gender relations was clearly an element of
temperance, in allowing women to regulate male drinking
habits, an important part of male culture and the source of
much conflict within the home.

But the Union's political

theory went well beyond sexual antagonism and repression.1
Seeking an expanded role for women in defining and securing
government redress for domestic wrongs and the brutal
conditions of wage labor, temperance women necessarily
reenvisioned government.

As they articulated new welfare

obligations and capacities in the state, they also pictured
government in their own image— the feminization of the
state.

The watchword here was not paternalism but

maternalism, or "organized mother love," and a healthy
extension of domestic values into the canons of government.
By seeking to make "politics a home question" temperance
women were asserting more than their right to participate:
their entry into the political arena coincided with the
transformation of government from "a coarse and clumsy
instrument by which military and police forces are dictated"
to "the flexible, changing, and delicately adjusted
instrument of many and varied educative, charitable, and

2This is the interpretation for much of the woman's
temperance movement suggested by Barbara Epstein in The
Politics of Domesticity: Women. Evangelism, and Temperance
in Nineteenth-Centurv America (Middletown, Conn., 1981).
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supervisory functions”.3 As Willard pictured it, women
would help men to make ”the great, cold, heartless state a
warm, kind, and protecting home ..."4
A state so construed needed the services of women
"wherever the state touches the personal life of the infant,
the child, the youth, or the aged, helpless, defective in
mind, body, or moral nature ...”

Stressing government's

increasingly "maternal" or welfare functions, women asserted
the need for their services in a government which, whenever
it undertook such work, entered into "the area of
distinctive feminine training and power" in pursuit of the
ends of "justice" and "fraternity".3 Frances Willard said
"reform and philanthropic movements are but associated
efforts to make the world more homelike.

Society and

government have long been fathered, but they have not been

sWillard, Glimpses of Fifty Years (Chicago, II., 1889),
p. 593; Anna Garlin Spencer, "Fitness of Women to Become
Citizens," in The History of Woman Suffrage. Stanton,
Elizabeth Cady, Susan B. Anthony, and Matilda Joslyn Gage,
et al., eds., (6 vols., New York, 1881-1922), vol. 4, pp.
308-9; Frances E. Willard, "The Coming Brotherhood," Arena
vol. 6 (1892), p. 320.
4Frances E. Willard, Presidential address, WCTU annual
meeting, 1887 (see Minutes of Annual Meetings, WCTU
microfilm series).
*Spencer, "Fitness of Women."

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

270

mothered enough to make them normal."*
This vision of the maternal state was rooted in a
Christian ideal which sought to extrapolate the individual
obligation to charity to bind the state/ so that "the
manifestation of love to one's neighbor is the duty of the
state as a public community."7
For evangelicals, the ties between citizens were analogous
to the ties between family members, as binding and as
permanent.
The contrast with liberal feminists was clear.
Antebellum liberals had relied heavily on the language of
slavery to describe their legal position under coverture;
disenfranchised, unable to hold property or keep their
earnings.

After the war, Stanton in particular, influenced

by free-love thought, extended the paradigm of slavery and
freedom to describe the physical relations of unhappy
husbands and wives as well as their property relations,
advocating "divorce at will" as a remedy analogous to
emancipation.

In her writings on divorce Stanton pictured

the essence of slavery as the slave's inability to change
employers at will and bargain for the terms of service, as

*Willard, Do Everything: a Handhnnlc for the World's
White_Ribboners (Chicago, 1895), p. 165.
7Willard, Do Everything, p. 30.
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she sought to recast marriage as a consensual relationship,
entered into voluntarily by the parties, and dissoluble when
either of the parties wished to end the contract.

In

Stanton's view the bonds which bound family members should
no more be permanent than those which constituted employeremployee relations or a business partnership, to be
dissolved, not without thought, but certainly for cause:
otherwise mistakes were too costly.1
The WCTU never came to espouse divorce in this period.
It recognized that wives of drunkards needed legal
separation with provisions for maternal custody and
financial support; but for most evangelical feminists, as
indeed for many of Stanton's own supporters, the
dissoluble marriage was too troubling.

concept of

They rejected the

analogy to slavery and the call to women's "emancipation” as
having "associations and ... history ... not to our
advantage."9
Further, evangelical feminists rejected notions of free
contract as a model of family relations.

Such language for

many feminists undercut the depth, the gravity, the

*See Chap. II for Stanton's views on marriage and
divorce.
Frances E. Willard, "Address Before the Second
Biennial Convention of the World's WCTU ... 1893" (London,
1893), p.. 35.
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permanence of the marriage and maternal bond.

They

accepted, though sometimes ruefully, that "we are tied from
the moment we enter the world, and are probably the better
and happier for it, though we may rebel against it ..."l0
Rather than the freely willed, voluntary contractual
agreement, the freedom to untie a bad marriage and try
again, they stressed the mutual obligations of the ongoing
relationship, a particular version of the obligations each
owed all human beings.
For most liberal and evangelical feminists, their views
of the structure of family obligations extended outward to
shape their views of the obligations of the state.
Stanton's notion of individual self-ownership and radical
bodily autonomy became the basis of her view of citizenship.
"Protection" for Stanton was a word out of the feudal past,
which smacked of slavery and the harem, as well as the
traditional family.
Evangelical feminists, by contrast, extrapolated what
they saw as the duties of family out into the civil sphere
to create the maternal state, where the ideal of the
obligations of each to each other was mediated through a
benevolent welfare state.

Willard openly espoused

“Jane Croly, For Better or Worse; A Book for Some Men
and All Women (Boston, 1875), p. 4.
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"protection" as the state's highest duty, deriving the
Union's suffrage slogan "Home Protection" from the language
of tariff.11 Willard's use of the term "wage slavery"
recognized the powerlessness and dependence of the worker,
but she did not see the contractual model as the remedy for
inequality in the state, either.

By the 1880's and 90's,

free labor ideology as a way of restructuring the labor
market had lost its appeal particularly for evangelicals,
with their social outlook and critique of industrial
capitalism.
Further, the obligations of citizens to each other were
not so fragile as contractual ties.

As in the family, duty

to others was a divinely imposed, life-long relationship,
not revocable by human will.

This idea of non-voluntary

obligations as the foundation and the measure of what the
state owed its citizens put evangelical feminists outside an
important ongoing dialogue in the broader society on
individual rights based on the language of slavery and on
notions of free contract, a dialogue into which Stanton fit
quite well.12 At the same time, by continuing in part in

“Willard, Glimpses, p. 401.
“See Amy Dru Stanley, "Conjugal Bonds and Wage Labor:
Rights of Contract in the Age of Emancipation," Journal of
American History, vol. 75 no. 2 (Sept. 1988), pp. 471-500.
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the explicitly religious tradition of antebellum feminists,
in which rights were sought to enable an individual to
perform duties to the whole, evangelicals could more
effectively hold government and industry to a standard of
legitimacy based, not on its dealings vis-^-vis any
individual, but on its performance within the whole social
context; the Union sought to set up a strict standard for
"legitimate industry," for example, which was "that every
other industry is benefited and helped by it."13
The brand of gospel socialism which Willard and the
WCTU espoused in the last quarter of the century was
informed in important ways by their religious outlook.
Evangelical feminists' Christian statism depended on a
corporate rather than a pluralistic community, and to this
end Union literature repeatedly rejected any kind of
sectarianism or denominationalism in favor of common goals
and drawing together as wide a circle as possible.

Such

tolerance obviously furthered the Union's recruitment power,
without being strained too far: the overwhelming majority of
members were white Protestant women.
But Willard's theory of the state necessarily implied a
homogeneous society as well, and both the Union's rhetoric

“Willard, "The Coming Brotherhood," Arena, vol. 6
(1892), pp. 317-324.
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and active agenda stressed, not just missionary outreach,
but transcending barriers between races, classes, ethnic
groups, and sexes.1* Willard even campaigned to heal the
split between still-estranged Northerners and Southerners,
returning from extensive travel in the South to tell her
flock that Southerners were "just our sort of folks."15 As
Willard's aspirations moved from a national to an
international temperance movement she became increasingly
liberal in her religious views, stressing ethics "found in
the Bible and questioned by no sane mind whether Jew,
Gentile, Catholic, or Protestant."1* Eventually her
tolerance grew to the point where "nothing good seems
secular to me."17
This commonality, the ability to make ethical
generalizations across class, race, religious, and sexual
divisions, served as a critical prop of the feminized
Christian corporate state.

For Stanton, the state's

reaching to "touch the personal lives" of its citizens was

“The language used here is often the language of the
mother reconciling siblings.
“Willard, Glimpses, p. 372.
“Willard, Glimpses, p. 463.
“Frances E. Willard, "Address Before the 22nd Annual
Meeting of the National WCTU ..." (see Minutes, Annual
Meeting, WCTU microfilm series), pp. 7-8.
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tantamount to assault; in her radical individualist world
the state could never touch each citizen according to each
one's different needs, and its "protection” was only
universal degradation: better to keep the state away.
Evangelicals, by contrast, subscribed to the Golden Rule as
the first principle of governance, a rule far more potent
for its assumption that you could know how to treat others,
because in fact they were like you.

The implication was

that you could know and love your neighbor in some deep way
not possible in Stanton's world.

This knowledge allowed an

empathy which served as the compelling basis of charitable
obligation, so that "eventually we shall conceive of society
as a unity which has such relation to every fraction thereof
that there could be no rest while any lacked food, clothing,
or shelter, or while any were so shackled by the grim
circumstances of life that they were unable to develop the
best that was in them both body and mind."1*
At the same time, this commonality served as the basis
of the regulatory impulse; what Stanton saw as officious and
coercive, temperance women saw as encouraging or enforcing
the behavior which would naturally prevail in each
individual in the absence of sin or the depredations of

l,Willard, "Address ... 2nd Biennial Convention," p.
52.
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poverty.

Willard often pictured teetotalism as the

foundation, prohibition as merely the legal superstructure
which must rest on a base of public sentiment, and she
sought to create the conditions for uniform behavior.

For

evangelicals, unlike liberal individualists, free will still
did not lie in the ability to do anything, but in the
ability to do good; as the first of the WCTU's Declarations
of Principle stated, "we believe in the coming of His
kingdom whose service is perfect freedom ...1,18
The theory of the liberal individual looked to the
growth of the self through individuation and
differentiation; maturation for evangelicals consisted of
the voluntary fulfillment of divine and natural laws created
for the health and happiness of human beings.

By the 1880's

and 90's the language of the WCTU in its war against liquor
had changed; most of it did not support restrictive or penal
measures against drunkenness and other offenses because they
were sinful or individual transgressions, but because they
harmed society, robbing it of the individual's contribution,
as well as being offenses against the family and the self.26

19Willard, "Address ... 22nd Annual Meeting," pp. 1, 3.
“Willard, "Address ... 2nd Biennial Convention," p.
31. See also Stevenson, Katherine L. A Brief History of
the Woman's Christian Temperance Union (2d ed.; Evanston,
111., 1907), p. 99.
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This broad vision of public accountability to the community
of those like you included vices as well as crimes because
they were antisocial and detrimental to the common good,
where "each man's habits of life should be an example safe
and beneficent to every other man."21

The Evangelical Theory of Rights
The concept of private rights, private assets— of
privacy itself— meant much less in such a world.

In a

single body— the corporate state— where "injury to a part is
injury to a whole" no part is free to act alone; each must
give up the "abstract right of unrestricted behavior."22
Nor can any member enforce privacy as against other members
of the same body, for where a single normative standard
applies privacy has little value, and usually signifies
deviation.
The WCTU understood "private" as describing, not the
home, but the plethora of male institutions closed to women,
from the saloon and smoking car to the voting booth; the
secrecy of those places nurtured behavior harmful to the
family and community.

Members of the WCTU worked for

“Willard, Do Everything, p. 1.
“Stevenson, Brief History, p. 99; Willard, Frances E.
Woman_and Temperance {Hartford, Conn., 1883), p. 491.
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complete openness within communities, so that each
individual's behavior could be scrutinized by all.

One

resolution urged prohibition of painted or frosted windows
or doors in saloons and bars, so that all could have a
"distinct view" of the goings-on inside; another stressed
municipal installations of street lamps to prevent evildoers
from doing their evil— "And God said 'let there be
light.'"23 Union members understood that the advances of
science would aid the quest for transparency, happily
quoting Thomas Edison's belief that "in a few years the
world will be just like one big ear; it will be unsafe to
speak in a house until one has examined the walls and
furniture for concealed phonographs."

In the world of

benign authority imagined by the WCTU, this civil
libertarian's nightmare held out instead the fantastic hope
of "a cessation of gossip in the earth, and then the
millennium.

God speed the photograph!"24 Here we have the

encephalitic corporate body swollen with outsized eyes and
ears, and those clearly female.
In refusing to romanticize Robinson Crusoe,25 Frances

“Union Signal. 18 January 1883, p. 12; 24 October
1889, p. 1.
“Union Signal. Jan. 16, 1884, p. 9.
25See Chap. IV, p. 3.
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Willard rejected the state of nature, or as she defined it
•'the solitary state," as any kind of Golden Age, and as
completely incompatible with the ideal of Christian
community.

For Willard the "solitary state" was an

artificial construct rendered invalid because it failed to
account for one of humankind's two natural instincts— the
primal instinct of self-preservation and "another far more
high and sacred— I mean the instinct of a mother's love" (a
civilized, Christianized version, perhaps, of the species'
instinct to propagate) ,2‘ The "solitude" of the state of
nature, then, was compromised from the beginning by the
maternal relationship.

Crusoe himself, lordly in his prime,

would still have perished a helpless infant without maternal
care.
In addition, using solitude as a measure of an ideal
life was the merest delusion; who, Willard asked quite
sensibly, knew anyone living on a desert island?

And the

translation of solitary practices to the "crowded realm of
civilization" would be catastrophic.

"Out on his island,

Robinson could reach forth his nimble fingers and gather
whatever seemed to him good for food ... but suppose him
transferred to this capital city of Iowa, and practicing the

2*Willard, Woman and Temperance, p. 453.
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same light-fingered method in your grocery store, good
citizen, or at your pantry shelf, dear lady!"

where all

live cheek by jowl, freedom is "but a drawing of the circuit
of one person's liberty just so large around and far across
as is consistent with the number of circles to be drawn
within a given space."21
Liberals and evangelicals alike agreed on the circle
that separated one's fist from another's nose.
circles proved harder to draw.

Other

Despite Willard's claim to

be able to delineate the spheres of rights with
"mathematical precision" the two sides disagreed vehemently
over the definition and boundaries of the individual's
"personal liberty."a# Liberals prized it; and used it as a
shield against a variety of regulatory assaults, including
prohibition measures.

Evangelicals were enraged by what

they saw as the irresponsible and antisocial use of
"personal liberty," and crusaded to discredit the term and
reveal the selfishness and malice concealed by its noble
ring.

They put the phrase into the mouths of the supposedly

disreputable; the black father who won't interfere with his
children's personal liberty and so lets them rob chicken

27Willard, Woman and Temperance, p. 491.
2,Willard, Woman and Temperance, p. 491.
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coops; the drunk who believes in "human rights— the right to
think/as one pleases, on issues of the day/in the fullest
the right to drink
enslave.”

the master who claims the right to

Willard warned of the dangers in store for a

society which worshiped liberty excessively,
melodramatically quoting Mme Roland on her way to the Paris
scaffold— "Oh Liberty!

What crimes are committed in thy

sacred name!"30
"Personal liberty" was an anachronism for Frances
Willard, soon to be superceded, because it pretended to a
false scope of action.

The law, as it should, protected

noses, and denied a "personal liberty" to break them.

But

the law, too, was a blunt instrument: it accorded to
bartenders "the right" to pour the equally harmful drink,
and to factory owners the right to keep workers laboring in
killing conditions for little pay.

Willard's view, for its

flaws, tried to comprehend the broader scope of harm in
human relations, the injustices not compassed under existing
tort or contract law.

In "love thy neighbor" vein Willard

insisted that personal liberty in Christian civilization
required a citizen to give up certain "rights," to

”Union Signal# 4 January 1883, p. 2; Granite State
Outlook# vol. 1 no. 7 {July 1891), p. 2.
30Willard, Woman and Temperance, p. 495.
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understand that "otherhood must be fully recognized in
preference to selfhood. "31
Injunctions against overt harm were inadequate: each
citizen had a responsibility to know how his or her behavior
affected others indirectly as well, perhaps even an
affirmative duty to help them.

Implicit and sometimes

explicit in this reasoning was a critique of legal doctrines '
of causation, which limited culpability to certain
restricted fact situations.

In Willard's broad assessment

of responsibility, even a vote could be culpable: a vote for
license made a "ballot ... a link in the chain of causation,
which shall lengthen itself out into every misery and every
sin."32 Several states actually made bartenders liable in
civil suits brought by drunkards' impoverished families, and
the WCTU enthusiastically aided the bringing of such
actions, the closest they came to establishing the legal
culpability they felt should naturally flow from the moral
guilt.33

“Frances E. Willard, speech, in scrapbook 7, WCTU
series, reel 30; Frances E. Willard, address (1894),
scrapbook 11, WCTU series, reel 31.
“Frances E. Willard, in Werner's Recitations and
Readings (New York, 1898), p. 24. This is the same language
used by antebellum feminists and cited in Chap. I.
33Stebbins, Jane. Fifty Years: History of the
Temperance Cause (Hartford, Conn., 1876), p. 296; Willard,
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Liberty, then, was a relative and not an absolute
value; and "personal" an inapt modifier for a power which
could only be properly used in reciprocity with others.

In

1883 Hannah Whitall Smith gave a "Hobby Party" with a theme
of personal liberty, and each guest was to come representing
his or her definition.

The Union Signal reported that,

while some went for the "German idea" of unfettered freedom,
most thought it a "relative" term; the definitions included
"liberty to do right," and one which credited the greatest
personal liberty to those who "most unconsciously obey ...
most laws"— laws as the larger principle laid down by God
for the happiness of all.34
While they negated the concept, or at least the scope,
of the liberal conception of personal liberty, evangelical
women put forth their own definitions.

Rights necessarily

occupied a different place in a relational than in a
liberal, individualist scheme, although they were not
nonexistent there as some have claimed.

Temperance women

did not completely eschew individual rights; in fact they

Do Everything, p. 150; Willard, Woman and Temperance, p. 70,
p. 83; Samuel Unger, A History of the National Woman's
Christian Temperance Union (Ph.D. thesis, Ohio State
University, 1933), p. 12.
34Union Signal. 11 January 1883, p. 9. The article does
not attempt to describe the costume.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

285

endorsed the individual rights argument for the woman's
ballot as self-evident.

But the extension of suffrage was

an easy case which represented an enlargement/ not a
reapportionment or conflict of rights; no one's vote was
directly threatened or withheld by enlarging the voter pool
to include women.
Individual rights which fell at the intersection of
others' interests became a more complex case for Willard,
without the easy trump quality which liberal proponents
claimed for them.

In large measure this was because for

evangelical women the purpose of rights was not to promote
the individual, but to reconstitute the family and the
community.

WCTU women's claims that their work as mothers

to the community entitled them to vote was not a ruse, or
even necessarily proof of a second-class feminist agenda.
Since they defined themselves relationally and not
individually, rights were most meaningful in a context; most
useful when used for others; most earned by the work which
put "otherhood ... in preference to selfhood"— again, a
Christian ideal.”
Rights represented in large part a remedial measure to
compensate for the defects of families, who through death,

“Frances E. Willard, speech, scrapbook 7, WCTU series,
reel 30; Woman and Temperance, p. 454.
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dissolution, or incapacity could not protect the physical
and emotional well-being of their members— a growing class
in industrializing urban America.

The ballot's value was in

caring for "the impoverished, disgraced, widowed, orphaned,
crazed, and idiotized through strong drink ... as the wards
of the stranger."3* Just as a connected individual had a
stronger identity than the isolated individual, so suffrage
had more meaning as a right earned by women's work for
others than as a trump to be used for one's own ends against
the world at large.
By the same token, evangelicals understood that, in
their relational scheme, rights were necessarily curtailed
as well as enhanced by a connection to others— the more
familiar, repressive face of the WCTU's program.

But again,

the restriction of rights— say the "right" to drink— was not
cast as a merely punitive measure taken because drinking was
a sin, but because the results of the individual's asserting
his right to drink were terrible harm to the family, and to
the community, which lost the drinker's labor and had to
pick up the pieces of his domestic responsibilities.

In a

relational world, there is a social right— a right of
"others"— which balances the individual right; "the right of

3*Union Signal, vol. 15 no. 43, 24 October 1889, p. 7.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

287

the individual ceases where the rights of his family, his
neighbors, and his country begin."37 Even the drinker
without family ties was committing a wrong; against his
community, which had an interest in all its members' well
being; but more especially against God the Father who had
created and loved him, and agonized over his degradation.
"Christ's Golden Rule," Frances Willard said, mandated her
abstinence for her own sake and the sakes of those around
her, as well as "because of my purpose, by God's grace, to
invest my life in hastening the day when all men's weal
shall be each man's care."3*
Union members in the last quarter of the century
increasingly drew on natural rights language, especially to
justify suffrage arguments.

Willard suggested that it went

without saying that women had a natural right to the
ballot.3* She was sincere— but like most evangelical
feminists probably relieved that such rights were a given,
and did not merit full discussion.

Evangelical feminists

37Union Signal. 25 September 1884, p.4.
“Frances E. Willard, Do Everything, p. 36.
“Willard, Woman and Temperance, p. 355; Frances E.
Willard, "Questions to Specialists," Our Dav: A Record and
Review of Current Reform, vol. 1 (1888), p. 169; Ruth
Bordin, Frances Willard. A Biography (Chapel Hill, 1986), p.
100 .
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were not fully comfortable with the free-standing notion of
"rights": any right, including the ballot, was far more
meaningful when seen as a part of the web of talents,
powers, and responsibilities which bound all together.40
Although the union between rights and responsibilities was
sacred in antebellum feminism, liberal feminists in the
later nineteenth century had tried to uncouple rights and
duties.

The temperance women continued to insist that "we

are responsible to humanity in exact proportion to the power
of which we are custodians," and acted accordingly.41
Evangelical feminists shared with liberals a sense of
the "natural" or physical laws which governed human life, as
well, using them as a standard by which to judge the human.
The WCTU did not develop this standard into a full-blown or
precise set of anterior claims as revolutionary Americans
did; nor did claims to civil rights define its content.
Rather, temperance women invoked the broad, perfectionist

40Willard, Woman and Temperance, p. 454; Stevenson,
Brief History, p. 15. Such an interpretation obviously
raises questions debated within contemporary feminism— does
it signify an immaturity, insecurity, lack of autonomy? an
ethos of care? Is it progressive? Regressive? An element
unfamiliar to us but critical to evangelical belief is the
sense of divinely imposed affirmative duty to others— an
idea with more starch in it than the psychologically based
"ethos of care," and one which mandated political action.
41Willard, "Address ... 2nd Biennial Convention," p.
33.
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principles of antebellum feminism before they focused on
legal remedies.
The early woman's movement derived much of its program
from a newly liberal interpretation of God's designs, most
explicitly set out by outlying denominations like the
Unitarians and Universalists, and by ministers like Theodore
Parker and the Channings.

That vision recast the scowling

Calvinist God casually damning his children into a
benevolent deity whose ultimate goal was the perfection and
happiness of each individual human life, and the full
development and use of its talents.

For liberals in the

post-war period God's new concern for human welfare became a
mandate for self-development.
Although evangelical feminists did not stress
individual development with the same enthusiasm as liberals,
evangelical and liberal feminists alike acknowledged the
"natural" laws of human health as conducive to woman's full
development, and showed a dedication to the naturalistic
health movements of the nineteenth century aimed at
releasing women from the unhealthy prison of their confining
clothes and inactive lifestyles.

Willard even spoke of the

WCTU as an exponent of "the reign of a religion of the
body," where a body healthy through abstinence becomes "the
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temple of the Holy Ghost."42
Unlike liberals, evangelicals went on to interpret
freedom from alcohol as a critical condition of physical as
well as moral and financial health, and so established an
anterior principle by which many laws failed; "No
legislation can bargain away the public health or public
morals."43 Holiness deriving from physical wholeness
translated not just into self culture, but into platforms
and programs which encompassed welfare obligations as well
as more structural reforms like support for the living wage,
on the grounds that physical well being was necessary for
the individual's full growth.

From our vantage point it is

easy to underestimate the power of the religious critique;
but in a time when Christian forms were deeply embedded in
the public consciousness, and Christian language still
resonated in the public as well as the private ear, such a
critique sprang from a common ethos external to the realm of
law and politics through which to formulate criticism and
reforms.

Religion provided the lay public in this period

with a route of powerful and legitimate criticism not

42Willard, Woman and Temperance, p. 42; see also Leach,
William, True Love and Perfect Union: The Feminist Reform of
Sex and Society (New York, 1980), passim.
43Frances Willard, in Werner's Recitations, p. 72
("Home Protection").
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available today.

In addition to their focus on rights as a route to self
culture, evangelical feminists distrusted liberals' abstract
talk of rights for another reason: they saw them as only an
intermediate step in achieving just governance, not as the
final and most important protection for the individual.
Ultimately, "rights" was a stage to be superceded.

In her

annual address to the convention of 1892, Willard laid out
her theory of rights as an evolution in three stages.

The

first was "set up in the camp of the savage," and consisted
of a primitive theory of "personal rights" to "life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."

(Seemingly she

would consign much of traditional American political
philosophy to this camp.)
The second, more advanced state recognized "meum and
teum," in the ability to say "thou shalt, and thou shalt
not"— the prohibitory power, or the recognition of communal
over individual rights, representing the present age.

But

this stage too was deficient.
The highest evolutionary stage was to be achieved in
the Christian state where "government by law is exchanged
for that mightiest of all government— public sentiment.

The

moral tone of society declared by resistless common consent
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what the law demanded by fines and penalties."41 Here
Willard pictured the withering away of the state in favor of
citizens' advancement to "the corps of the self-governed"
living under the Golden Rule.45 Rights in a liberal scheme
served to protect individuals from each other and from the
government.

In a true moral community/ where standards were

consensual, where all were "sisters" and "brothers," and
where government was the "organ of social consciousness,"
there is no need for "rights."44
But Willard also acknowledged that Gilded Age society
fell short of a real moral community, and worked to impress
on the public a hierarchy of rights not congruent with that
of the liberals.

As shown by the prohibition of social

offenses less than crimes (drunkenness, for example), the
right of society superceded the individual when the two came
into conflict.

Willard and other union members often spoke

"Frances E. Willard, annual address, WCTU Convention
1892.
(See Minutes of Annual Meeting, WCTU Microfilm
Series.)
45Willard, Woman and Temperance, p. 26.
44Spencer, "Fitness of Women;" Willard, Woman and
Temperance, p. 20; Stevenson, Brief History, pp. 102-103;
Plan of Work and Circular Letter of the WCTU (n.p., n.d.),
p. 2. Willard's vision resembles Stanton's in anticipating
the demise of a system of laws, but substitutes an ongoing
moral community as the ordering force instead of Stanton's
self governing individual.
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of the "equally self-evident social right" which balanced
the rights of individuals.

Towards the end of her life, as

Willard's interests and dedication to socialist principles
grew, she increasingly pursued the social over the
individual good.47 But from early on it was a utilitarian
tenet of the movement that "the public good far transcends
private interest and convenience.

The law is for the

greatest good of the greatest number, and therefore it is
for the individual to yield when his plans would subvert the
broader foundations."4*
The assertion of "social rights" ultimately undergirded
what became after Willard's death an increasingly regressive
campaign against human pleasures, and a theocratic agenda
which included not just prohibition but curfews, media
censorship, school prayer and Bible reading, and a host of
ether moral regulations.

But in the heady period of the

1880's and 90's, the WCTU, though it had its own agenda,
worked in harmony with the burgeoning labor movement,
particularly the Knights of Labor; Christian socialists;

47Union Signal# 25 September 1884, p. 7; Willard, Woman
and Temperance, p. 493; Frances E. Willard, "Address"
(1894), Scrapbook 11, WCTU microfilm series, reel 31.
4,Stebbins, Fifty Years, p. 285. See also Daniel T.
Rodgers, "Why Was There No Utilitarianism in NineteenthCentury America?", paper delivered at the Davis Seminar,
Princeton University, Oct. 17, 1986.
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ethical economists like Richard Ely; and progressive and
populist political movements.

Particularly in this

political context, the idea of social right took on a more
positive content as well.
Far more than the idea of "individual" rights could (a
concept which does not work well in our legal system for
those without titles or deeds), the idea of "social right"
or public good expanded to claims for economic justice.
Coming at the problem not from the standpoint of "what do I
✓

own" but "how can society's needs best be met," the WCTU
developed a standard of redistributive justice based on
God's design for human happiness, and for the sanctity and
full development of each mind, soul, and body.

As one Union

member said in support of the living wage, a cause the Union
fully subscribed to, "To hinder one of the least of our
brethren from properly fulfilling his appointed place in the
great whole, is to disturb the equilibrium of the entire
moral and social structure ... and to interfere with the
plan of the Great Architect."49

49Stevenson, Brief History, p. 104. See also Union
Signal, vol. 15, no. 40 (Oct. 3, 1889), p. 2. This language
is also reminiscent of antebellum formulations of rights;
see Chap. I.
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Local Governance
Unlike the "liberal" state, whose citizens were always
looking over their shoulders, fearful of intrusion, the
benevolent maternal state which "touches the personal life"
of its constituency, presented little threat to its
constituents.

Although they drew on antebellum feminism,

the evangelical feminists of the later nineteenth century
differed in their enthusiastic recourse to the state,
reminiscent of the theocratic Christian nationalism George
Frederickson finds in male thinkers of the war and postwar
period.50 Their growing fidelity to the institution of
government was only possible, though, because temperance
women saw government as the most effective means of
administering protective measures.
More importantly, the state was not a separate or alien
being, not the public realm to any private: in common form
it was simply the largest of the concentric circles moving
outward from the heart, or "the great, kind, farsighted
human family as a corporate firm of We, Us, and Co .

S0George M. Frederickson, The Inner Civil War: Northern
Intellectuals and the Crisis of the Union (New York, 1968),
chapter 9.
“Frances E. Willard, "Address . . . (to the) Woman's
National Council of the United States at Its First Triennial
Meeting ... 1891" (Indianapolis, 1891), p. 20.
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Edward Bellamy's utopian novel "Looking Backward" came
out in 1887, and by late that year Frances Willard was
corresponding with Bellamy, and an enthusiastic supporter of
the Nationalism Movement touched off by his tract.

Bellamy

seems to have brought to life many of the Union's dreams
with breathtaking sweep in his design of a benevolent state
which would step in to care for every aspect of its
citizens' lives, very like the maternal state envisioned by
temperance women.

A number of writers have pointed out the

contradictions, overlooked by Willard, between the
democratic, egalitarian bent of feminism, and potential for
anti-individualism in even a "benign" all-powerful state.”
Certainly Bellamy's state had much to offer women, whom
Leach rightly portrayed as less fearful of appealing to a
strong state than men.”
But to speak of "state" in the monolithic is deceptive
in a time when the functions of government were beginning to
differentiate into the complex organism of today's state.
Unlike Stanton and Matilda Gage, Willard and her followers
dreamily underestimated the malignant and coercive potential

“William Leach, "Looking Forward Together: Feminists
and Edward Bellamy," Democracy. January, 1982, pp. 120-134;
Bordin, Frances Willard, pp. 145 ff.
“Leach, "Looking Forward," p. 129.
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of the strong state, in part a result of the religious lens
through which they saw state power.

But their creed also

mandated a level of grass-roots power and activity in the
WCTU's theory and practice, both which compromised the
growing power of the centralized, monolithic state in this
period.

While contributing to a theory of the strong state,

they also helped create a counter ethic of local action,
incongruous with centralization.
The idea of a single great state was irresistible to
temperance women.

Their corporatism and socialism were

Christian corporatism and socialism, and despite other
progressives' secular language the advent of a perfectly
caring and moral government represented for them the coming
of the Kingdom of God, and the establishment of the kind of
Christian state which they knew would prevail after the
millennium.5* Evangelical women did not fear government,
in part because the omnipotent state was God in some real
way.

In this light, no groups needed to fear discrimination

or coercion; denominations, political parties, race, gender,
and all other artificial barriers— results of "destructive
criticism of the incomplete masculine mind"— would be

5<Ida Treatault Miller, "Frances E. Willard: Religious
Leader and Social Reformer," (Ph.D. thesis, Boston
University, 1978); on millennialism see especially pp. 177
ff.
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brought down.”

Late-nineteenth-century liberals and

evangelicals engaged each other in an intense struggle over
the nature of governance in a post-Calvinist world.
Evangelicals for their part pushed a theocratic vision of a
strong Christian state; to be suspicious of such power would
be to scrutinize God.
But in the meantime, while working toward the
millennium, a strong current of localism ran in the Union.
The Gilded Age mania for association into clubs and leagues,
fraternities and'orders, unions and granges, and other types
of nationally organized societies had its counterpoint in
the continual breakdown of these organizations into groups
that were smaller, purer, more narrowly defined.

The WCTU

brilliantly institutionalized the tension between national
and local within its own structure by organizing Unions at
local, county, state, and national levels.

Each larger unit

encompassed the smaller in its jurisdiction, but neither was
preeminent; "the organization ... is a system of links,
every part of which is essential to the makeup of the whole
since if one link is missing the chain is broken and

“Willard, "Address ... at the First Triennial
Meeting... 1891," p. 34; see also Union Signal, vol. 4 no. 7
(15 Feb. 1883), p. 11.
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rendered incapable of doing full service."5* Local and
state meetings could rely on the national as much or as
little as they chose, but had full autonomy at their own
levels to accept or reject national positions.57
Just as no individual was without significance in the
Christian scheme, individual effort was paramount to the
Union's philosophy.

Such an emphasis might seem to

contradict the anti-individualism of the evangelical's
outlook, but it did not.

Although each individual woman had

to put forth her best work both for herself and for the
success of the initiative, victory was gained, never through
the efforts of an individual, but only through the combined
work of the group.

Temperance women often described

themselves as worker bees in "the great hive of true and
loving Christian women," or spiders spinning huge, complex
silken webs.

As one WCTU member busily transforming the

world exclaimed, "Why I feel just like a ray of light
through a prism!"51

5<WCTU Handbook (2nd ed., Chicago, 1890), p. 8.
57In the southern states, for example, few Unions
endorsed suffrage, labor issues, or the more adventurous
social outreach work.
s,Ann Elmore, A Mother's Story (Newark, N.J., 1879), p.
2; Granite State Outlook, vol. 1 no. 9 (Sept., 1891), p. 4;
Willard, Do Everything, p. 77.
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Such images are coy, and may reveal a lack of
confidence in women's ability to change their political
environment.

But Willard and others were stressing

interdependence and group skills.

In direct opposition to

Stanton's sense of the uniqueness and irreplaceability of
the individual, here no individual was omnicompetent, and
all were expendable: if one left, more would rush in to fill
the vacancy.39 But the pride of the movement was in each
giving from their own store of power, and at least in theory
the speech writer at the temperance gathering and the Irish
serving girl who stood in the rain to prop her mistress gave
equal shares.90 This theory of contribution was exactly the
strength of the early mission movement, or "mite societies"
among women; the idea that many humble donations could spark
a mighty work helped mobilize the energies and loyalties of
a wide range of women.91
By this accretion theory, progress is made "a stitch at
a time, a prayer at a time, a sacrifice here and a supreme

59Frances Willard, "Address Before the 2nd Biennial
Convention," p. 29.
90Willard, Woman and Temperance, p. 143..
91Patricia Hill, The World Their Household: The
American Woman's Foreign Mission Movement and Cultural
Transformation. 1870-1920 (Ann Arbor, 1985).
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effort there ..."**

This "holy call of individual

responsibility and systematically united effort" was the key
to political success; when women and workmen each combined,
Frances Willard suggested, "the war-dragon shall be slain,
the poverty viper shall be exterminated, the gold bug
transfixed by a silver pin ... and the last white slave
liberated from the woods of Wisconsin."*3 A no-license
vote, too, on closer viewing turned out a pointillist "snow
storm of pure Christian prohibition ballots."**

The outcome

in some way depended on each ballot as much as on the
combined power.

Each Christian was equally bound to

participate personally, to give of themselves in some form;
under Christian government the idea of delegated
responsibility could not be squared with individual
conscience.*5
The metaphor of the chain, the web, the wire which
connected the dots and gave them power was one of the most
commonly used by temperance women, and one critical to their

“Stevenson, Brief History, p. 112.
“Willard, Do Everything, p. 29; Willard, "Address ...
at Its First Triennial Meeting ... 1891", pp. 3-4.
“Willard, Werner's Recitations, p. 38.
“W.C.T.U., Plan of Work, p. 1.
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political theory.”

For evangelical Christians the moral

(i.e./ political) world was deeply responsive, a moral
ecosystem balanced as delicately as we now know our ecology
to be; any minor act or omission could cause unlooked-for
changes many links down the chain.

No part of the system

could thus be insulated, neither public nor private; again
in the concentric model, ever-widening rings of influence
agitated and effective "to the remotest bound" of the
outside circle.*7 One end of a chain of influence was
tethered by the humblest citizen, the other held in the hand
of God; for "society and government are but the connecting
wires of God's great telegraphic system along which he sends
shocks of power from His own heart."**
Such a political model— the WCTU's in both practice and
theory— repudiated any centralized state in which God is not
yet fully realized.

The Union's emphasis on the importance

of individual action, the personal obligation of each to
each other, created an opening for a genuinely participatory
politics.

Many Union women understood maternal government

**Again, note the similarity to antebellum language in
Chap. I.
*7Stebbins, Fifty Years History, p. 183; Stevenson,
Brief History, p. 99.
“Willard, Do Everything, p. 147.
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as a loving, hands-on operation; their message to drunkards
was "you take the pledge, we'll take it too; you wear the
badge of ribbon, blue or red, we'll wear it too ..."“
The moving force here is not bold legislative strokes,
nor presidential decrees from on high, but local action,
accretion, stitches, steps.

Evangelical feminists did not

distinguish between the coming of righteous government and
the coming of the Kingdom of God on Earth.

And both, in

their brand of pre-millennialism were achieved in the same
way, "not suddenly, but little by little, imperceptibly,11 an
accretion of pure habit and good deeds.'0 Like raising a
child, raising a society was not done by edict, but was an
ongoing evolutionary process furthered by "faith and courage
and hope all the time, and God overhead," and it was fully
participatory.11

“Willard, Woman and Temperance, p. 177. In another
place Willard recounts the thrill she had with her first
experience of being hungry and without money, and how she
walked the streets addressing herself in her mind to the
poor, "I am a better friend than you dream; I know more
about you than you think, for...I am hungry, too" (Glimpses,
p. 344). In practice, of course, "participation" often ended
up functioning rather undemocratically.
10willard, "Address ... at Its First Triennial Meeting
... 1891," p. 35.
71Stevenson, Brief History, p. 112.
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Anti-Legalism
In addition to the mandate for personal participation
at all levels, the WCTU's broad, branching agenda included
yet another safeguard against electoral politics' growing
monopoly.

The WCTU departed sharply from antebellum

evangelical precedent in their love affair with regulatory
legislation.

Male and female temperance groups alike were

infatuated with the heady sense of power, the instant
results, which a sweeping prohibition amendment or statute
could bring.

But female reformers were ambivalent as well

about the prospects of the electoral and legislative
spheres, standing as they did with one foot in and one foot
out.

Their optimism was tempered by their sense of betrayal

by the political system, and its corruption.

After all, the

kingdom of electoral politics had not yet arrived for women;
their place in the legislative process was tenuous at best.
Temperance women understood from bitter experience that
the potential for good implicit in the lawmakers' power was
undercut by high numbers of drunken and dishonest
congressmen, governors, judges, and state legislators whose
treacherous double-dealing defeated so many reform
initiatives.

They felt a strong sense of betrayal by such

male "allies;" losing faith in men, one woman wrote, left
only God and woman to redeem society, since legislative
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halls themselves turned out to be the font of the "seething,
foaming tide of beer and whiskey."
fairer battleground:

The court room proved no

some of Satan's "most efficient

agents" were covered in "judicial ermine."72 Lawyers
"experienced in technicalities of law, guileful in device"
also confounded courtroom justice with tactics like
dismissing all temperance sympathizers from the jury panel
in a prosecution for illegal sale of liquor, forcing the
sheriff to complete the panel "a tales" with "drinking
men."73
The evangelical temperance movement was in large part a
movement of people untrained and unimpressed by the
complexities of the common law, and reluctant to let legal
process hinder a "just" result or provide a cloak of
respectability for wrongdoing.

As one Josiah Allen's wife

asked, if a serpent is writhing through your town eating
people, "Do you suppose they would rent out that serpent at
so much a year to crunch and swaller folks accordin' to law?
And would it be any easier for folks that was crunched and

72See inter alia Union Signal, vol. 4 no. 5 (1 Dec.
1883), p. 1; vol. 4 no. 9 {1 March 1883), p. 1; Willard,
Woman and Temperance, pp. 70 ff., 350, 379; Julia Ames,
Platform Voices: Choice Temperance Recitations for Old and
Young (Chicago, 1887), p. 26.
73Willard, Woman and Temperance, p. 263.
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swallered, and for surviving' friends of the same, if they
was killed by an act of Congress?"74 Mrs. Allen's folksy
tone conveys the conviction that law in its complexity was
itself a serpent in the garden. WCTU women often and
fluently expressed their disgust with the strategems and
devices of lawyers and theologians as a way of envisioning a
world where anger, corruption, and self interest disguised
as professional canons did not succeed.
Temperance women renounced the "legal striving" in
order to find a "simple way," a route which required "entire
surrender and perfect trust in God."75 Electoral politics
was only capable of redemption to the extent that that
process became simplified and purified, in the "good time
coming" when "methods, useful in themselves but hitherto
secular, shall be informed by the spirit which giveth life."
In a fictitious debate over the moral nature of
parliamentary procedure, Mrs. Plymouth Rock rhapsodized
about an "election, so simple and unpremeditated,
nominations all made in open meeting, and hymns, tears, and
prayers coming in as freely as if no 'red tape' existed to

7<Ames, Platform Voices, p. 26.
75Willard, Woman and Temperance, p. 203 (quoting a
letter from Hannah Whitall Smith.)
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besmirch the world."16 Willard found a local Arkansas law
"superb" which allowed "No 'remonstrance' or counter
petition ... the simple question "Do we want dram-shops?' is
answered by the signatures of men and women and that settles
the matter— not for a year only, but 'once for ail.'"

Only

with such transparent and simple procedures can "conviction
... be correlated with law. "71
Legal elaboration only allowed the possibility of
corruption, "politics" in its worst sense, to defeat the
pure will of the people, and provided a shield for
chicanery.

It was out of real frustration and apprehension

that their interests were not being attended to that
evangelical feminists expanded their precept "the letter
killeth, but the spirit giveth life" to cover politics as
well.
In fact, the WCTU's parallel rejections of formalism in
law and theology gave birth to a reinterpretation of the
relative roles of faith and works which was critical to
their political theory.

The Reformation had produced an

emphasis on faith which, despite the lightening spontaneity
and unpredictability of grace, became mired in theological

16Willard, Woman and Temperance, p. 141.
17Willard, Woman and Temperance, pp. 340-341.
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wrangling and disputation— a dry, loveless legalism.

By the

Gilded Age, the minister modelled on the austere, colonial
theologian had lost face.

Congregations demanded attention

be paid to "what the Pews Want from the Pulpit," not
preaching or instruction but an active example.

In the face

of overwhelming social dislocation, many Christians rejected
a "velvet-lined pew religion" in favor of "that Christianity
that treads the streets."7I
The WCTU fell in the same tradition as the economist
Richard Ely, whose views they often cited.

Ely explicitly

criticized the church since the Protestant Reformation for
ignoring the second of the two great commandments, "Thou
shalt love thy neighbor as thyself,"

a commandment which

Ely placed on a par with the first.79 Ely represented the
"applied Christianity" of the social gospel movement,
Christianity in the streets.

He suggested that the true

study of religion was sociology and not theology; man, he
believed, "'had been placed in this world to save it.'"*°
Re-enforcing temperance women's instinctive dislike of

70Lady Henry Somerset, Werner's Recitations, pp. 8687.
79Richard Ely, Social Aspects of Christianity (New
York, 1889), p. 1.
,0Ely, Social Aspects, p. 72.
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hair-splitting theology, Ely openly substituted a standard
of works for one of faith.

In this light, the Christian

social movement, of which the WCTU formed a part, can be
seen as a counter-reformation of sorts— a conscious attempt
to shift Christian thought away from legal questions of
personal salvation and the nature of God, and to focus
instead on worldly obligations to neighbors.

Regulatory Bureaucracy
The shift to a spiritual emphasis on works clearly
reverberated in the political sphere.

Temperance women had

an ambivalent relation with law and faith, but they lauded
the "faith which turns as readily to works as steam to
water."

The rejection of formal theology turned women's

attention to work in the public sphere; and their rejection
of and exclusion from the legal culture turned them toward
less official networks of authority.

The two combined to

inspire temperance women all over the country to participate
in creating and staffing a nascent bureaucracy designed to
allow women to re-establish traditional networks of power at
more official levels, while circumventing the unreliable
political arena.
Women were not excluded from social programs at local
levels by any civil barrier; they could conceive, implement,
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direct, and staff them.

WCTU-affiliated women in many towns

took advantage of this to turn their formidable organizing
talents toward the state.

Although such work— largely

centered around health, welfare, and education— had fallen
within the restricted scope of women's charitable
activities, WCTU workers did not classify their works as
private action, but rather as alternative public action.
In fact, Willard and others pictured themselves as
establishing through their organization and programs a whole
separate government, so that
we should thus have within National
Government, as carried on by men, a republic
of women, duly organized and officered ...
and tending toward such mutual fellowship
among women ... as should establish
solidarity of sentiment and purpose
throughout the Nation of woman Workers, (and)
put a premium upon organized as against
isolated efforts for human betterment.'1
One power of this republic of women lay in the
combination of "the two great principles of co-operation and
personal effort, in order that Christian public opinion
concerning the political or moral welfare of Town, City,
State, or Nation, may quickly and emphatically be heard."
The WCTU fostered a network of organization and opinion
which encompassed like-minded groups nationwide who could

“Willard, "Address —
... 1891," pp. 5-6.

at the First Triennial Meeting
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band together to express public sentiment to legislative
bodies and combat "the evils existing at the caucus,
convention, and ballot box"— an effective alternative to
electoral politics.*2 One important tactic was to forge
alliances with other sympathetic voluntary associations
through communications networks, legislative alerts,
solicitation of common members, exchange of periodicals, and
simply contributing to others' causes— activity which
merited an entire department for "Presenting Our Causes to
Influential Bodies" to seek their cooperation in programs
and petition drives.”

In her address at the World's WCTU

meeting at the Columbian Exposition in 1893, Willard
described the coalition approach of the Fabian socialists,
and urged members to look for contacts in all other clubs
and organizations— an "extended concept of duties and
privileges.nM
This approach was so successful that the Woman's
National Council sought to replicate the WCTU's organization
by confederating locally organized woman's societies— clubs,

“ "Annual Leaflet of the National WCTU" (Chicago,
1902), p. 46.
” "Annual Leaflet," p. 3.
“Willard, "Address ... 2nd Biennial Convention ...
1893," p. 43.
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service societies, temperance organizations, and others—
and coordinating their work, the local confederation
functioning autonomously under similar state and national
confederations.

Such a system could more efficiently pursue

the "overthrow of all forms of ignorance and injustice,
(and) ...the application of the Golden Rule
custom,and law."85

to society,

In their initiatives the WCTU

cooperated with reform, health, medical, and teachers'
associations, and with groups of all descriptions.
In addition to co-opting voluntary associations, the
Union's strategy included gaining access for women to power
within local governing bodies.

If such positions did not

exist, they lobbied to create them.

Willard argued that

Locally, a woman's council should, in the
interest of that 'mothering' which is the
central idea of our new movement, seek to
secure for women admission to all school
committees, library associations, hospitals
and other institutional boards entrusted with
the care of the defective, dependent, and
delinquent classes; also to boards of
trustees in schools and colleges and all
professional and business associations.88

“Frances Willard, "The Political Future of
Prohibition," Our Day, vol. 3 (April, 1889), p. 172.
88Willard, "Address ... at the First Triennial Meeting
... 1891," p. 7. See also Willard, "Political Future of
Prohibition;" Willard, Do Everything, p. 128; Cobbe, Frances
Power, The Duties of Women (Boston, 1881), esp. chap. 6,
"Woman as a Citizen of the State"; and "Minutes of the
Monroe County WCTU" (New York, 1888), p. 27.
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Women seem to have had considerable success in this period
in gaining such seats, or in lobbying those who did.

Such

victories were often reported triumphantly in the Union
Signal,.
One of the WCTU's most effective initiatives, pursued
nationwide at state and local levels, was the drive to
introduce compulsory Scientific Temperance Instruction into
public school curricula.

In the course of this highly

successful campaign workers in the department of STI
mercilessly lobbied doctors' groups, teachers'
organizations, boards of health, school boards, and
legislative bodies at all levels.

When they could the Union

stacked boards with their own members, using their influence
in local affairs to gain appointments.

When they could not,

the Dept, of S.T.I. often formed its own boards of experts
from respected educators, clergy, and health care profes
sionals to produce and pass on the quality of material to be
used in public school instruction.

Their recommendations

were usually accorded great weight.
Under the meticulous planning and direction of Mary
Hunt, the Union gathered its contacts and experts into a
battering ram of "public opinion" which crushed opposition.
According to Mrs. Hunt, "It is not too much to say that the
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school boards of the country ... are in a state of siege at
the hands of mothers, urging that the schools shall utter
nature's solemn warning against the cup."17 The Union in
the 1890s had great success in persuading schools both at
state and local levels to include WCTU-approved temperance
materials as mandatory parts of public school curricula."
Such a wide mandate clearly moves well beyond the
concern for alcohol abuse which was the Union's founding
principle; in fact, it is hard to exclude any aspect of
civic governance from the Union's stated list of concerns.
The broad, perfectionist commitment to the community's
health and welfare translated into a mandate for inquiry and
reform of many state and local services— all under the broad
banner of "Prohibition."

One recitation, "Prohibition

Defined," included a verse lumping the baker selling bad
bread and the butcher selling bad meat with the saloon
keeper selling rum.

Halting such abuses, the Chorus reminds

us, is public spirited— "And this is prohibition."”

"Quoted in Stevenson, Brief History, p. 34.
"The materials from and on this department are
voluminous; the department itself published a series of
texts, tracts, and leaflets, many of which are preserved in
the WCTU microfilm series.
"Ames, Platform Voices, p. 75.
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Willard and others continued to reiterate the maternal basis
of public action.

In Occupations for Women, for example,

she stresses the importance of women's gaining municipal
government posts as "the work of salvation for other
mother's little children."90 But the type of power which
evangelical women were trying to appropriate for themselves
went well beyond the bonds of private charity or home care.
If laws were not being enforced, the WCTU was prepared to
mount its own commission of inquiry, packed with influential
citizens, male and female alike.

A private commission, for

example, was set up to investigate the liquor traffic in its
relation to a broad range of subjects from domestic violence
and the impoverishment of women to crime, unemployment, the
collection of municipal revenue, and lawmakers' potential to
profit from the liquor trade.91 Bypassing electoral
politics, this strategy effectively restored to women some
of the power lost in the breakdown of the traditional
community.

While this grass roots strategy did not put them

in the legislature, temperance women‘thought of themselves
as "the power behind the throne" in the battle for municipal

90Willard, Occupations for Women (New York, 1897), p.
360.
91Willard, "Address Before the Second Biennial
Convention...1893," p. 10.
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improvement.”
Sometimes women actually sat on the throne:

an article

entitled "Petticoat Rule" lauded the success of a woman
mayor and an all-female council elected in a Kansas town in
1889.

By this account the women managed to pass and enforce

a series of municipal ordinances improving morals and
services both, and although the local merchants became ' "a
trifle ugly" when the Sunday observance law was enforced for
the first time, the board enjoyed great popularity and
success.

One initiative seemed doomed when the city

attorney vetoed a ban on spitting tobacco juice on the
sidewalk (where it clung to trailing hems) as an
infringement on personal liberty.

But citing the power of

the moral community over statute, the councilwomen instead
made a personal appeal to every chewer to spit elsewhere,
and claimed that the cooperative approach proved even more
effective than an ordinance.”
In Delavan, Illinois, women who were not elected
officials nonetheless raised money from exhibitions and
concerts to build sidewalks.

As the (male) officials let

”Lucia Additon, Twenty Eventful Years of the Oregon
Women's Christian Temperance Union. 1880-1900. (Portland,
Or, 1904), p. 73.
”Reel 31, scrapbook 10, WCTU microfilm series.
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them fall into disrepair, women lamented
There are the sidewalks broken and worn,
And here is the Town Board all forlorn,
And there are the men who talk and talk,
Though once there were women who built a walk
In this town of Delavan.”
The women's exhibit at the Columbian Exposition of 1893
opened a futuristic perspective on the world of the maternal
state which evangelical feminists imagined.

The female

world of philanthropy and reform— "and in the last analysis
this includes church and state"— was to illustrate a
socialized haven of the future with nurseries, day care
centers, hospitals, cafes— every thing touching the "health,
holiness, and happiness of the home people."9* For Willard
and many others, this was a vision of a future that worked;
they expected each woman to "come away with the feeling that
God has given her a mighty work to do in the world.
Temperance women shared their program for better
governance with a broad range of male and female citizens
who considered themselves progressive and subscribed to what

“Willard, Woman and Temperance, p. 471.
95Willard, "Address ... at the First Triennial Meeting
... 1891," p. 30.
“William Cameron, The World's Fair (Chicago, 1893), p.
11. The women's exhibit included a detailed miniature model
of a Swedish leper colony, which Willard thought showed "the
sublime heights to which self-sacrifice can reach in caring
for the afflicted" (p. 462).
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the WCTU called "the maternal state” as the most enlightened
response to the problem of their day— the restructuring of
work and family relations around the tenets of industrial
capitalism.

But temperance women took a unique approach/

scattershot in seeking multiple avenues of influence.
Frances Willard called women, unlike men, "natural
branchers-out" who sought their goals through a variety of
methods.97 Certainly they worked vigorously in electoral
politics supporting candidates and initiatives, and they
sought the ballot in anticipation of the day when the
woman's vote could help establish their programs and reforms
by legislative fiat.

But they also strove consciously to

develop an alternative to electoral politics through a two
pronged scheme:

a national, loosely organized voluntary

network of groups which could exert influence as a block;
and an effort to create and fill posts at state and local
levels with members of these groups, in a broadly defined
area which included education, public health, and the
provision of municipal and relief services.
When the WCTU was formed, the American state was just
beginning to develop into the complex structure of today;
and certainly Frances Willard for all her prescience never

97Willard, "Frances E . Willard and Woman's Temperance
Work" (n.p., n.d.), p. 14.
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envisioned our national bureaucracy.

But temperance women's

efforts were channeled into the creation of agencies and
departments below the national level, and in attributing to
government through those departments obligations to the
welfare of the general citizenry, in a way which helped set
the stage for the later assumption of these obligations by a
national bureaucracy.

Although they never laid out a formal

proposal or theory, WCTU women fully understood that they
were creating an alternative type of politics, one over
which they had more control and through which they could
more effectively implement their own agenda.

To some

extent, Willard's vision of a "republic of women" within a
national government was fulfilled in the next several
decades, as women connected to the settlement house movement
and related reforms continued the drive to create local
bureaucracies through which to administer public welfare
programs, culminating in the influence of women in the
administrative bureaucracies of the New Deal.”

#aA great deal of work is currently being done, most of
it unpublished as yet, on women's role in the growth of
administrative agencies in the Progressive era and up to the
Second World War. Linda Gordon and Kathryn Kish Sklar are
both working on books in this field, as are a number of
other scholars.
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Conclusion
Two uneasy components lurk under our label "liberal"
today: a commitment to individual rights and liberties, and
another to the welfare state.

The antebellum feminist

vision smoothed over this rift by linking rights designed
for the growth of the individual to her duties and
responsibilities to others; family, friends, and neighbors.
Within later nineteenth-century feminism, however, these two
elements were openly unreconciled, and bitterly at odds.
The tension between oneself and another, foreshadowed in the
writings of Elizabeth Cady Stanton, emerged after the Civil
War to split the American woman's movement into two
competing camps.
NWSA feminists, who organized in 1869, shed much of
their religious imagery, along with the radical
perfectionist demands for widespread reforms touching all
aspects of personal and social life.

They adopted instead a

more traditional constitutionalism.

More responsive and

knowledgeable than evangelical feminists about the political
process, they focused increasingly on civil rights, their
political aspirations developing reciprocally with the
government's ability to administer equal protection
standards.

The NWSA program was expressed most commonly in
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a plea for suffrage; as reformers steeped in the
abolitionist tradition the group was disposed toward
constitutional remedies,

and the process of frising women's

claims into the existing structure of civil rights narrowed
the NWSA platform.

But liberal feminism remained fiercely

committed to personal autonomy, and hypersensitive to bonds
or obligations, physical or legal; and the demand to rectify
women's sexual standing remained an important secondary
platform.1 Those concerns— as well as the plea for suffrage
itself— came out of a tradition forged in abolitionism,
familiar to liberal feminists, of the emancipated body— a
powerful political paradigm because it combined the equality
claim of revolutionary thought with liberal feminism's
desire for bodily autonomy.
The WCTU by contrast rejected the liberal emphasis on
autonomy as socially harmful, and forged instead a theory of
the state which privileged the rights of the community over
those of the individual.

Using principles of "organized

mother-love” the WCTU pushed to create a "maternal state"
designed to administer the needs and not just the civil
rights of its constituents.

The resurgence of evangelical

bodily autonomy always remained first with Stanton,
and on several occasions in her later year3 she criticized
the movement for its focus on suffrage to the exculsion of
other more fundamental issues.
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thought in the later nineteenth century complicated the
scheme of individual rights in the constitutional path laid
down during Reconstruction, addressing not the "equality”
problem of admission to

citizenship status or the granting

of civil rights, but the thornier problem of how to deal
with obvious inequality with its source in the "private"
rather than the civil realm, a problem of class which
individual rights language could not accommodate.
Evangelical feminists had recourse to many of the ideas of
the antebellum woman suffrage movement, but differed
substantially from them in a way that would ultimately lead
them down a very different path, in hypothesizing a powerful
state that could juggle and enforce the rights of groups.
These two views were based on very different
conceptions of the body and its place in the public and
private realm.

As epitomized in Stanton's work, the liberal

view— an outgrowth of the peculiar American conjuncture of
abolitionism and the struggle against religious orthodoxy
which resulted in liberal Protestantism— saw the body as an
isolated and autonomous entity, a free agent in the world; a
view which with some tailoring could

be fit into the civil

rights model of constitutional activism.
Evangelicals based their political philosophy on the
idea of maternalism, or the connected body.

Their
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interpretation of scripture did not stress growth and self
development as did liberal Protestantism, but the more
traditional Christian doctrines of the atonement, the
passion, the parental quality of God.

Christ had come to

the world for self-sacrifice, not self development; within
evangelical religion he himself presented a maternal image
in his willingness to touch, heal, and physically love even
the unlovable.

Liberals stressed corporeal integrity in the

instant; for evangelicals, corporeal integrity could only be
established over time, through the accretion and discharge
of ties and obligations to others.
Within organized feminism these differences expressed
themselves most violently in the late part of the century
over issues of church and state.

In the 1890s in

particular, the newly united suffrage organization under the
banner of the National American Woman Suffrage Association
(NAWSA), brought together the liberal NWSA with the more
conservative AWSA, with its close ties to evangelical
feminists.

Some of the issues debated most violently at

those meetings were whether feminists should intervene
either for or against the Sunday closing of the proposed
Columbian Exposition; what the relationship was between
organized religion and the suffrage movement; and the debate
over Stanton's project to rewrite the Bible, which was
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finally repudiated in a resolution of the NAWSA after a
bitter fight.
Again, the root question was one of moral regulation—
mother or not mother— of individual behavior.

The WCTU had

consistently used its clout to support evangelical
coalitions round the country who were sponsoring legislation
imposing curfews, censorship, school prayer and Bible
reading, as well as prohibition.

This vision of a morally

regulated world met violent opposition from feminist
advocates like Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Matilda Joslyn
Gage, who saw Protestant orthodoxy as the greatest enemy of
woman's emancipation.

Stanton, Gage, and others saw in the

evangelical reformers' campaign an attempt to alter the
established constitutional separation of church and state,
imposing the moral imperative of a minority on an
increasingly diverse society by legislative fiat.

Stanton

understood the struggle to contain the power of the
Protestant Church over civic life to be as critical a
condition of woman's freedom as the struggle against
patriarchy: in fact they were one, and Stanton was not
betraying her own priorities when she said that "much as I
desire the suffrage, I would rather never vote than to see
the policy of our government at the mercy of the religious
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bigotry of such women."2
In fact, there was real basis for Stanton's fears.
Because of the declining importance of theology, and
therefore of the dogmatic schisms which divided Protestant
denominations at the beginning of the century, the
possibility of a stronger Protestant union than ever before
made the prospect of a "Christian state" more real a threat
than in the past.

With Protestant denominations no longer

balancing each other's powers,

many denominations made

common cause to attack a common enemy, and openly sought to
enhance the power of Christian moral governance within the
state.

This was the political and religious context in

which the woman's movement split in the second half of the
nineteenth century.3

2Quoted in Ellen DuBois, Feminism and Suffrage: the
Emergence of an Independent Woman's Movement in America.
1848-1869 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1978).
3One problem which looms large for explaining rifts in
nineteenth-century feminism using a church-state analysis is
that the history of contemporary or second wave feminism
falls out very much like the first, with a liberal, civil
rights-oriented movement growing out of a civil rights
movement of black Americans and later challenged by a
revisionist feminism based on a difference rather than an
equality analysis. This pattern developed in second wave
feminism without any appreciable help from the churches or
from a spiritual analysis (those schools certainly exist but
have not been central to revisionist feminism); and I am
certainly not willing to push for some kind of persistence
of nineteenth-century patterns without further thought. But
the split within feminism in the nineteenth century was not
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In the early twentieth century, the Woman's National
Committee of the Socialist Party put out two pamphlets, one
entitled "Elizabeth Cady Stanton on Socialism" and the other
entitled "Frances E. Willard on Socialism."4 In these
pamphlets, from speeches published sometime in the 1890s,
both women agree that after 50 years of suffrage it is time
to lay new groundwork: "Agitation of a broader Philosophical
socialism is now in order," and competition must give way to
cooperation; that the want of the working classes is the
critical question of the time.

Even, Stanton says, if most

women's reforms--suffrage, temperance, purity— were
achieved, they would make no change in the condition of the
masses.
Little remains for either Stanton or Willard to
document their immersion in socialist principles, which for
both women took place very close to the end of their lives.
The twin movements of temperance and suffrage which they had
animated had moved on, in tandem, toward securing a national

parthenomitosis, but was contained within a broader American
poltical culture which could not deal adequately with the
problem of individualism, either; a condition in the
political culture which still exists today and has
presumably had some effect on the feminist movement working
within it.
4"Elizabeth Cady Stanton on Socialism" (Chicago, n.d.);
"Frances E. Willard on Socialism" (Chicago, n.d.); Rare Book
Room in the Library of Congress.
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amendment for woman suffrage.

Stanton and Willard had each

moved on, too; had either woman lived much longer, it seems
possible that she would have further severed her ties with
her own organization and cast her lot with socialism.
For both women, the change came about after extended
stays in Europe, particularly England, where both were
introduced to Fabian socialism. For both it was a revelation
of sorts, a release from the organizational mandates of
temperance and suffrage; from platforms limited and shaped
by political considerations; and from the recalcitrance of
the rank and file they had been fighting for so long.
Fabian socialism combined a hospitality to the individual
with a class-based analysis in a way that sparked both
women, and enabled each to transcend the limitations of her
own political world view.

Stanton's dualism, born of the

peculiar American strain between slave and free, rigid
Calvimism and liberal Protestantism, blurred a little; and
she relaxed her fierce individualism enough to begin to
consider the interests of people in groups.

Willard too,

away from the American evangelical ethic of harmony between
all people, turned to the problems of labor with a new eye
for the realities of class conflict.

The dilemma of

nineteenth-century American feminists was very much a
product of its time; on the Grand Tour with Stanton and
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Willard it took on a new life of its own.
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